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The Reference Point Effect, 
M&A Misvaluations and Merger Decisions 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the reference point effect on M&As. Prospect theory proposes that the 
reference dependence bias is firmly rooted in people’s minds, affirming that people rely heavily 
on a piece of relevant information while making decisions. This thesis applies this reference 
point to M&As, showing that M&A participants are subject to reference-dependence bias. The 
reference point theory explains the M&A motives in a new way. The results of this thesis offer 
important implications to M&A practitioners.      
 
Baker et al. (2012) suggest that the target’s reference price enhances the target’s bargaining 
power in the U.S. market, inspiring the author’s thinking that the reference point effect is likely 
to be reinforced in a competitive market and in the scenario where the bidder is in the face of 
considerable information barriers. In this pursuit, Chapter 3 studies the reference point effect 
on a sample of public acquisitions involving a U.K. target. Using the target 52-week high as 
the reference price, a positive relationship emerges between the reference price and the offer 
premium. Further, there is evidence of overpayment among domestic bidders whereas little 
evidence among cross-border bidders, indicating that the market acquiesces the payment 
according to the target reference point among cross-border bidders. Evidence that reference- 
dependence bias serves as the bargaining power is confirmed outside the United States.  
 
However, the real M&A motive of the bidder is unlikely to be revealed solely depending on 
the target reference point. Therefore, Chapter 4 extends Baker et al.’s paper (2012) by adding 
both the target and the bidder reference points. A Relative Reference Point (RRP) is proposed 
for M&A misvaluations as per Shleifer and Vishny (2003), indicating the extent to which the 
bidder is more overvalued relatively to the target. The joint reference point effects can explain 
the motivation of why bidders paying high offer premiums. The results obtained in this chapter 
show that bidders are likely to pay with stocks when RRP increases, suggesting that bidders 
accelerating the process of overvaluation dilution is a sign of bidder overvaluation. In addition, 
the offer premium increases with the RRP, indicating the motive of diluting overvaluation is to 
be seen by the target, leading targets to bargain over high offer premiums. When assessing the 
long-term performance of stock bidders, it became evident that bidders time the market by 
paying stocks according to the RRP.   
 
A direct implication of prospect theory is that people seek risk in the face of loss gauged by a 
reference point. Chapter 5 proposes the bidder reference point to assess the market anticipation 
effect. Investors suffer mental loss when their firm’s current performance is significantly below 
its best recently achieved performance. They anticipate that the firm will take risks to turn the 
table round. It was evident that the firm is rewarded with positive market reactions when it 
takes risks according to the market’s anticipation. In a further analysis, it also emerged that 
managers taking the market-anticipated risks exhibit greater efforts in the processes of M&A 
negotiation and post-merger integration, reflected in the low offer premiums paid to the target 
shareholders and positive long-term abnormal returns earned.       
 
This thesis has empirically investigated many implications of the reference point effect in the 
M&A context. The main aim of this thesis is to simplify M&A decisions for managers in order 
to structure M&A effectively.    
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“We're blind to our blindness. We have very little idea of how little we know. We're not 
designed to know how little we know.” 
 
Daniel Kahneman 
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
2 
 
The central purpose of this thesis is to examine the reference point effect on the causes and 
consequences of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). In Collins’ English Dictionary: the 
reference point is ‘a fact forming the basis of evaluation or assessment’. The notion of the 
reference point was first noted in the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and developed 
as an important implication of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979). Prospect 
theory is a descriptive theory depicting how individuals make decisions under risks. A series 
of implications were built in relation to the reference point, a specific point that gauges people’s 
mental feelings about gains and losses. Prospect theory suggests that people have a strong loss- 
aversion tendency relative to a reference point, suggesting that people are unwilling to suffer 
losses and thus seeking many risks when experiencing loss, while, on the other hand, they avoid 
taking too many risks when enjoying gain. Feelings about the loss are more intense than those 
relating to gain, and feelings tend to be stronger nearer the reference point than further away 
from it in both the loss and the gain domains.  
 
M&As serve as an ideal testing ground for prospect theory for four proposed reasons. First, 
M&As are major corporate investment activities associated with large risks. Prospect theory 
addresses how managers make decisions in consideration of uncertainty, which is a suitable 
theory to explain the M&A motive. M&As decisions are complex as they normally involve a 
negotiation process that requires superior skills and considerable efforts by bidder managers 
who are committed to completing the M&A deal to create the wealth for shareholders. It 
remains largely unexplored how much a bidder manager should pay for the target. Valuing 
targets is a very subjective task since it rests upon a large number of assumptions that make the 
decision-making process hard to be observed by outsiders. In such a case, the reference point 
price, a relevant piece of information, is likely to be employed to assess M&A motive.  
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Secondly, whilst existent behaviour finance theories have explained M&A motives on a basis 
of deal synergies, the hubris management hypothesis (Roll, 1986; Hayward and Hambrick, 
1997), managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008), self-attribution bias 
(Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) and the misvaluation hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Dong et al., 2006), prospect theory explains the M&A motive from a perspective of managerial 
decision-making process. This theory explains decision-making from a human’s nature 
response, without making any assumptions regarding whether the market or the managers are 
rational during the course of the transaction. Given that the outcome of major investment 
decisions significantly affects the interests of stakeholders, the reference point price, as it is 
easily obtained, is likely to be considered by the managers. The reference point theory of 
M&As thus allows the researcher to observe how the reference-dependence bias affects 
managerial major corporate investment decisions, such as initiating an M&A deal or valuing 
the target.  
 
Thirdly, whilst traditional theories explain the M&A motive from the perspective of the bidder, 
reference point thinking could help the researcher to explain M&A motives from the 
perspectives of the two firms involved in an M&A deal (i.e. the two firms involved). Because 
the agreement of an M&A deal cannot be reached without the consent of the two firms involved, 
bidders should consider the willingness for deal acceptance on the target side while making 
M&A decisions. The reference point used in this thesis is an item of price information that 
reflects the market’s perspective on a firm’s prospects. Managers who make major decisions 
should also be concerned about the market’s reactions. Therefore, focusing on the reference 
point effect enables a big picture on how investment strategy is formulated and how it is 
structured from the perspectives of major participants in M&As. This thesis examines role of 
the reference point effect played on various central aspects of M&As, including offer premiums, 
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the method of payment and managerial risk-taking attitude, which significantly affect M&A 
outcomes.  
 
Finally, M&As offer the researcher many considerations on how the reference point effect is 
reinforced. One possible explanation for people looking at a salient piece of information is 
because there exists considerable uncertainty about the information, making the true situation 
less likely to be accurately observed. This raises the concern as to whether the reference point 
effect is significant in the setting where the level of information asymmetry is high according 
to the information asymmetry hypothesis. Addressing this concern, the reference point theory 
of M&As was made use of in a sample consisting of both cross-border and domestic bidders’ 
acquisitions of a U.K. target. It was expected that the reference point effect would be stronger 
for cross-border bidders than domestic bidders based on the rationale that domestic bidders, 
with sophisticated networking, are more advantageous in gathering information than cross-
border bidders. A common intuition suggests that managers are skilful and have private 
information about their firms, and have better understanding than the market in terms of the 
deal. Thus, it is expected that managers (i.e. more experienced investors) should be less likely 
to be influenced by a single number, such as a reference point price, instead, they tend to take 
other relevant factors into consideration, whilst the market (i.e. less experienced investors) 
tends to put greater emphasis on the reference point due to limited information and limited time 
in which to process the deal. If this is the case, the reference point effect should have little 
impact on managers’ decision-making process. However, it may not be the case, as managers 
who work for the best interests of the shareholders should provide rationale to shareholders as 
to why they initiate an M&A deal and how it is valued, implying that the reference point is 
used as an important decision-making tool for shareholders to judge M&A performance. This 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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thesis integrating prospect theory into the M&A testing ground gives the researcher better 
knowledge on how different M&A stakeholders understand M&A motives. 
  
Neoclassical M&A theory suggests that managers are rational and thus add the value to the 
firm through M&As (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). According to Jensen (1988), M&As are a 
process of allocating and integrating resources of a firm so as to maximise the firm’s value. 
His view is well supported by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Hodgkinson and 
Partington (2008) who found synergies gains an essential motive for M&As, dominating over 
other proposed M&A motives, such as hubris and agency problems. Despite this, it is a well-
documented fact that bidders do not gain in either the short or the long run, whilst targets gain 
in M&As (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The fundamental reason for bidder’s underperformance 
is overpayment, which is the offer price paid to the target shareholders largely is greater than 
the expected synergies gains following a merger. Bidder shareholders may find the firm has 
difficulty generating synergies if high offer premiums are offered to the target shareholders, 
since they are directly observed by the market, leading to negative market reactions once the 
bid is announced.   
 
One thread in relevant literature contributes the concept of overpayment to the agency conflicts 
of interests between managers and shareholders, which arise when managers seize the 
opportunity to acquire firms to pursue their own benefits at the expenses of their shareholders. 
As a result, bidder managers tend to pay excessively for targets. Jensen (1986) studied the 
performance of a bidder with large free cash flow and found that managers tend to engage in 
ill-conceived investment projects. In a similar vein, Morck et al. (1990) find managers fail to 
maximise the value of the firm, as they tend to engage in value-destroying deals for the 
purposes of risk reduction and job security. Fu et al. (2013) found that severe agency problems 
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lead to the firm’s underperformance in the long term. All of these studies indicate that 
managerial overpayment destroys the value of a firm.   
 
Another thread in relevant literature concerns overpayment to behavioural finance explanations. 
Roll (1986) was the first to develop the hubris management hypothesis that managers tend to 
overestimate the synergies gains to be generated by M&As and accordingly overpay for the 
target. In this line of thinking, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found the self-importance of top 
managers leads to overpayment. Malmendier and Tate (2008) found overconfidence in 
managers having a strong preference for their firm’s stocks tends to lead to the completion of 
more acquisitions associated with negative market reactions. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
contribute such managerial overconfidence to market-to-book value (MTBV), showing that 
high MTBV firms tend to be associated with strong stock price momentum due to better 
historical performance, thus being overvalued. The positive market reaction therefore 
reinforces the managerial illusion of control1, leading to excessive unnecessary acquisitions. 
Moeller et al. (2004) ascribe managerial confidence to firm size, suggesting that larger firms 
are associated with worse performance than that of smaller firms, reasoning that managers of 
larger firms tend to have fewer restrictions on a firm’s resources and such power of autonomy 
arguments managerial overconfidence.  
 
Prospect theory offers many additional considerations for overpayment distinct from those in 
behaviour finance theories. Given limited time and limited information in which to process the 
deal, bidders and targets tend to employ a relevant piece of price information for decision-
making. Following studies that link corporate investment decisions and the firm’s reference 
point price (Heath et al., 1999, George and Hwang, 2004, Huddart et al., 2009, Burghof and 
                                                          
1 The tendency that people overestimate their ability to control events.  
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Prothmann, 2011, Baker et al., 2012), the firm’s 52-week highs were employed as reference 
points in this thesis, as they are frequently reported by financial media and more likely to create 
a deep impression in the investors’ minds. Targets may presumably believe that a price relative 
to their 52-week high is a fair price as it reflects their best performance. According to prospect 
theory, people have a strong loss-aversion tendency. If losing the control of the firm is 
perceived as a mental loss for the target shareholders, an offer price that is closer to the 
reference point is more likely to compensate the feelings of such a loss, making the deal more 
acceptable. On the other hand, targets encouraged to use its 52-week high to negotiate a decent 
offer price with the bidder, as target shareholders believe the firm may well create value without 
it being acquired. Edward and Walkling (1985) regard offer premiums as the outcome of the 
bargaining process between the bidder and target managements, suggesting that bidders in a 
relatively weak position tend to pay high offer premiums, leading lower abnormal returns, 
while targets in a relative strong position can demand high offer premiums being translated 
into larger positive abnormal returns. Therefore, the use of the reference point reinforces the 
target’s bargaining power in exchange for high M&A offer premiums. 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis examines the role of reference point effect in the U.K. market. The idea 
of Baker et al. (2012), who examined the role of the target 52-week high effect on the U.S. 
market, was put forward to the U.K. market. Unlike Baker et al. (2012), a sample containing 
both the domestic and cross-border bidders were taken into consideration in the United 
Kingdom. The reference point effect was expected to have a substantial impact on cross-border 
M&As into the U.K. for three proposed reasons. First, U.K. targets may find it easier to use 
their 52-week high to negotiate with the bidder given that targets are in the most competitive 
market where their bargaining power is more easily to be reinforced and thus being translated 
into higher offer premiums (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Alexandridis et al., 2010). 
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Second, U.K. firms have a relatively strong corporate governance system where target 
managers are expected to be more likely to serve the best interests of their shareholders. In that 
case, target managers tend to use their 52-week high to seek higher offer premiums, which 
reconcile the view of their shareholders. Finally, it is expected a stronger tendency for cross-
border bidders than domestic bidders in terms of looking at the target 52-week high as a 
reference point given that there is greater information uncertainty regarding cross-border 
bidders over domestic bidders.  
 
Using a sample of 451 domestic acquisitions and 155 cross-border acquisitions into the U.K. 
between 1985 and 2014, a positive relationship between the target 52-week high and the offer 
premium was emerged. The reference point distinguishes the takeover motive of domestic 
bidders from that of cross-border bidders. It became evident that offer premiums driven by the 
target 52-week high lead to a negative market reaction for domestic bidders, suggesting 
evidence of overpayment. However, there is little evidence of overpayment for cross-border 
bidders paying according to the target 52-week high. The findings in this research are consistent 
with prospect theory. 
 
Chapter 3 makes two distinct contributions to the M&A literature. First, this is the first 
examination of the role of the reference point in the context of cross-border M&As. This allows 
the researcher to investigate how bidders value targets under information uncertainty. Further, 
the reference point theory of M&As distinguishes the motive of domestic bidders from cross-
border bidders acquiring U.K. public targets. Offer premiums paid based on the target reference 
point price have a negative impact on bidder announcement returns for the domestic M&A 
subsample while there is an insignificant impact on bidder announcement returns for the cross-
border M&A subsample, indicating that shareholders tend to believe that managers of domestic 
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bidders pay too much for the target based on the target 52-week high, while take those of the 
cross-border who pay according to the target 52-week high for granted.  
 
Chapter 3 applies the idea of the reference point effect to the U.K. where targets have a strong 
bargaining position with an expectation that they are likely to employ the 52-week high as the 
reference point in the negotiation table. This chapter finds that the reference point reinforces 
the target’s bargaining power in M&As, and important factors that enhance the reference point 
effect on M&As. However, it leaves a great deal to think about the role of the bidder reference 
point in the context of M&As in consideration of the bidder 52-week high is also an available 
item of information for the market to assess the value of the firm around the takeover 
announcement date. Whilst Chapter 3 finds that the target 52-week high is a reference point for 
how much the bidder should pay for the target, Chapter 4 studies the bidder 52-week high effect, 
which gives market information on how much the bidder could pay for the target. Bidder with 
a nearness 52-week high tend to create an image of strong profit-generating ability and richness 
in financial resources, whilst those whose current price deviates considerably from the 52-week 
high tend to experience many difficulties to finance a deal.  
 
In addition, Baker et al. (2012) reason that bidders who pay according to the target 52-week 
high are confident in realising synergies above the same level of the target. However, these 
authors found that those bidders do not generate synergies. If they can time the market by 
selecting quality deals for the purpose of synergies integration, this leaves the researcher of this 
thesis to believe that focusing on the target 52-week high alone may not fully account for the 
reference point effect on M&As. Therefore, both the target and the bidder 52-week highs were 
taken into considerations and examined in Chapter 4, where a new proxy was developed by 
including both the target and the bidder reference points. If the market price reflects the view 
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of the market investors to the firm’s valuation, it should be suggested that a firm with the 
nearness 52-week high is likely to be overvalued based on the rationale that investors should 
be reluctant to bid up the price, fearing that the firm is already overvalued. In contrast, a firm 
whose current price deviates a long way from its 52-week high leads the market to believe that 
the firm is experiencing bad news and is thus undervalued. Therefore, prospect theory can 
accommodate many important implications of the misvaluation hypothesis.  
 
Whilst behaviour finance theories explain value-destroying deals as bidders have a better than 
average illusion and overpay the target shareholders accordingly, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
proposed the misvaluation hypothesis that bidders overpay for the targets with the purpose of 
diluting overvalued stocks. This hypothesis rests upon the assumption that the market is 
inefficient whereas managers are rational, thus managers are able to exploit mispricing of the 
market. However, this motive is not observed by investors with short horizons, resulting in 
negative market reactions to the bid announcement. The theoretical model of the misvaluation 
hypothesis yields three important implications: first, overvalued firms tend to pay high offer 
premiums to the shareholders of a less overvalued firm. Second, overvalued firms prefer stocks 
as a means of finance for acquisitions as it accelerates the process of overvaluation dilution. 
Finally, offer premiums hedge against the risks of holding stocks in an overvalued market. 
Studies reveal that the rationale behind overpayment is that bidders are threatened by the 
danger of overvaluation, as addressed in the Jensen’s work (2005).   
 
Shleifer and Vishny’s study (2003) fail to provide any rationale as to why targets would accept 
overvalued stocks given that they are as rational as bidders and their firm is not 
underperforming prior to an M&A deal. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) complemented 
their view by arguing that both bidders and targets are rational and the reason for making 
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mistakes by accepting too many overvalued stocks is that targets do not have access to private 
information about the bidder, resulting in large valuation errors due to an overestimation of 
synergies. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), further relaxing the irrational target assumption, 
suggesting that targets will also make mistakes in valuing the deal when market-wide valuation 
is high. Dong et al. (2006), who employed the P/B and the P/V of both the bidder and target to 
examine what drives M&As, also provided supportive evidence that estimation biases of 
managers to the firm’s valuation leads to M&As. They note that it is not the true market 
misvaluation of the firm but the view of managerial misvaluation drives M&As.  
 
However, Di Guili (2013) challenges this view by proposing the measures for misvaluation. 
He found that a high MTBV could lead to predictions that the firm has better investment 
opportunity or the firm is significantly overvalued, leading the researcher to believe previous 
studies borrowed such valuation measure cannot fully account for the misvaluation hypothesis. 
So as to overcome the bias caused by the firm’s fundamental characteristics, Chapter 4 of this 
thesis measured the misvaluation of the firms involved by constructing a new proxy, the 
relative reference point (RRP), which is the difference between the target and the bidder’s 
reference points. The measure makes no assumption as to the true valuation of the firms but 
aims to explain the valuation errors driven by the market affecting M&As. It could be advisable 
that market should hold a similar view of the valuation of the two firms involved prior to the 
announcement date. The measure covers considerations of both the target and bidder sides. 
Since the market price is a reflection of the investors’ view of the firm performance, the RRP 
thus directly reflects the market’s perception of a firm’s misvaluation. The measure built upon 
the reference point captures market reactions and eliminates estimation biases caused by a 
firm’s fundamental characteristics.  
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Using a sample of 1,878 U.S. domestic public M&As between 1985 and 2014, it became 
apparent that the propensity for using stocks increases when the RRP increases, suggesting that 
the relatively more overvalued bidders tend to use stocks as a means of finance for acquisitions. 
In addition, the offer premium increases with the RRP, indicating relatively more overvalued 
bidders tend to pay higher offer premiums to the less overvalued targets. The RRP takes on a 
role of overpayment in the short term, reflected in negative market reactions. However, the 
long-term analysis indicates that offer premiums that are associated with acquisitions of higher 
RRP tend to generate less negative long-term returns than acquisitions of a lower RRP, 
suggesting that managers of more overvalued firms are able to time the market by looking at 
the RRP.  
  
Chapter 4 provides three distinct contributions to the M&A literature. First, a new measure for 
misvaluation is proposed, based on market perception. The measure establishes a bilateral 
valuation framework where both the bidder and the target’s misvaluation are considered. The 
measure also eliminates the biases caused by a firm’s fundamental characteristics or any 
retrospective and forward-looking information since it reflects the latest market reaction. 
Secondly, we provide evidence that both experienced and less experienced investors tend to be 
affected by the reference point effect. However, they may interpret the reference point in 
different ways. An investor with a short-term horizon tends to contribute the offer premium 
paid to the target shareholders with the result of overpayment, whilst a bidder who pay offer 
premiums according to the RRP times the market, reflected in the less negative market. Finally, 
it is suggested that the RRP is an important indicator of the method of payment. Overvalued 
bidders who use stocks rather than cash as a means of finance for acquisitions tend to pay lower 
offer premiums. It was established that lower offer premiums are associated with cash instead 
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of stock payments for relatively more undervalued targets. These results offer a new 
explanation for the method of payment hypothesis.  
 
One important implication of the reference point is that people tend to seek risks when they 
experience loss relative to the reference point and adopt a risk aversion when they enjoy gains 
relative to this specific point. Chapter 5 of this thesis directly assessed this implication by using 
the bidder 52-week high as the reference point. Since the firm’s 52-week high reflects the 
market reaction to the bidder’s performance, the loss relative to a reference point price serves 
as a relevant piece of information that signals to the market that risky investment opportunities 
should be available. Managers who fail to utilise this will be blamed for not meeting the 
commitment of value-maximising the firm. Therefore, a decline in performance prompts 
managers to undertake risky M&As. Managers are also exposed to larger risks when they 
engage in a risky M&A deal, motivating them to rationalise their motive by taking market- 
anticipated risks and working hard to convince the market the performance will be boosted 
through their superior management skills in risky projects. It is expected a firm’s current price 
that deviates greatly from its 52-week highest stock price leads managers to undertake M&As 
according to market anticipation. As a result, risky M&As would bring forth positive abnormal 
returns for the firm. Managers engaging in risky acquisitions are also exposed in stricter 
shareholder monitoring, requiring them to make greater efforts on deal negotiation, reflected 
in the lower offer premiums they pay for the target. In a further analysis, the quality of the 
decision that is based on market anticipation is assessed. Since the integration process of M&As 
requires time, it is suggested that assessing the short-term performance may not fully reflect 
the quality of a risky M&A decision. Therefore, the long-term performance of the deal is 
studied to observe whether bidder managers make great efforts to improve the deal quality.  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
14 
 
M&As form is a good platform to test managerial risk-seeking behaviour. First, they are a 
major investment activity that could fundamentally alter the wealth status of the shareholders, 
since small magnitude of change in wealth status does not touch investors’ risk appetizer 
(Brenner, 1983). Further, it is common for shareholders to compensate managers engaging in 
risky investment projects (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Graham et al. 2013). The feeling of loss, 
part of human nature, tends to motivate the manager to tolerate more risks and accordingly 
undertake risky M&As. Finally, M&As allow the researcher of this thesis to further explore 
whether managers can control risks with their skills and efforts. It was also found that risk-
taking is distinguished from gambling insofar as it depends purely on probability.  
 
Chapter 5 makes two main findings by studying a sample of 2,018 U.S. public acquisitions 
announced between 1985 and 2014. First, the bidder reference point and target risks are 
positively related, implying that when bidders perceive losses relating to the reference point 
they are likely to undertake risky investment projects. Second, bidders engaging in risky 
projects anticipated by the market tend to perform better, suggesting that managers who follow 
market-anticipated risks will be rewarded. Third, it was also established that risky M&As 
expose managers to strict shareholder monitoring, which motivates them to work hard.  
 
Chapter 5 makes three distinct contributions to M&A literature. First, this is the first paper to 
test the reference point effect on managerial risk-taking behaviour in the M&A context. It is 
also suggested that human-related biases have a direct impact on investment behaviour. Second, 
the researcher contributes to behaviour finance literature by documenting the evidence of the 
reference point effect on both individual and institutional investors. Third, a contribution is 
made to M&A literature, affirming that taking risks does not necessarily lead to negative 
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market reactions and taking risks according to market’s anticipation is an important source of 
positive market reactions.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a summary of relevant 
literature on M&A motives, M&A processes, M&A performance and prospect theory. Chapter 
3 studies the reference point theory in domestic and cross-border M&As in the U.K. market. 
Chapter 4 examines the reference point effect on M&A misvaluations, while Chapter 5 assesses 
the reference point effect on managerial risk-taking behaviour. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. 
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2.1. M&A motives 
Researchers on mergers and acquisitions (M&As)2 focus on the causes and consequences. 
M&As are one of the major investment activities undertaken by firms to create wealth for 
shareholders, expand the size, or integrate resources for example. Prior studies have offered 
various explanations for M&A motives. So as to prescribe corresponding strategies for 
management following M&As, Trautwein (1990) recognised seven M&A motives, namely 
efficiency theory, monopoly theory, valuation theory, empire-building theory, raider theory, 
process theory and disturbance theory. Of these theories, he finds that the valuation theory, 
empire-building theory and process theory play a more active role in M&A motives than the 
efficiency theory and monopoly theory, whereas raider theory and disturbance theory have the 
least explanatory power. Despite this, his study implies that no single theory can fully account 
for an M&A motive.   
 
Studies have also provided empirical evidence in explaining the M&A motives. Berkovitch 
and Narayanan (1993) were the first to test the fitness of the three major M&A motives: synergy, 
agency and hubris. The authors studied a sample of tender offers in the U.S. market between 
1963 and 1988 and used the correlation between the gains of the target and the combination to 
examine M&A motives. They assumed that the positive correlation between gains of the target 
and the combination represented synergy, the negative correlation represented agency whilst 
the zero correlation represented hubris. Their study indicates that about 75 percent of M&As 
are motivated by synergy and the negative correlations are driven by agency, while hubris co-
exists with synergy. Hodgkinson and Partington (2008) put forward their idea in an alternative 
market. They examined a sample of 529 successful M&A deals between 1984 and 1998 in the 
                                                          
2 In this thesis, the terms ‘takeovers’ and ‘mergers and acquisitions’ were used interchangeably, ‘mergers’ and 
‘acquisitions’ also refer to M&As in some circumstances unless they are specified in the correspondent sessions.  
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U.K. market and found that synergy was the most plausible M&A motive and there is also 
evidence for both agency and hubris. Raj and Forsyth (2003), who focused on the performance 
of hubris-infected bidder managers, noted significant loss on the bidder announcement returns, 
suggesting that one of the negative sources of bidder performance is managers’ overestimation 
of M&A synergies.  
 
Seth et al. (2000), who studied the bidders’ motives in the context of cross-border M&As, 
affirm that synergy remains a primary motive for cross-border M&As. Studying 100 
acquisitions of U.S. targets between 1981 and 1990, the authors found synergy is the 
dominating M&A motive for domestic M&As consistent with the findings of Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993). In addition, the total gains in cross-border M&As are 7.6 percent, which is 
similar to the figure achieved in the study conducted by Bradly et al. (1988)3. Seth et al. (2002) 
identified multiple sources of value creation and value destruction for cross-border M&As. 
Based on their sample, asset sharing, reverse internationalisation of valuable intangible assets 
and financial diversification are the main sources of value creation while risk reduction is the 
only source for value destruction. Their paper suggests that synergies play an essential role in 
cross-border M&As.  
 
2.1.1. Synergies  
The synergy hypothesis of M&As asserts that the value of combined firms after a merger is 
larger than the sum of the returns generated by the two separated firms. Bradley et al. (1983) 
found some support for this hypothesis, suggesting that M&As create synergies for the 
combined entity by reallocating the resources of the firms. Unlike the information hypothesis, 
which posits that managers have private information about the true value of the firm, authors 
                                                          
3 Bradly et al. (1988) found a 7.4 percent increase of the combined firm in domestic M&A sample. 
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suggest that managers generate gains by exploring potential synergies via M&As, which is 
consistent with the synergy hypothesis. Bradly et al. (1988) investigated a sample of 236 
successful tender offers in the period 1963 to 1984 and recorded an overall increase of 7.4 
percent in the value of combined firms, providing additional support to the synergy hypothesis. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), by reviewing prior studies, found that M&As on average generate 
gains, and targets benefit, whereas bidder firms at least do not lose.  
 
A large body of M&A studies have summarised three main sources of synergies: operations, 
finances and management improvement. Devos et al. (2009) attribute synergies to an 
improvement of resources allocation. Using the value line forecasts to estimate synergy4, the 
authors found that the average synergy for a sample of 246 large mergers increased the value 
of the combined entity to 10.03 percent. Of particular note, operating synergies take up 8.38 
percent and financial synergies account for the remaining part. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) 
suggest that large synergies are obtained through acquisitions of targets whose products are 
different from bidder firms’ rivals, suggesting that synergies are created by a product 
differentiation strategy that intensifies bidders’ competitiveness and sets obstacles for their 
rivals, making them hard to imitate. Using a large unique patent-merger dataset between 1984 
and 2006, Bena and Li (2014) found synergies to be created through innovation activities 
following M&As. Houston et al. (2001), who investigated a sample of the largest bank mergers 
between 1985 and 1996, noted that bank mergers create value for bidders. In particular, the 
authors identified the source of synergy in bank M&As as being mainly created from cost 
savings rather than revenue enhancement.  
                                                          
4 In Devos et al. (2009), merger synergy was calculated as the forecasted incremental cash flows of the combined 
firms relative to the sum of the premerger forecasted cash flows of bidding and target firms. 
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Lang et al. (1989) explained synergy gains with the Q theory. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio 
of a firm’s market value to the replacement costs of its assets. Q ratio measures the firm’s 
performance, and the well-performing firms are those with a high Q ratio whereas the poor- 
performing firms are those with a low Q ratio. Acquisitions involve a high Q bidder and a low 
Q target generating large total gains for the bidder, the target and the combined firm. The results 
imply that managers of a well-performing firm have abundant resources to improve the firm’s 
performance whereas a poor-performing firm lacking investment opportunities is an ideal 
target for synergy exploitation. Servaes (1991) reported supportive evidence by applying Lang 
et al.’s idea (1989) to a larger sample with additional controls.   
 
M&As play a disciplinary role with regard to managers who perform poorly. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) indicate that the market for corporate control creates value for the firm. 
Managers compete for the rights to manage corporate resources, hence, poor management is 
removed while good management serves the best interests of the shareholders via M&As. 
Jensen and Ruback’s view (1983) suggests that M&As enhance the firm’s efficiency by 
removing an inefficiency management team. Palepu (1986) studied the inefficient management 
effect on the likelihood of the firm to be acquired, and measured an inefficient management 
team by means of average excess returns of the firm. His results show a negative relationship 
between firms that are likely to be the M&A target and inefficient management, which is 
significant at a 5% level. The conclusion of this inefficiency management hypothesis is that 
managers who fail to ensure the commitment of value-maximisation for the firm are likely to 
be replaced. Accordingly, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) found that firms whose managers perform 
poorly following a merger is likely to be acquired by another firm. Martin and McConnell 
(1991) affirmed high turnover rate for target managers following M&A completion and the 
performance of these firms is well below that of the industry average prior to the M&A. In a 
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similar vein, Lehn and Zhao (2006), by studying 714 acquisitions during 1990 to 1998, found 
that 47% of top managers of bidder firms are dismissed within 5 years (including 16% due to 
takeovers). Therefore, takeover threats for managers tend to create synergy for the firm. 
 
However, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003), who included a sample of over 2,000 M&As from 1926 
to 1996, reported little evidence that inefficient firms will necessarily be acquired. Measuring 
the operating performance and stock market returns for the target firms, the authors revealed 
that takeover targets are not all those underperforming firms prior to the M&A announcement. 
In addition, targets do not underperform in the decade prior to M&A announcements regardless 
of whether the performance was measured with the firm’s operating performance or stock 
market performance. Results are robust when the authors take account of the size of the firm, 
industry and past performance of the targets for the targets’ operating returns, and the size, 
book-to-market value and past returns for the stock market performance. Results continue to 
hold when employing an alternative benchmark model to calculate targets’ stock returns. The 
authors proposed two main reasons why their findings fail to support Palepu’s inefficient 
management hypothesis (1986). First, the primary M&A motive is not to remove the inefficient 
management team in the sample, as there is only a small proportion of targets perform 
inefficiently prior to M&A announcement date. Second, their sample did not include 
disciplinary or attempted M&As that support the inefficient management hypothesis.  
 
Jensen (1988) suggests that the market for corporate control brings forth economic benefits for 
shareholders, society and the corporate form of organisation. Moreover, takeovers bring about 
major changes fitting for the future development of firms. Such fundamental changes including 
new recruitment and resources, offer new top-managers opportunities, forsaking the old 
strategies and facilities that are no longer beneficial to the firm. Further, the market for 
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corporate control effectively reallocates resources. Jensen (1988) indicates that major 
restructuring activities create economic efficiency due to the influences of political and 
economic conditions in the 1980s when many U.S. firms experienced revenue slowdown and 
used M&As to cope with market changes. The author holds that the pressures of managers’ 
turnover and the political activity weaken M&A efficiency.     
 
2.1.2. Agency problems  
The firm is a separation of ownership and control, in which shareholders are the owners of the 
firm (i.e. the principal) and managers are the agent hired by shareholders to manage the firm 
(i.e. the agency). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), this principal-agency relationship 
is a financing contract between shareholders and managers, in which managers are committed 
to maximising the wealth of shareholders. However, such a contract is violated when managers 
pursue their own interests at the expenses of their shareholders (i.e. agency problems).  
 
M&A studies have found evidence of agency problems in firms with sizable free cash flows. 
Jensen (1986) suggests in the free cash flow hypothesis that managers of cash-rich firms tend 
to distribute the excess of cash in unnecessary investment projects rather than paying out to 
their shareholders. Harford (1999) provided empirical evidence in support of Jensen’s view. 
Studying a large sample of U.S. M&As from 1950 to 1994, Harford found that managers of 
cash-rich firms engaging in M&As due to low managerial ownership is where agency problems 
are likely to occur. Cash-rich bidders receive negative market reactions and experience declines 
in operating performance following M&As.  
 
Contrary to the free cash flow hypothesis, Gregory (2005), focusing on the long-term 
performance of U.K. market, noted that firms with abundant cash flows free of use outperform 
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those possessing low free cash flows. The author argued that firms with low free cash flows 
are more likely to be financially constrained in the long term, and have difficulty in boosting 
its performance following a merger. Managers who hold large free cash flows and whose firms 
have a low Q ratio are likely to create value for the firm, in that the initial undervaluation tends 
to be corrected by the market in the long term. Likewise, Lin and Lin (2014), using a sample 
of Australia takeovers and measuring free cash flows with two proxies: excess cash holding 
and excess accounting cash flow5, found that managers of cash-rich firms do not undertake 
value-destroying M&As. 
 
Morck et al. (1990) found “bad managers”6 who raise severe agency conflicts in M&As. Using 
a sample of 326 U.S. M&As from 1975 to 1987, the authors found evidence of agency problems 
through three types of value-destroying deals. First, agency problems are raised when managers 
act for the purposes of job security and risk reduction of their own stock holdings. As such, 
managers tend to undertake diversifying M&As associated with negative market reactions due 
to unfamiliarity with an unrelated industry. Further, it is also suggested that bidders are likely 
to overpay for high-growth targets to increase their personal benefits. Finally, firms performing 
poorly in the past are likely to initiate bad deals. Harford et al. (2012) found entrenched 
managers were less likely to pay for acquisitions with all-equity offers, avoiding creating larger 
block-holders that diminish their power in the firm. Their M&A selection avoids acquiring 
private targets that could create value for the firm7, and more importantly, they overpay for 
targets whose synergy-generating ability is low.  
                                                          
5 Excess accounting cash flow was defined as the ratio of earnings after interest paid, tax paid and dividend paid 
before depreciation to total assets.  
6 “Bad managers” here refers to those who do not serve the best interests of their shareholders.  
7 In Fuller et al. (2002), bidders’ acquisitions of private firms tend to generate positive announcement returns 
while acquisitions of public firms generate negative announcement returns. Specifically, it is found that there is 
negative 1 percent announcement returns when targets are public firms and positive 2.1 percent when targets are 
private firms. In addition, Fuller et al. (2002) showed that offer premiums to private targets are lower than public 
targets, which is also consistent with the finding in a study of French M&As over the period of 1966 and 1982 by 
Eckbo and Longohr (1989).  
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 Studies have shown one of the main sources for agency problems is the compensation 
rewarded to top managers engaging in M&As. Studying a large sample of U.S. M&As, Harford 
and Li (2007) found it was a great incentive for a bidder CEO to undertake an acquisition as 
CEOs’ pay increases substantially after an acquisition regardless of the wealth of shareholders. 
This is also supported by Guest (2009) who studied a comprehensive U.K. sample between 
1984 and 2001. He established that CEOs’ salaries increase within a year after an acquisition 
even though takeovers destroy the firm’s value.  
 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) revealed that it is managerial power that influences compensations 
but not the deal performance, offering little evidence that better M&A performance increases 
pay to the managers. Their study showed that 39% of companies reward their CEOs involved 
in a completed deal due to the efforts the CEOs made, where efforts of those in the important 
positions are easily to be seen. In contrast, Datta et al. (2001) and Falato (2008) found that 
CEOs’ compensation is positively related to stock performance, indicating that compensation 
boosts the firm’s performance, implying that there is low probability that compensation causes 
agency problems.  
 
Studies have also documented that not only bidder managers but also target managers could 
cause agency problems, reflected in that target managers exchange private benefits such as 
compensation or positions in the bidder firms following a merger for lower M&A offer 
premiums. Analysing 311 large U.S. firms between 1995 and 1997, Hartzell et al. (2004) found 
that target managers are likely to persuade shareholders to give up their control of a firm when 
they are compensated with financial rewards or attractive positions in the bidder firms. 
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Likewise, Wulf (2004) in a sample of “mergers of equals”8 in the U.S. market between 1991 
and 1999 found that target managers exchange shared governance in the bidder firms for lower 
M&A offer premiums, which destroys the wealth of target shareholders, leading to 5.6 percent 
lower than average abnormal returns. However, Bargeron et al. (2010) argued that target 
managers’ retention is not as the result of lower M&A premiums. Their findings contradict 
those of Hartzell et al. (2004) and Wulf (2004), indicating that bidders retain targets’ managers 
who have skills and experience in the new combined firm to increase its value.   
 
2.1.3. Behavioural finance theories 
Behavioural finance has received a great deal of attention in M&As over the last three decades. 
There are two threads in the literature that link behavioural finance with M&As, according to 
a survey conducted by Baker and Wurgler (2012). The first thread of literature assumes that 
the market is efficient while the managers are less than fully rational, in that managers cannot 
benefit shareholders via M&As because there are no mispricing opportunities waiting to be 
explored., and the hubris management hypothesis and the managerial overconfidence 
hypothesis are the two of the most important hypotheses built upon this assumption. The second 
thread of literature assumes that the market is inefficient while the managers are fully rational, 
in that managers can explore market mispricing, and the over-reaction (or under-reaction) 
hypothesis and the market-timing hypothesis are the two of the most important hypotheses built 
upon this assumption.   
 
 
 
                                                          
8 According to Wulf (2004), “mergers of equals” was defined as that the bidder firm and the target firm is similar 
in size. 
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2.1.3.1. Managerial overconfidence 
Roll’s study (1986) was the first on managerial hubris in the context of M&As. The author 
proposed his hubris management hypothesis as managers overpaying for targets due to an 
overestimation to their own profit-generating ability. By reviewing U.S. and U.K. studies, Roll 
(1986) identified overconfident managers and discussed them from three perspectives. First, 
bidder managers are subject to hubris bias, in that the firm’s price falls after that a bid is 
announced or fails at a later stage. Second, hubris infects target managers, as a target firm’s 
price increases by 7 percent on average when a bid is announced and falls significantly when 
the bid is withdrawn. Third, the performance of the combination entity is also affected by hubris 
as it earns significantly negative abnormal returns following a merger. The hubris management 
hypothesis provides evidence that an individual decision maker may not be rational, which 
answers the question of why managers tend to pay for a takeover target with a price that is 
higher than its market price.  
  
Following hubris management hypothesis of Roll (1986), Hayward and Hambrick (1997), who 
studied a sample of 106 large U.S. acquisitions, found that bidder CEOs paying too much for 
large acquisitions is due to hubris bias. The authors identified three important sources of 
managerial hubris: the firm’s recent performance, the recent media praise for CEOs’ 
performance and the CEOs’ self-importance. The authors suggest that any recent success of 
the firm would enhance the confidence of the bidder managers. As a result, they overpay for 
the targets. The media praise for CEOs also fosters CEOs’ overconfidence in investment 
activities. Moreover, managers receiving with higher-than-average compensation and salary 
tend to feel important in major investment decisions, which will make them believe their 
abilities could improve the firm, thus overpaying for the targets. Similar to those of Roll (1986), 
Hayward and Hambrick found hubris results in losses on bidder abnormal returns.  
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Malmendier and Tate (2005) revealed CEO overconfidence in a sample of 477 publicly traded 
U.S. firms from 1980 to 1994. Measuring managerial overconfidence in the exercise of 
managerial options and CEO stock holdings, the authors found that overconfident CEOs tend 
to exercise their stock options at a later period and hold losers for a longer period. It is because 
that they are over-optimistic about their firm’s prospects or have strong affiliation with their 
own stocks, which miss the correct market timing for investments. Besides, their study also 
revealed that CEOs whose firms have a higher investment to free cash flow ratio tend to 
undertake more investments, suggesting that firms with overconfident managers are likely to 
have sufficient internal funds. Using the same dataset as in the Malmendier and Tate’s work 
(2005) and adopting some press-based proxies for managerial overconfidence, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) found that the market reacts negatively to a bid announced by overconfident CEOs 
and affirmed that managerial overconfidence encourages more acquisitions since 
overconfident CEOs are more aggressive than non-overconfident CEOs. These two related 
studies lead the researcher to believe that small firms are less vulnerable to managerial 
overconfidence while large firms tend to make more value-destroying deals due to 
overconfidence.  
 
Many studies have addressed the fundamental reason for managerial overconfidence. One 
thread in M&A studies attributes managerial overconfidence to the market’s tendency to 
explore the past best performance of big firms. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) put forward the 
over-extrapolation hypothesis that the financial market and the managers tend to over- 
extrapolate the past performance of the bidder and react more positively to those with low 
book-to-market ratio (i.e. glamour firms) than firms with high book-to-market ratio (i.e. value 
firms). The market’s reactions reinforce the confidence of the managers of glamour firms when 
undertaking M&As. In addition, the authors found glamour firms perform better than value 
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firms in the short term as the market tends to reward firms with better past performance. 
Making adjustments for the size of the firm and book-to-market value to estimate the long-term 
performance of the bidder, the authors found that glamour bidders underperform value bidders. 
They interpreted this phenomenon as that short-term momentum created by the market’s over-
extrapolation leads to correspondent long-term reversals when the market can correct its initial 
reactions, and such a short-term momentum is stronger in glamour bidders than value bidders. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) found consistent results when putting forward Rau and 
Vermaelen’s idea (1998) for the U.K. market. They employed the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) 
and market-to-book value (MTBV) for glamour and value bidders and calculated shareholder 
returns with a range of benchmark models. Their findings suggest that a lower P/E bidder (a 
value bidder) outperforms a higher P/E bidder (a glamour bidder) and a lower MTBV firm 
outperforms a higher MTBV firm in the long term.  
 
Another thread in relevant literature has largely attributed managerial overconfidence to 
managerial self-attribution bias. Attribution bias was first discussed in Heider’s attribution 
theory (1958) in which suggests that people tend to make systematic errors and attempt to 
attribute those to external factors. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) tested this theory on an M&A 
testing ground. Studying a sample of 5,334 successful U.K. private acquisitions between 1980 
and 2004, the authors recorded that bidders in the higher order acquisition9 underperform those 
in the lower order acquisition. They describe this phenomenon as the self-attribution bias of 
managers who believe initial success is due to their own superior ability and so undertake more 
M&A deals, whilst managers attribute negative market reactions of the subsequent deals as bad 
luck. Billet and Qian (2008) provided some similar findings by focusing on the U.S. market. 
                                                          
9 According to Doukas and Petmezas (2007), higher order acquisitions refer to bidders who undertake five or more 
deals within a three-year period.  
Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Motives 
 
29 
 
After controlling for the order of the deal, their findings showed that the first bids have higher 
abnormal returns whilst the higher order bids generate negative abnormal returns. In addition, 
bidders who have experience of undertaking successful acquisitions before are likely to engage 
in more value-destroying M&A deals. It is suggested that bidder managers are cautious in their 
first bids but are affected by self-attribution bias when undertaking subsequent bids. 
 
However, Aktas et al. (2009) explain the findings of Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Billet 
and Qian (2008) as the learning hypothesis. They suggest that the negative returns to the bidder 
firm during the time of a bid announcement are a result of the learning behaviour of bidder 
managers. The authors reason that bidder managers who undertake multiple bids tend to learn 
lessons from the previous deal and become more risk-averse for subsequent deals, which leads 
to negative abnormal returns. This study links a positive relationship between market reactions 
and managerial risk-taking. It is worth noting that the learning hypothesis weakens in the case 
of a manager not being able to engage in multiple bids prior to the current bid during his or her 
professional career, hence some of them do not have a chance to learn from their experience, 
notably young managers.  
 
In addition to the extrapolation hypothesis and the self-attribution bias, many additional studies 
have also explained causes and consequences of managerial overconfidence in the M&A 
context. Moeller et al. (2004) affirm that bidder size plays an important role in managerial 
overconfidence, suggesting that larger firms are likely to be overconfident as managers have 
great discretionary power over the firms, resulting in fewer obstacles allocating a firm’s 
resources. Since acquiring public firms is the quickest way of size expansion for a firm, 
managers of large firms are likely to overpay for public targets with high growth opportunities. 
Andreou et al. (2016) found a significant negative relationship between managerial 
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overconfidence and the value creation of corporate diversification. Analysing a sample of 
diversification M&As, the authors found overconfident managers destroy firm value by 12.4 
to 14.1 percent as opposed to rational managers do.  
 
Despite the main stream of the literature that links managerial overconfidence and corporate 
investments, which suggests that managers who overestimate their own ability make value-
destroying deals, a few papers note the bright side of managerial overconfidence. For example, 
Galasso and Simcoe (2010) found a positive relation between managerial overconfidence and 
a firm’s innovative performance. Using a CEO stock-option exercise for managerial 
overconfidence consistent with that used by Malmendier and Tate (2005), the authors 
discovered that overconfident managers tend to boost the innovative performance of a firm, as 
overconfidence leads the managers to underestimate the probability of the failure of deals, 
encouraging them to pursue innovative activities. In addition, overconfident managers are 
likely to make significant changes in innovative strategies that make the firm stand out in a 
competitive environment, which is more pronounced in competitive industries. Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012) who measured managerial overconfidence with options and press-based proxies for 
a sample of U.S. CEOs during 1993 to 2003 also found that overconfidence drives managers 
to engage in riskier projects, greater investment in innovative activities and greater innovative 
activities, suggesting that overconfident managers are better innovators and more likely to be 
hired by high growth industries.  
 
2.1.3.2. Investors’ overreactions and underreactions 
Debondt and Thaler (1985) postulate the overreaction hypothesis that news-oriented investors 
exhibit reactions driven by unexpected and dramatic news events, which lead to market 
fluctuations and make it predictable. Using the monthly data of U.S. stock returns, the authors 
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uncovered evidence of inefficiency in a weak form market, thus proposing two testable 
hypotheses. First, price reverses follow extreme price movements that have occurred over the 
previous days. Second, such a price adjustment tends to be greater when the initial price 
movement is dramatic. Their study reveals that portfolios that have lower returns in the past 5 
years outperform those have higher returns by 25 percent, suggesting that the market is sluggish 
to respond to fresh information and overreaction is due to mean-reversion.  
 
Consistent with Debondt and Thaler (1985), Barberis and Vishny (1998) suggest that the 
overreaction or underreaction is due to investors’ mistakes. When a company announces good 
news, the market tends to be over-optimistic about the firm’s prospects, which pushes the 
firm’s price to high levels. However, the price was revised when investors recognise the 
fundamental reason for the price boost was due to overreactions. In a similar vein, investors 
also revise their pessimism about loser stocks in the long term. 
 
The overreaction hypothesis has been challenged by many researchers. Jordan and Pettengill 
(1990), who duplicated Debondt and Thaler’s study (1985) in a different sample period, found 
that losers become winners but winners do not lose. In addition, Fama and French (1996) 
proposed a three-factor model to account for reversal of long-term returns as they argued size 
effect on a firm’s abnormal returns, affirming that small firms are associated with higher risks, 
while large firms are associated with lower risks. It became evident that small firms are likely 
to generate higher returns than larger firms.  
 
It is generally believed that evidence regarding the underration hypothesis is much robust than 
that regarding the overreaction hypothesis. Barberis and Vishny (1998) documented the 
mechanism for investors’ underreactions. When a company performs well (badly) the market 
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tends to raise (lower) its stock price and this will be further raised (lowered) when the 
performance of the firm is well supported by its earnings performance in a subsequent period, 
which often occurs in a short period of time (3 to 5  months) compared with the overreaction 
(3 to 5 years). Whilst theorists who suggest high risks are associated with high returns, Barberis 
and Vishny (1998) offered plausible explanations from a psychological perspective on how 
investors make mistakes when processing new information, suggesting that managers can 
formulate profitable investment strategies by taking full advantage of such mistakes. Edwards 
(1968) suggests that conservatism bias of investors, suggesting that underreaction is formed 
due to slow updating belief. In the light of this, Li and Yu (2012) found that conservative 
investors focus on the market 52-week high and historical high, affirming the investors 
attention hypothesis.   
 
2.1.3.3. The misvaluation hypothesis 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a model of M&As based on the assumption that 
managers are rational and the market is less than fully rational. The model explains ‘who 
acquires whom, the choice of the medium of payment, the valuation consequences of mergers 
and merger waves’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003: 295). Their study focuses on the limitations of 
the neo-classical theory of M&As, which focuses on industry-specific shocks, and the effect of 
the method of payment on M&As, which is not clearly interpreted. In addition, reasons why 
cash-financed M&As generate long-term positive earnings while stock-financed M&As 
generate long-term negative earnings have not been well explained. So as to explore these 
reasons, their study presents a simple valuation model of M&As to explain the short- and long-
term gains of the bidder. The model implies that the bidder can produce a positive synergy in 
the short term yet few synergies in the long term. Important implications drawn from this model 
are presented as follows: 
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Suppose the target firm is 0 and the bidder firm is 1. Stock volumes for firms 0 and 1 are K and 
K1, and price per unit is Q and Q1, and Q1 being greater than Q. The price per unit for the 
combined equity is S, q is the long-term price. Bidders would pay a price for the target, denoted 
P. If synergies exist, P lies between Q and S (i.e. Q<P<S).  
 
1. The combined market value is S (K+K1)-K1Q1-KQ, which is the value of the new combined 
firms minus the value of each individual firms involved in an M&A deal.  
 
2. The target value in the short term is (P-Q) K, suggesting that the offer price is over market 
value. 
 
3. The bidder value is made up of two parts, one part is the gains the bidders earned as long as 
their pay is less than S, the other is the loss of value dilution of the bidder firm’s capital, from 
Q1 to S or (S-P) K+(S-Q1) K. 
 
4. Given that there is no long-term profit for the combined firm when acquisitions are funded 
with cash since the gains to the target firm is the loss on the bidder firm, the effect on the value 
of the target is K (P-q), whereas the value of the bidder is K (q-P).  
 
5. For stock-financed acquisitions, suppose x is the ratio of deal value over combined firm 
value or x = PK/S (K+K1). In the long term, this share is xq (K+K1) = q (P/S) K; 
 
6. The net long-term gains to target shareholders in stock-financed acquisitions are q (P/S) K- 
qK = qK (P/S-1), where qK is the stand-alone value of target in the long term, whereas for the 
bidder shareholders, it is qK (1-P/S).  
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Shleifer and Vishny’s misvaluation model (2003) indicates that bidders are those with a 
considerable valuation whereas targets are those with a low valuation. Further, the long-term 
effect of cash-financed acquisitions suggests that the target is undervalued whereas the net 
long-term effect of a stock deal generates a short-term loss and long-term gains, explaining 
why an overvalued bidder tends to use stocks as ‘cheap currency’ to pay for targets. Moreover, 
there is a reverse effect between the bidder firm and the target firm, i.e. what the bidder loses 
is the target gains. Finally, the model reveals that both the target and the bidder firms could 
gain in the short term if there is synergy from the mergers.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) also reason that M&As are a trade-off game between the bidder 
and the target, since they involve a high valuation bidder and a low valuation target based on 
the rationale that a low valuation firm may find it hard to create synergy through the acquisition 
of a high valuation firm. Their study suggests that a bidder buys a target to create long-term 
value whereas the target focuses on short-term gains; hence, targets voluntarily accept 
overvalued stocks for a cash-out purpose. All of these imply that bidder managers attempt to 
maximise the interest of shareholders through exploring the market’s mispricing in an 
inefficient market (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003: 296). 
 
Therefore, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that bidder managers are rational whereas target 
managers are irrational as since they accept overvalued stocks. However, this view has been 
challenged by Rhodes-Kropf and Vismanthan. (2004) who contend that rational managers 
accept overvalued stocks by mistake. According to this study, target managers are misled when 
the market valuation is high, and accept overvalued stocks as they overestimate synergies. 
Further, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) identified three types of specific valuation errors that drive 
merger waves. By decomposing the conventional MTBV proxy into three components: the 
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firm-specific deviations from short-run industry pricing (firm-level misvaluation), sector-
factor, short-run deviations from a firm’s long-run mispricing (sector-level misvaluation), and 
long-run pricing to book (long-run growth opportunities), the authors found that high MTBV 
firms buy low MTBV firms, which is attributed to firm- and sector-level valuation errors. Firms 
of low long-run growth opportunities tend to buy firms with high long-run growth opportunities. 
Their study suggests a positive correlation between stock-financed acquisitions and market-
wide valuation.   
 
In this connection, Dong et al. (2006) affirm that the misvaluation hypothesis is in favour of 
high valuation periods. Analysing a sample of U.S. M&As from 1978 to 2000, the authors 
claim that evidence for the misvaluation hypothesis is more relevant for M&As after 1990 than 
before, whereas the evidence for the Q hypothesis is more relevant before 1990 than after. 
Their findings suggest that the misvaluation hypothesis reconciles the case that the market-
wide valuation is high whereas the Q hypothesis is employed to explain how well-run bidders 
explore synergies from poorly-performed targets. In addition, the authors find that more 
overvalued bidders prefer to pay for targets with stocks rather than cash, choose mergers rather 
than tender offers, and pay higher offer premiums. Their results are consistent with those 
predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (2003).  
 
Dong et al. (2006) investigated the effectiveness of the Q hypothesis and the misvaluation 
hypothesis in different sample periods but fail to address the concern as to whether bidders 
paying with overvalued stocks are being rational. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
bidders who use overvalued stocks as a means of payment for M&As receive negative market 
reaction in the short run, leading shareholders to believe that the firm does not generate 
synergies. Their real purpose of using overvalued stocks is to dilute overvaluation and create 
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value for the firm, since holding stocks in an overvalued market incur risks for the firm (Jensen, 
2005). In this respect, Ang and Cheng (2006) assessed the long-term performance of the bidder 
who pays for acquisitions with stocks. Studying a sample of completed stock-financed 
acquisitions, the authors find that bidders undertaking M&As with overvalued stocks perform 
better than those engaging in M&As but not using overvalued stocks. Their study indicates that 
not all M&As are driven by misvaluation, since their data show a small fraction of the stock-
financed acquisitions involve an undervalued bidder, which contrasts with Savour and Lu’s 
view (2009) in their assumption that all stock-financed acquisitions are misvaluation-driven.  
 
The misvaluation hypothesis has been challenged by many studies. Firstly, in line with Ang 
and Cheng (2006), Fu et al. (2013) suggest that ‘The existence of relative overvaluation 
between the bidder and the target is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the 
acquisition to benefit acquirer shareholders’, as their M&A sample shows that two-thirds of 
stock-financed acquisitions are motivated by a bidder firm’s overvaluation. They suggest that 
bidder shareholders only benefit from overvalued stocks if low premiums are paid to the target 
shareholders. Using a sample of 1,319 stock-financed acquisitions between 1985 and 2006, the 
authors found that overvalued bidders do not outperform those firms in the control sample, 
reflected in significantly worse operating performance and worse stock returns five years 
following the M&As. By including corporate governance related proxies, their study reveals 
severe agency problems in an overvalued firm, indicating that acquisitions driven by 
misevaluation destroy a firm’s value when the firm experiences agency problems.   
 
Further, Eckbo et al. (2016) suggest that ‘overvaluation reduces the all-stock payment 
propensity’, which contradicts the idea of the misvaluation hypothesis. Using aggregate mutual 
fund flows as an instrumental variable of the pricing error, the authors indicate that the shock 
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caused by mutual fund flows pushes up the market valuation but it does not increase the volume 
of stock-financed acquisitions. Their study challenges the view that managers use overvalued 
stocks to time the market. The authors find that bidders who pay with overvalued stocks for 
financing acquisitions tend to be small firms and non-dividend paying firms with low leverage, 
indicating that firms that are financially constrained avoid using cash as a means of payment 
for financing M&As.    
 
This section has reviewed three broad types of M&A motives. According to these studies 
reviewed, there is no single theory that can fully address the M&A motive, since it varies 
significantly in any particular sample at any particular time, which calls for up-to-date evidence. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), by reviewing a quantity of M&A research up to the 1980s, 
suggesting that the primary M&A motive is synergies, and the small role the human factors 
played on M&As weakened prior to 1990. This is also supported by a number of M&A research 
works (Bradley et al., 1983; Bradley et al., 1988; Jensen, 1988; Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 
1991), whilst Jensen (1986) indicates the agency problem of free cash flow where managers of 
cash-rich firms invest unwisely, and Roll (1986) suggests hubris-infected managers engage in 
value-destroying M&A deals. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that M&As are driven by the 
relative valuation of the two firms involved, indicating the role of managers’ timing the market. 
Dong et al. (2006), who studied the misvaluation hypothesis and the Q hypothesis in the context 
of M&As, noted that synergy-driven acquisitions are more likely to be found prior to 1990 
whereas the misvaluation-driven acquisitions are common after 1990.  
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2.2. M&A process 
2.2.1. Selecting a target 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986), who explored the M&A motive and M&A process, identified three 
important M&A motives for bidder management: strategic fit, organisational fit and acquisition 
process. The first two motives indicate that the acquisition should be financially or strategically 
fit for the firm’s prospects, while the latter one indicates the essential role of M&A participants, 
including analysts and key managers, played during the course of M&As. In this line of 
thinking, human factors have a substantial impact on the M&A process.   
 
The issue concerning “who buys whom” in the M&A context has been discussed for years. 
Takeover targets are largely predicted within the scope of the bidders’ M&A motives. The 
synergy hypothesis predicts that the less efficient firms are likely to be a takeover target, as the 
bidder views target’s price discounts as a source of synergies generation. Investigating the 
probability of takeover targets, Papelu (1986) proposed six hypotheses relating to “who buys 
whom”, including the inefficient management hypothesis, the growth-resource mismatch 
hypothesis, the industry disturbance hypothesis, the size hypothesis, the market-to-book 
hypothesis and the price-earnings hypothesis, identifying that firms with an inefficient 
management, smaller size, mismatch between resource and growth opportunity10 and high 
leverage ratio are probably the target firm in an M&A deal.  
 
Brar et al. (2009) who examined the probability of takeover targets by extending Palepu’s 
model (1986) with inclusions of price momentum, trading volume and a measure of market 
sentiment for a large sample of European and cross-border acquisitions found that takeover 
                                                          
10 According to Palepu (1986), the mismatch between resource and growth opportunity refers to a rich resource 
with low growth opportunity or poor-resources with high growth opportunity.  
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targets are small, undervalued and less liquid relative to bidders. Their findings are in 
accordance with Palepu (1986). In addition, the authors suggest that takeover targets are those 
firms with low sales growth and strong short-term price momentum and their shares are 
actively traded prior to the announcement date, indicating that arbitrage around the M&A 
announcement date leads the price of the target to be hard to value. The authors also noted that 
takeover targets are those firms with incompetent managers, inducing other managers to 
explore the potential synergies through takeovers.  
 
Jensen (1988) notes that managers who compete over the rights to control a firm’s resources 
initiate M&As. Hence, M&As are a vehicle of integrating the bidder firms’ and the target firms’ 
resources, suggesting that poorly performing firms are likely to be acquired in M&As. 
Similarly, Mitchel and Lehn (1990) found that firms whose managers made value-destroying 
deals are likely to subsequently become takeover targets. Lang et al. (1989) and Servaes (1991) 
also provided supportive evidence that inefficient firms are likely to be takeover targets. Their 
findings suggest that acquisitions enhance value for the firm when they involve a high Q bidder 
and a low Q target. The Q hypothesis indicates that high Q bidders are easier to explore 
synergies from the poor-performing firms than from the well-performing firms through M&As.  
 
Another line of literature suggests that it may not be the case that acquired firms are in a weak 
position prior to an M&A. Bradly et al. (1983) documented that targets are those ‘sitting on the 
gold mine’, suggesting that targets hold excess cash, hence, they are attractive to firms 
experiencing financial constraints. Agrawal and Jeffe (2003) find direct evidence that targets 
do not underperform prior to M&A announcements, and their results continue to hold 
regardless of various measures employed to influence the firm’s performance. Rhodes-Kropf 
and Robinson (2008) showed evidence of ‘like buys like’, suggesting M&As involve a firm 
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with similar prospects. Based on the relative bargaining power of the bidder and the target, 
their model suggests that bidders tend to acquire firms of a similar MTBV. Levis (2011) 
suggests that firms of high revenue growth opportunities but high operating costs are probable 
takeover targets whereas firms of lower growth opportunities but high cost efficiency are 
probable takeover bidders. Investigating a sample of newly-listed firms that become takeover 
targets shortly after their initial public offerings, De and Jindra (2012) noted firms that perform 
well in operations or in the stock market are likely to be acquired due to superior post-IPO 
performance.   
 
Studies have addressed the issue concerning “who buys whom” from other angles. Massa and 
Zhang (2009) found M&As are driven by the popularity difference between the two firms 
involved. They identified ‘cosmetic mergers’ where a less popular firm tends to buy a more 
popular firm. This investment style is more prevalent when the popularity difference 11 
between the target and the bidder is significant. The popularity of an acquired firm creates a 
‘hole’ effect for a less popular firm, increasing the probability that the market will re-evaluate 
the bidder firm. Shleifer and Vishny (2003), however, suggest that the undervalued firm is 
probably the takeover target as it provides great scope for value dilution for the highly valued 
firm. If the primary M&A motive of the bidder is to eliminate any takeover threats, larger firms 
in the same industry as the bidders are the probable targets since they can quickly help expand 
the bidder firm’s size and reinforce their competitiveness among the industry peers (Gorton et 
al., 2009). Indeed, Hoberg and Phillip (2010) showed that firms offering the bidder some hard-
to-imitate assets are attractive takeover targets.  
                                                          
11 The authors used data on the flows in mutual funds in different styles to construct a measure of popularity.  
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Not only bidders look for targets, but also targets actively search for bidders (i.e. target-initiated 
deals12). Studying a sample of over 3,800 U.S. public acquisitions between 1996 and 2009, 
Eckbo et al. (2014) found 45% of acquisitions in their M&A sample were initiated by targets. 
Their findings are also supported by Boone et al. (2007) who observed that about half of 
takeovers of 400 U.S. takeovers announced between 1989 and 1999 had been initiated by 
investment bankers hired by the target whose aim was to sell the firm. Masulis and Simsir 
(2015) suggest a large number of M&As deals announced between 1997 and 2006 are target-
initiated: 237 as opposed to 408 bidder-initiated deals in their sample of 645 M&A deals. The 
authors documented that target financial or economic weakness, target financial constraints and 
economy-wide shocks were the key factors that determined target-initiated deals. The target-
initiated deals that are not strategically or financially fit for bidders reinforce bidder’s 
bargaining power, resulting in lower levels of offer premiums, target announcement returns 
and the deal value to EBITDA multiples of the target-initiated deals compared with the bidder-
initiated deals (Masulis and Simsir, 2015).  
 
2.2.2. Paying for a target 
Paying for a target is of first-order importance in M&As, since how much a bidder pays for 
acquisitions directly determines the wealth distribution between the shareholders of the two 
firms involved. Though a high offer premium increases the likelihood of the deal success, it is 
at the expenses of the wealth of bidder shareholders. Because a low offer premium is hard to 
persuade the target to give up the firm given that target shareholders are loss-averse (Baker et 
al. 2012). However, the argument above leads the researcher to a question as to how much 
offer premiums are too much, as on-one can give an accurate figure of the valuation of the firm 
since valuing a target requires additional considerations regarding the decision makers. Two of 
                                                          
12 Information on who initiates a deal is not identified in SDC database.  
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the most important factors influencing M&A valuation is how much M&A offer premiums the 
bidder pays for the target, and by what means the bidder is willing to pay. The following section 
reviews literature on the offer premium and the method of payment.  
 
2.2.2.1. M&A offer premiums 
Schwert (1996) explains offer premiums as the sum of the target price run-up and the mark-
up.13 The author found that final offer premiums increase with the pre-bid target stock price 
run-up while the price mark-up fails to explain a majority of offer premiums. His study 
measured the target price run-up with the target abnormal stock returns from 42 days to 1 day 
prior to the takeover announcement date relative to the abnormal stock returns during the 
announcement date, and offer premiums with target abnormal stock returns between 42 days 
prior to the takeover announcement date and 126 days after takeovers.14 Analysing a sample of 
1,814 U.S. mergers and tender offers between 1975 and 1991, the author established that for a 
one dollar increases in target price run-up would cost a bidder firm an extra 1.13 dollar. 
Similarly, Betton et al. (2008), who studied the relationship between the target price run-up 
and initial offer premiums, found that for a dollar increase in the price run-up increased the 
offer price by 0.8 dollars.   
 
The minimum offer price equals the current market price of the target firm given that the firm’s 
value is fairly estimated. It is commonly believed that the offer price should be higher than the 
market price of the target, otherwise the target will refuse the offer, arguing that it will bring 
forth synergies to the combined firm. However, in some cases firms are sold below market 
value or with negative offer premiums. Weitzel and Kling (2014) suggest that targets 
                                                          
13 In other words, offer premiums were defined as the difference between abnormal returns and the price run-up. 
14 For those targets delisted before 126 days after takeovers, he used the day when they were delisted.  
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compensate bidders in the acquisitions on the rationale that they believe there will be post-
merger synergies. Secondly, targets compensate bidders who agree to accept their overvalued 
shares, since small firms find it hard to justify overvaluation. Finally, targets who experience 
severe shortage in liquidity tend to sell firms with negative offer premiums.  
 
However, in most cases, the offer premium is positive and underlines the overpayment 
hypothesis or the synergy hypothesis. If offer premiums are driven by wealth creation purpose, 
bidder firms gain positive abnormal returns around the announcement date (i.e. the synergy 
hypothesis). In agreement with this line of thinking, Antoniou et al. (2008) found that offer 
premiums and bidder returns are positively related in a sample of 396 U.K. public acquisitions 
announced between 1985 and 2004.  
 
Evidence suggests lower offer premiums are paid to the target shareholders if the needs of 
target managers are met. Wulf (2004) suggests bidders who guarantee the retention of target 
managers in the combined firm tend to pay a lower offer premium for the target. Studying the 
relationship between offer premiums and the choices of payment method in a sample of 2,959 
acquisitions between 1983 and 2004, Zhang (2009) found that offer premiums decrease when 
cash is paid as a result of increasing popularity of cash. Their findings suggest that cash 
payments increase the bargaining power of the bidder when negotiating with targets who have 
a strong cash preference. In this line of thinking, bidders, by offering what the target manager 
wants, save takeover costs.    
 
The overpayment hypothesis suggests that bidders tend to overbid for the target if the offer 
premium is greater than expected synergies generated following the combined firm for a variety 
of reasons. Roll (1986) indicates that bidders who overestimate the synergies of a combined 
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firm or over-optimistic about their own management skills tend to overpay for targets. Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) explained this as overestimation about the synergies increasing 
with valuation errors. Following this line of discussion in relevant literature, Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) provided related support that hubris-infected managers tend to overpay for 
acquisitions. Investigating offer premiums for a sample of large U.S. M&A deals, the authors 
suggest that CEOs whose firms have performed well recently, who are praised by the media or 
have a high salary have strong sense of self-importance, which increase high offer premiums 
to the target shareholders. Antoniou et al. (2008) found overpayment for diversified M&A 
deals and attribute this phenomenon to over-optimistic CEOs stepping into an unrelated field. 
Baker et al. (2012) found confident bidders who pay according to the target 52-week high so 
as to successfully obtain an M&A deal, reasoning this as the reference point theory of an M&A. 
Since targets have a loss-aversion tendency, a price that is significantly lower than this 
reference point price will increase the probability of the deal being rejected by the target. The 
authors also measured the market reactions to the M&A pricing decisions that depend on the 
reference point, and found that the payment according to the target reference point was 
associated with negative market reactions, as the market regards this as overpayment.  
 
Rather than studies relating overpayment to bidders’ overconfidence or reference dependence 
bias, others explaining it with the bidders’ rationality. Jensen (2005) suggests that bidders 
overbidding the target with overvalued equity is a measure to avoid the risks of holding those 
stocks in an overvalued market. The firm’s value will be destroyed when the initial 
overvaluation is corrected by the market. This view is also supported by the prediction of 
Shleifer and Vishny’s theoretical model (2003), suggesting that bidder managers attempting to 
dilute their overvaluation are likely to overpay for a less overvalued target. In order to reduce 
the risks of stocks being down-priced by the market, bidders offer high M&A premiums to 
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smooth the M&A process. Evidence that managers do not pay high offer premiums to the target 
shareholders because of managerial irrationality is also supported by many additional studies 
(Dong et al., 2006; Fu et al., 2013).    
 
Studies have related overpayment to agency problems. Specifically, bidders’ overpayment is 
due to lucrative compensation paid to managers who initiate or complete M&A deals. Harford 
and Li (2007) and Guest (2009) suggest that CEOs engaging in an M&A deal are better off 
regardless of the quality of the deal. Since the primary purpose for the manager is to obtain 
rewards through M&As, they overpay for the target so as to smooth the M&A process. Jensen 
(1986) also indicates that managers of cash-rich firms tend to pay excessively for these ill-
conceived investments.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that offer premiums should bring forth positive abnormal returns 
to the bidder if they are in line with the synergy hypothesis, while negative abnormal returns 
will accrue to the bidder if they are explained with the overpayment hypothesis. In this pursuit, 
Diaz et al. (2009) identified a quadratic relationship between the offer premium and bidder 
abnormal returns, reasoning that the lower level of the offer premium represents its role of 
synergies whereas the higher level represents overpayment. 
 
2.2.2.2. Method of payment hypotheses 
The choices of payment methods are another important factor influencing M&A valuation. 
This section reviews four broad categories of explanations regarding the method of payment: 
tax considerations, the signalling hypothesis, capital structure and corporate control and 
behavioural finance, followed by relevant empirical evidence for each explanation.  
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2.2.2.2.1. Tax considerations 
Studies have linked the method of payment with corporate taxes, suggesting that targets would 
demand high offer premiums when M&As were solely financed by cash. In accordance with 
capital gains taxes, there will be an immediate tax on capital gains for cash while tax on capital 
gains for stocks is deferred until gains are realised. Therefore, high offer premiums are 
associated with cash as a compensation for the targets. Wansley et al. (1983) who studied the 
tax effect on the choice of payment method found that target cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAARs), measured with 41 trading day stock returns after M&As, are 33.54 percent 
when the means of payment for M&As is cash, but this figure nearly doubles when it is 
substituted with stock payments. Likewise, studying a sample of 204 pairs of mergers between 
1977 and 1982, Huang and Walking (1987) reported CAARs for cash payments, stock 
payments and the combination of cash and stocks were 29.3 percent, 14.4 percent and 23.3 
percent respectively.   
 
By contrast, Franks et al. (1988) found that the presence of the all-cash offer premium effect 
was pronounced before capital gain taxes were introduced into the U.K. market, suggesting 
little evidence of the tax treatment effect on the method of payment. They examined a sample 
of 2,500 acquisitions in both the U.K. and the U.S. markets between 1955 and 1985 and found 
that U.K. firms had a much stronger cash preference than their U.S. counterparts. In addition, 
the period of 1965 to 1969 saw a significant decline in cash-financed acquisitions as compared 
with that in the period of 1960 to1964, before the capital tax gains law came into effect: 18.6 
percent compared with 29.2 percent. Moreover, their study indicates that cash payments, 
though associated with higher offer premiums than stock payments, reap more benefits for 
long-term shareholders due to the valuation effect.  
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It can be argued that early studies that examined the tax treatment effect on the choice of 
payment methods based on the periods when the method of payment effect has received little 
attention. In this line of thinking, examining the tax treatment effect on the method of payment 
in a public U.S. acquisition sample between 1985 and 2004, Ismail and Krause (2010) provide 
the most up-to-date evidence that fails to detect the tax treatment effect on the method of 
payment. Their study reinforces Frank et al.’s findings (1988), suggesting the tax treatment 
effect has little impact of on the method of payment.  
 
2.2.2.2.2. Signalling hypothesis 
Another classic explanation for the choice of payment methods is the signalling hypothesis 
assuming that the market is transparent and there are no transaction costs and taxes, the method 
of payment choices should be irrelevant to finance an M&A deal. However, Myers and Majuf 
(1984) found evidence of information asymmetry, as managers know better than the market 
about the value of a firm, in that they are able to choose the right sources of financing for 
acquisitions. As such, stock payments signal to the market that the firm is overvalued and thus 
incur negative market reactions, whilst a cash payment indicates that the firm is undervalued, 
resulting in positive market reactions.  
 
According to this literature, Travos (1987) found direct evidence that stock payments are 
associated with negative bidder announcement returns whereas a cash payment is associated 
with positive bidder announcement returns, claiming that stock payments convey bad news to 
the market whereas as cash payment conveys good news to the market. Using a sample of 
successful acquisitions between 1972 and 1982, the author examined a series of factors that 
had a substantial impact on bidder announcement returns highlighted in the prior M&A 
literature, including the method of payment, the offer premium, relative size and the type of 
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mergers. Surprisingly, it is suggested that only the method of payment has a significant impact 
on bidder announcement returns, and stock payments are negatively related to bidder 
announcement returns, which is consistent with M&A literature.   
 
Hansen (1987) regards stock payments as a risk-sharing agreement between the bidder and 
target firms. With high levels of information uncertainty, bidders are likely to be misled by the 
valuation of the target. So as to avoid overpayment, bidders are prone to pay for acquisitions 
with stocks, requiring the targets to share the downward risk of stock overvaluation, while cash 
is a clear cut between the bidder and the target and paying acquisitions with cash indicate 
undervalued bidders. His study underscores the central role of the risk relating to the method 
of payment, providing a rationale on why bidders choose stocks for acquisitions given that 
abnormal returns are lower than those paid with cash.  
 
Fishman (1989) claims that cash payments played a pre-emptive role in M&As involving 
multiple bidders. He proposed a model of pre-emptive bidding, suggesting that cash payment 
signals to the target that the bidder’s valuation is high whereas stock payments indicate the 
opposite case. The role that cash played in enhancing the advantages of the bidder was also 
addressed in Franks et al.’s U.K. study (1988). Cornu and Isakov (2000) found supportive 
evidence that cash offers deter competition, working better than debt or equity. Consistent with 
the signalling hypothesis, Cornu and Isakov (2000) reason that cash offers signal to the market 
a high-valuing bidder who is capable of managing the deal.  
 
In the presence of information uncertainty, the market perceives stock payments as 
overvaluation by the bidder or that uncertainty regarding expected synergies increases with 
stock payments. As such, stock payments incur negative market reactions whereas cash 
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payment brings forth positive market reactions. However, a number of studies have challenged 
this view, arguing that bidders do not underperform when financing an acquisition with stocks. 
Savor and Lu (2009) found that bidders who are able to complete an M&A deal with stocks 
would outperform those who fail to do so. Studying the joint effects of seasonal equity offerings 
(SEOs) and method of payment on bidder gains, Golubov et al. (2015) found stock-financed 
acquisitions are not the source of value-destruction of an M&A deal.  
 
2.2.2.2.3. Capital structure and corporate control 
The choices of payment methods also relate to a firm’s capital structure decision. Pecking order 
theory suggests that firms prefer to use internal resources to fund investments and will not use 
external resources until their internal resources are exhausted. The method of payment is the 
means that the bidder chooses to pay for an acquisition, whereas the source of financing is what 
the bidder funds an acquisition. The means of the bidder uses to get the funds can be different 
from their payment decisions in M&As. Whilst conventional M&A studies considered the 
means of payment as the same as the source of financing, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) 
disentangled the effect of the source of takeover financing and the effect of the method of 
payment. According to their study, the source of financing includes purely internal funds, 
equity issues, debt issues and combinations of debt and equity issues. Acquisitions are paid 
with cash when the source of financing is purely internal funds and debt issues, and are paid 
with stocks when the sourcing of financing is equity issues, or a combination of equity and 
debt and cash. Analysing a sample of 1,361 completed acquisitions in 26 European countries15, 
the authors found that acquisitions funded by internal sources underperformed those funded by 
debt issues.  
                                                          
15 Their sample consists of both European domestic and intra-European cross-border acquisitions with both 
bidding firm and target firm from European countries or the U.K.  
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Pecking order theory is commonly violated in the context of M&As especially when bidders 
are financially constrained or distressed. Martin (1996) noted that one of the main reasons that 
a firm uses stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions is that the firm is in short of cash 
prior to the M&A announcement date. Jensen (1986) found supportive evidence that a large 
free cash flow motivates managers to use cash instead of stocks to finance an acquisition. 
Harford et al. (2009) indicate that firms that have a higher leverage ratio relative to targets tend 
to use equity as a means of payment for finance acquisitions while the lower leverage ratio 
firms tend to use debt-financed cash. Their study relates the method of payment to the capital 
structure of the firm. Firms in the face of larger risks of financial distress or bankruptcy are 
more cautionary about the change in their leverage, indicating an important role of risks played 
in the method of payment choices. In a similar vein, Alshwer et al. (2011) found financially 
constrained bidders tend to retain internal sources to maintain financial flexibility.  
 
Other studies have related the method of payment choices to managerial control. Managers 
holding large stocks would have extensive control over the firm, in that they should be reluctant 
to offer stocks in order to maintain their control. Stulz (1988) suggests that managers attemping 
to protect their ownership of the firm avoid using stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions. 
Martin (1996) obtained results consistent with of those in Stulz’s work (1988). The results 
suggest a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and the method of payment. 
Managers are insensitive about the method of payment when their ownership is low, while a 
high level of managerial ownership, between 5 and 15 percent, reduces the probability of 
acquisitions being paid for with stocks, as managers with large stock holdings avoid using 
stocks as this result in dilution of their control to over the firm. Similarly, Faccio and Masulis 
(2005), who investigated a sample of European M&As between 1997 and 2000, noted that cash 
is more likely to be used to fund acquisitions when the level of managerial ownership is 
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between 20 and 60 percent. These authors also document that the probability of stock payments 
decreases when target firms have concentrated managerial ownership, since this creates new 
block holders threatening the firm control of bidder managers.  
 
However, it is argued that neither the target nor the bidder managerial ownerships have an 
impact on the method of payment. Zhang (2001) examined the effect of managerial ownership 
on the method of payment in the U.K. market using a number of factors that have a significant 
impact on the method of payment, including the firm size, the financial policy of the bidder, 
returns of equity and the performance of the bidder.16 Taking these controls into account, the 
ownerships of the two firms involved showed little impact resulting from the method of 
payment. The author concluded that there was little evidence of the managerial ownership 
effect on the method of payment, but he failed to explain the rationale behind this finding.  
 
2.2.2.2.4. Behavioural finance  
Studies have emphasised the role of managerial behaviour played in the method of payment 
choices. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that bidder managers choose an appropriate means 
of payment for acquisitions. By doing so, bidder managers utilise stocks in acquisitions when 
their firms are overvalued. Additionally, Vijh and Yang (2013) found small public targets were 
less vulnerable to overvalued stocks. Studying a large sample of U.S. public acquisitions 
between 1981 and 2004, the authors established a positive relationship between the target size 
and stock-financed acquisitions, suggesting that small targets leave bidders limited room to 
dilute overvaluation and acquiring small targets is associated with larger transaction costs and 
higher offer premiums than large targets. This suggests that the valuation of firms is an 
                                                          
16 Zhang (2001) found that stocks were likely to be used for acquisitions when bidder firms were large and equity 
returns were higher (as bidding firms might believe their stocks are undervalued therefore paying for acquisitions 
with cash), while cash was likely to be employed for acquisitions when bidder firms paid higher dividends to their 
shareholders and the bidder firm performed better in the stock market.  
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important factor for managerial considerations regarding the method of payment choices. Once 
again, their evidence suggests rational managers link the method of payment to the valuation 
of the firm.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf and Visvanathan (2004) also claim misvaluation drives all stock-financed 
acquisitions. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) identified the three sources of valuation errors that 
drive stock-financed acquisitions. Of these, the firm- and sector-level valuation errors were the 
main explanatory factors. In support of this, Dong et al. (2006) found that stocks were likely 
to be used for acquisitions as the two firms involved had a high valuation. They measured the 
firms’ valuations with P/B and P/V, which are based on managerial perceptions, reasoning that 
 
‘It could be argued that it is not actual misvaluation that influences takeovers, but merely an 
incorrect perception by managers that there is overvaluation. If managers believe that the 
price-to-book ratio is an indicator of misvaluation, they may make takeover decisions based 
on this measure.’  
Dong et al. (2006:756) 
 
Following this, Ben-David et al. (2015) used short interest as a measure for mispricing where 
short interest is a sophisticated investors’ belief regarding a firm’s misvaluation. The authors 
suggest that bidders engaging in stock-financed acquisitions have stronger short interest, which 
distinguishes the measure used for the real investment opportunities of the firm. The 
mechanism is that short-sellers tend to take (avoid) a short position in overvalued (undervalued) 
stocks. Further, their study suggested that firms in the top quintile of short interest are 54 
percent more likely to engage in stock-financed acquisitions, which is consistent with the 
misvaluation hypothesis.  
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Studying the willingness of targets to accept overvalued stocks, Burch et al. (2012) found that 
institutions tend to accept or hold stocks with high valuation. It was found more than 56 percent 
of the institutions in their sample sell target stocks before the completion of an M&A or convert 
them to bidder stocks soon after that. Contradicting the view that targets accept overvalued 
stocks by mistake (Rhodes-Kropf and Visvanathan, 2004)17, Burch et al. (2012) found that 
institutional shareholders time the market using highly valued stocks. Managers find it easier 
to use overvalued stocks to liquidate their holding position. They can sell stocks before the 
market downgrades the value of stocks. In addition, they presumably believe that highly valued 
firms are also well-performing firms or those with better investment opportunities. Hence, 
holding stocks in these firms can generate benefits in the future.   
 
Studies that examine the misvaluation hypothesis largely borrow MTBV as a measure for 
mispricing, (Rhodes-Kropf and Visvanathan, 2005; Dong et al., 2006). However, Di Giuli 
(2013) argued that MTBV is problematic for misvaluation as it is a proxy for both mispricing 
and investment opportunities. Specifically, a firm that has better investment opportunity or is 
highly valued leads to the same prediction that its MTBV is high. This is even misleading in 
industries of high growth prospects. So as to disentangle the two effects, the author proposed 
a new measure for investment opportunities, which is the average ratio of capital expenditures 
over assets in the four years following the merger. The proxy is based on post-merger 
investments. Using this on a sample of 1,187 mergers between 1990 and 2005, the author found 
that one standard deviation increase in capital expenditure increases the probability of paying 
acquisitions with stocks rather than cash by 7.5 percent, suggesting that better investment 
opportunities lead bidders to increase stock payments for acquisitions.  
 
                                                          
17 The mistake refers to an overestimation of the synergy or underestimation of the market-wide overvaluation. 
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Rather than the misvaluation hypothesis, which predicts cash as a means of payment for 
undervalued targets, the supply-driven explanation proposed by Zhang (2009) suggests that 
cash is likely to be used as a means of payment for acquisitions when the popularity of cash 
for target shareholders is high and target firms are less active and more constrained. Offering 
what the target shareholders want, bidders also reinforce their bargaining position in an M&A 
deal. It was found that cash paid to target shareholders with greater cash popularity is associated 
with lower offer premiums.  
 
Additional factors also exhibit a significant impact on the method of payment include. First, 
the size of the firm relates to the method of payment. Dong et al. (2006) suggest that equity is 
more likely to be used for acquisitions involving large bidder and target firms. It can be 
interpreted as follows: bidders may find it hard to borrow large amount of cash to finance a 
large target and thus use stocks as a substitute (Martin, 1996; Moeller et al. 2004). Further, 
tender offers are more likely to be associated with cash payment whereas mergers are more 
likely to be associated with stock payments (Martin, 1996). In addition, cash is likely to finance 
hostile takeovers and generate higher abnormal returns for bidders (Schwert, 2000). In a cross-
border M&A settlement, the legal environment differences across the countries also affect the 
method of payment (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009).  
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2.3. M&A performance 
M&A performance is the consequence of M&As, which is one of the direct criteria that assess 
the success of an M&A deal. It is a well-documented fact that targets receive positive market 
reactions around the M&A announcement date, whereas bidders on average do not gain (Dodd 
and Ruback, 1977; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2013). As abnormal returns for short-term period may 
not fully capture the announcement effect of a takeover, studies have also assessed the long-
term performance of the firm (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Agrawal 
and Jaffe, 2000), since it reflects the holding experience of the investors. Some studies have 
also assessed the operating performance of the firm in the post-merger period, which is an 
accounting-based approach (Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova 
et al., 2006). Overall, M&A performance is sensitive to the sample period examined18, the 
sample criteria selected and the benchmark models employed to calculate abnormal returns of 
a firm. 
 
A number of factors have had a significant impact on the abnormal returns of the firm, and 
been summarised into two broad categories: firm-specific characteristics and deal-specific 
characteristics. Studies that link the M&A performance of firms include those variables as 
standard controls, such as MTBV (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), 
the size of the firm (Asquith et al., 1983; Moeller et al., 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2013), the 
method of payment (Travos, 1987; Franks et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), target status 
(Fuller et al., 2002; Antoniou et al., 2007), merger choices (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; 
                                                          
18 There are six merger waves defined in the M&A literature (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). The first merger 
wave was between 1890 and 1903, the second merger wave was between 1910 and 1929, the third merger wave 
was between 1950 and 1973, the fourth wave is between 1981 and 1989, the fifth wave was between 1993 and 
2001, with the sixth merger starting in 2003.  
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Berkovitch and Khanna, 1991), deal attitude (Schwert, 2000; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006) 
and industry relatedness (Morck et al., 1990; Agrawal et al., 1992).  
 
2.3.1. Short-term performance 
Numerous studies have examined the abnormal returns for the bidder firm, target firm, and the 
combined firm with the event study. This approach has become dominated in analysing the 
abnormal returns of the firms since it was first adopted by Fama et al. (1969). According to 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), abnormal returns are the difference between the realised returns of 
the firm and the benchmark returns:  
 
‘Abnormal returns are measured by the difference between actual and expected stock returns. 
The expected stock return is measured conditional on a realised return on a market index to 
take account of the influence of market-wide events on the returns of individual securities.’  
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983:6) 
 
Early event studies measure abnormal returns of the firm around the effective date of merger. 
However, Dodd and Ruback (1977) argued that the price effect could be released prior to the 
announcement date, leading the price effect surrounding the completion date to be insignificant 
(Asquith, 1983). Martynova and Renneboog (2011) proposed the necessity of observing both 
the pre-announcement and post-announcement returns in an M&A study, since both are able 
to measure M&A performance of the firm. Specifically, pre-announcement returns could 
capture the information leakage, insider trading and market anticipation of an M&A deal while 
post-announcement returns could reflect market correction for investor sentiment, such that 
they over- or under-react to the M&A deal.  
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Martynova and Renneboog (2011) hold that M&A information is partially released prior to the 
M&A announcement date, suggesting that investors could learn about the bidder’s objective of 
takeover, the target’s attitude towards to the bid and so forth prior to the announcement date. 
As such, abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date of a merger may not be able to 
fully reflect the market reactions to an M&A bid. Following this view, Schwert (1996) 
measured investors’ reaction to the M&A announcement with stock price change in a period 
of 42 trading days prior to the announcement date and the announcement date. Stock price 
change in the post-announcement period captures additional information that pre-
announcement period fails to do, such as, the level of post-merger integration and the 
performance of successful and failed deals. However, it is difficult to assess the post-
announcement effect separate from other effects that also lead to a change of stock price 
following a merger, such as financial or operational performance (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). In spite of these factors, studies that examine the wealth creation from M&As have 
employed a relatively short event window holding that price change around the announcement 
date fully reflects M&A performance (Asquith, 1983; Dodd, 1980).  
 
M&A studies have revealed appealing features of abnormal returns of firms by merger waves. 
It is well-established that M&As generally create value for the two firms involved prior to the 
fifth merger wave starting in 1993. Investigating the price change of the entire merger process 
between 1962 and 1976, Asquith (1983) found positive announcement returns for bidder and 
target firms regardless of deal outcomes. More specifically, targets enjoyed 6.2 percent two-
day excess returns19 for successful deals and this figure up to 7 percent for unsuccessful deals 
                                                          
19 The two-day excess return is the sum of abnormal returns in the window one day prior to the takeover 
announcement date and the takeover announcement date.  
Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Performance 
 
58 
 
while bidders enjoyed 0.2 percent two-day excess returns for successful deals and 0.5 percent 
for unsuccessful deals.  
 
Reviewing thirteen studies examining abnormal returns of both bidders and targets between 
1950s and 1980s, Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that targets gain from M&As, whereas 
bidders do not loss on average in abnormal returns around the announcement date. Of particular 
note, targets outperform bidders in the samples of successful and unsuccessful M&A deals, 
whereas bidders generally gain in successful M&A deals. In addition, bidder abnormal returns 
are high regardless of whether the merger choice is a tender offer or merger for successful 
M&A deals, and the two firms suffer small losses in abnormal returns for failed tender offers 
and mergers. Franks and Harris (1989), who conducted an out-of-sample test, reported target 
announcement returns in the range between 25 and 30 percent while bidders earn zero or 
modest gains based on a sample of 1,800 U.K. takeovers announced in the period of 1955 to 
1985, consistent with those in the work of Jensen and Ruback (1983).  
 
Studies have shown significantly positive bidder announcement returns prior to 1993. 
Analysing a sample of U.S. tender offers between 1958 and 1978, Dodd and Ruback (1977) 
found that bidders earned 2.83 percent abnormal returns in a period of the announcement date 
until 20 days following a takeover. Focusing on a similar sample period of Dodd and Ruback 
(1977), Franks et al. (1977) reported abnormal returns of 4.6 percent for U.K. bidders. Studying 
a comprehensive U.S. M&A sample, Schwert (1996) found both the two firms earn 
significantly positive announcement returns regardless of merger choice. Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000), focusing on a sample consisting of both domestic and cross-border M&As between 
1964 and 1983, found that abnormal returns to a U.S. bidder’s acquisition of a Canadian firm 
were zero, whereas a Canadian bidder earned significantly positive in domestic M&As. Jensen 
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(1988) explained positive bidder abnormal returns as the effectiveness of the market for 
corporate control returns prior to 1990s when managers compete to improve the efficiency of 
the firm through M&As. 
 
Whilst studies have found significantly negative bidder abnormal returns around the 
announcement date after the start of the fifth merger wave, identifying various sources of value 
destruction, such as agency problems, managerial overconfidence and market mispricing. 
Agency problems suggest that the value of the firm is likely to be transferred from a firm that 
is associated with severe conflicts of interests between the shareholder and the manager. 
Harford et al. (2012) found entrenched bidder managers engaging in a value-destroying M&A 
for fear of their stocks being diluted avoid using all equity, which in return destroys the firm’s 
value. Moreover, entrenched managers avoid biding private targets that can potentially create 
value for the combined firm, and they overpay for public firms and firms of low synergies. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007), who examined the effect of managerial overconfidence on bidder 
gains between 1980 and 2004, found that bidder announcement returns were lower for a higher 
order acquisition than a lower order acquisition, explaining this as the managerial self-
attribution bias. Using a large sample of U.S. mergers between 1978 and 2000, Dong et al. 
(2006) found negative abnormal returns for overvalued bidders’ acquisition of a less 
overvalued target. In such a case, bidder managers sacrifice the wealth of shareholders in the 
short term to protect the wealth of the shareholders in the long term, and this finding is also 
supported by Ang and Cheng (2006).   
 
The sixth merger wave that started in 2003 witnessed some similar patterns of M&A 
performance as those in the fifth merger wave. Alexandridis et al. (2010) suggest that bidder 
abnormal returns decrease with the competitiveness of the takeover market. Studying a 
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worldwide M&A sample consisting of M&As announced between 1990 and 2007, the authors 
suggest that bidders in the takeover competitive markets (i.e. U.S., U.K. and Canada) tend to 
overpay, resulting in loss in the announcement returns, whereas bidders beyond these three 
countries on average realise gains. Their study suggests that bidder abnormal returns vary 
significantly from market to market. In spite of lower offer premiums are paid for targets during 
the sixth merger wave than the fifth merger wave, bidders do not gain. Alexandridis et al. (2012) 
underlined this to free cash flow problem, suggesting that the firms undertaking M&As in the 
sixth merger wave tend to have lower valuation and higher cash balances than those in the fifth 
merger wave, indicating that cash payment dominates stock payments in this period.      
 
2.3.2. Long-term performance 
2.3.2.1. Stock performance 
A large body of M&A research has documented significant negative bidder abnormal returns 
in the long-term up to a five-year period following a merger (Asquith, 1983; Jensen and Rubuck, 
1983; Agrawal et al., 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Franks and 
Harris, 1989) 20. Asquith (1983), examining the bidder’s performance in the post-acquisition 
up to 240 trading days following a takeover announcement date, reported a dramatic decline in 
bidder abnormal returns compared with those on the outcome date of a merger. Specifically, 
bidder abnormal returns decreased by 1.9 percent in the 100 days and by 7.2 percent in the 240 
days following the date of the deal outcome. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reported negative 
bidder abnormal returns of -5.5 percent in the year following a merger and noted that the result 
is unsettling as it indicates market inefficiency. They further suggested this finding as the 
market’s overestimation of the synergies accompanying a merger. Ruback (1988) late accepted 
                                                          
20 Despite these studies, Higson and Elliott (1998) reported zero abnormal returns in the three years following a 
merger to the U.K. bidders between 1975 and 1990. In addition, equal-weighted abnormal returns to bidders were 
found to be insignificant while bidders whose abnormal returns were calculated with the value-weighted returns 
were positive and small. 
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the result that significant negative abnormal returns to bidders over the two years following a 
merger as a fact. The notion that the market is inefficient has been supported by many 
additional studies in favour of negative bidder long-term abnormal returns. Agrawal et al. 
(1992), among other researchers, also reported negative bidder abnormal returns of -10 percent 
over five years after a merger and their results continue to hold after controlling for size effect 
and beta risk in various benchmark models.  
 
Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), citing the work of Agrawal et al. (1992), attribute underperformance 
as a ‘post-merger performance puzzle’. The authors outlined the method of payment and the 
performance extrapolation hypotheses to this underperformance puzzle. The former hypothesis 
indicates that when equity is used, the bidder is likely to be overvalued, and when cash is used, 
the bidder is undervalued. Since the overvaluation will be corrected by the market in the long 
term, stock-financed acquisitions are associated with negative market reactions, while cash-
financed acquisitions generate positive market reactions. The performance extrapolation 
hypothesis indicates that the market overestimates the firms with high MTBV, which creates a 
strong momentum around the takeover announcement date and leads to a strong long-term 
reversal. Thus, Agrawal and Jaffe’s findings (2000) are consistent with those of Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). In a similar vein, Gregory (1997), who examined the relationship between 
long-term abnormal returns and the free cash flow of a firm in the U.K. market, noted that firms 
with high Q and low free cash flow are overvalued and underperform in the market in the long 
term.  
 
Another explanation for bidders’ underperformance in the long term is the neglect of the post-
merger integration process. Hansen (1987) indicates larger potential revaluation loss is 
associated with the greater relative size of the target to the bidder. Moeller et al. (2004) suggest 
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that large deals require more diligent work by bidders, and they are associated with 
considerable integration costs that lead to downward synergies. Despite their study not directly 
addressing the long-term performance of the bidders, managers of a larger firm are likely to be 
hubris-infected due to extensive managerial autonomy in the firm, causing more negative 
announcement returns. Likewise, Antoniou et al. (2008) re-addressed the loss in the long-term 
abnormal returns as the neglect of post-merger integration in a sample of U.K. public 
acquisitions.  
 
Others attribute bidders’ underperformance in the post-merger period to misspecifications of 
the benchmark models employed. Franks et al. (1991), who tested a sample of 399 U.S. 
takeovers between 1975 and 1984, suggested underperformance is measurement errors of the 
models. The authors use multiple benchmark models in assessing the long-term performance 
of the bidder and find insignificant abnormal returns, and the results are significantly different 
depending on which portfolio is used: the equally- or value-weighted. Moreover, the authors 
claim that long-term abnormal returns are largely dependent upon the relative size of the target 
and the bidder, the method of payment, and the models employed. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
also addressed bad model problems. They proposed multifactor models instead of a single 
model to avoid mean-variance inefficiencies, and control firms of similar size and MTBV to 
calculate long-term abnormal returns within five years following a merger. Their approaches 
showed well-specified test statistics.  
 
2.3.2.2. Operating performance  
Researchers also measure bidder long-term performance using operating performance by 
assessing the firm’s performance from its fundamentals, avoiding measurement errors from the 
benchmark models based on an efficiency market. (Healy et al., 1992; Barber and Lyon, 1996; 
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Ghosh, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova et al., 2006). According to Powell and Stark 
(2005), previous M&A studies for assessing a firm’s operating performance following a merger 
were prepared from three perspectives: the measures, the deflator choices21 and benchmark 
models. Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest the important roles that firm size and pre-
announcement performance played in operating performance, showing test statistics well when 
controlling for these two factors in the matched firm sample.  
 
Studies commonly employ cash flows as a proxy to assess a firm’s operating performance 
following a merger (Healy et al., 1992; Barber and Lyon, 1996), as other accounting-based 
measures are likely to be manipulated after takeovers (Powell and Stark, 2005). Healy et al. 
(1992), examining a sample of 50 largest U.S. publicly industrial mergers completed between 
1979 and mid-1984 and using operating cash flows and asset productivity as proxies for 
operating performance, found strong operating improvements following a merger. In a further 
analysis, the authors found a positive relationship between abnormal returns and operating cash 
flow performance of the bidder, implying that the market can predict the operating performance 
of the firm.  
 
Likewise, Switzer (1996) in his study focusing on a relative large sample size finds firms’ 
operating performance improved following a merger, regardless of the firm’s size, relatedness 
of the two firms and bidder leverage. Linn and Switzer (2001) also provide evidence in support 
of the existence of improvement in a post-merger performance. According to their study, cash 
payment is associated with significantly greater change in operating performance than stock 
payments. Their results indicate that bidders use cash as they have private information about 
                                                          
21 Powell and Stark (2005) have reviewed a series of studies relating to the techniques used in scaling the 
accounting measures.  
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the potential synergies to be realised in the long term, reflected in an improvement of operating 
performance.    
 
However, Ghosh (2001) challenges the findings of Healy et al. (1992) by arguing that such an 
improvement in operating performance is due to the fact that firms engaging in acquisitions are 
larger firms compared with their industry peers. In most cases, large firms enjoy superior 
performance, thus examining the operating performance of the firm exists bias when including 
large firms. To combat this concern, the author uses firms matched on size and performance as 
a benchmark to account for pre-performance of the bidder and compares the operating 
performance of the firm before and after mergers with the matched firm sample. His study 
shows little evidence that operating cash flow performance improves following a merger.  
 
Many additional studies borrowing different operating measures have shown a decline to 
operating performance following a merger (Mueller, 1980; Clark and Ofek, 1994; Fu et al., 
201322). Mueller (1980) observed a decrease of operating performance measured with ROE, 
sales growth rate and total asset growth rate. Clark and Ofek (1994), studying a sample of 
M&As with financially distressed targets and using earnings before interests, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITD) as a proxy23 for operating performance also document a decline in 
operating performance.   
 
Using different accounting-based measures for the firm’s operating performance, Gugler et al. 
(2003) reported mixed results in a sample of worldwide M&As announced between 1981 and 
1998. More specifically, measuring operating performance with Profit/Assets, the authors were 
                                                          
22 Fu et al. (2013) detected the operating performance by focusing on a test for an implication of the misvaluation 
hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), which is whether the long-term performance of the stock bidders 
improves when they use overvalued stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions.     
23 His study scaled EBITD with revenues, which is EBITD/Revenues.  
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able to show an improvement in operating performance while the results decreased when 
measured with Sales/Assets. Similarly, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) used four different 
accounting-based measures to detect the operating performance for a sample of European and 
U.K. M&As between 1997 and 2001. Controlling for industry, size and pre-takeover 
performance in the matched firm sample, the authors showed that the previous significant 
decrease in operating performance tends to be insignificant. In addition, the authors indicate 
when the intercept model (or the regression-based model) was applied, the profitability tended 
to be significantly positive and when the change model used the profitability tends to decrease. 
Once again, their studies indicated that a firm’s long-term operating performance was sensitive 
to the factors controlled and benchmark models employed.  
 
2.3.3. Factors influencing M&A performance 
2.3.3.1. The method of payment  
The performance of the firms involved in an M&A deal are dependent upon a number of factors 
examined in M&A literature (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Eckbo, 2009), and the 
method of payment has been widely studied in this regard. A review of the method of payment 
hypotheses was presented in the 2.2.4 section of this thesis.  
 
There is unanimous agreement among researchers that cash payment outperforms stock 
payments in the short term. Studying a sample of U.S. acquisitions in the period of 1980 to 
2001, Moeller et al. (2004) reported 1.38 percent bidder abnormal returns for acquisitions were 
financed by cash, which is higher than stocks (0.15%). Martynova and Renneboog (2006), who 
employed an 11-day window to calculate the bidder cumulative abnormal returns in a sample 
of E.U. acquisitions, also reported quite similar results. In their study, though stock-financed 
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acquisitions can generate positive abnormal returns to bidders, they are significantly lower than 
the returns on cash payment, 11.1 percent as opposed to 20.17 percent.  
 
Similar results were reported in the M&A studies that focus on the bidders’ long-term abnormal 
returns. Loughran and Vijh (1997) examining 947 acquisitions in the period 1970 to 1989 noted 
that stock-financed mergers significantly underperformed cash-financed tender offers in the 
five years following a merger, -25 percent as opposed to 65 percent. These authors provided 
two proposed reasons in support of this finding. First, it was found that M&As that are paid in 
cash are also tender offers that replace inefficient management and thus improve a firm’s value. 
Secondly, bidders pay with stocks if the stocks are overvalued, leading to a decline in value  
after market correction. In this vein, Bouwman et al. (2003), examining a sample of U.S. 
acquisitions between 1979 and 1998 and using a two-year period following the acquisition, 
reported negative excess returns of 7.03 percent for all stock-financed mergers whereas there 
were insignificant excess returns of -1.76 percent for their cash counterparts. Analysing bidders’ 
long-term abnormal returns in a three-year period following an acquisition in a U.S. sample 
between 1984 and 2001, Ang and Cheng (2006) reported negative excess returns of -12.45 
percent for all-stock financed acquisitions, the result the authors explained with the 
misvaluation hypothesis. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), focusing the U.K. market, reported 
significantly negative abnormal returns for stock-financed acquisitions in the period 2 to 36 
months following an acquisition regardless of the level of the price to bidders’ earnings ratio.  
 
Researchers have addressed the effect of the payment method on the firm’s performance by 
different M&A subsamples. Bouwman et al. (2003), who examined bidder abnormal returns 
by merger choice, indicated that abnormal returns to bidders were lower for acquisitions 
financed by stocks compared with those financed by cash, the result is more significant for the 
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merger subsample than the tender offer subsample. In a sample of U.S. acquisitions between 
1979 and 1998 and to calculate bidder abnormal returns with a 3-day window, the authors 
demonstrated insignificant positive abnormal returns for a sample of tender offers financed by 
cash and stocks: 0.36 percent and -0.62 percent, while for those mergers, bidders enjoy 
significantly positive abnormal returns for cash-financed acquisitions (0.88%) and significantly 
negative abnormal returns for stock-financed acquisitions (-0.79%).    
 
Whilst numerous M&A studies documenting evidence show that cash payment generates 
positive abnormal returns and stock payments generate negative abnormal returns for bidders, 
Chang (1998) reported significantly negative bidder abnormal returns for stock-financed public 
acquisitions (-2.46%), but insignificantly negative bidder abnormal returns for cash-financed 
public acquisitions (-0.02%). However, these results are reversed when targets are private firms 
(i.e. unlisted firms). In particular, bidder abnormal returns for stock-financed private 
acquisitions are significantly positive (2.64%) whereas cash-financed private acquisitions are 
insignificantly positive (0.09%). This author provided three hypotheses to underline this 
finding: the limited competition hypothesis, the monitoring hypothesis and the information 
hypothesis. The limited competition hypothesis indicates that positive bidder abnormal returns 
are due to the high probability of underpayment given weak competition for private 
acquisitions. The monitoring hypothesis indicates outstanding performance achieved by 
bidders using stocks for private acquisitions, as paying with stocks creates new block holders 
that motivate the firm’s performance. The information asymmetry hypothesis indicates that the 
market may re-evaluate the bidder’s valuation and reacts positively to the bid announcement 
based on the rationale that private targets value stocks with caution. This finding is also 
supported by Draper and Paudyal (2006) who have examined the U.K. takeover market where 
a large majority of deals involve a private target firm.  
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2.3.3.2. Target status 
Target status plays an important role in explaining bidder announcement returns. In most cases, 
a private target is an illiquid firm, motivating the bidder to restore price discounts through 
takeovers. Furthermore, a private target has a weak bargaining position, which reduces M&A 
offer premiums. Studying a sample of 3,135 acquisitions between 1990 and 2000 and using a 
5-day window for CARs, Fuller et al. (2002) found significantly positive returns were created 
for bidder firms. When looking into subsamples according to target status, the authors noted 
that bidder announcement returns were -1.0 percent when the target was a publicly-listed firm, 
2.1 percent when the target was a privately-held firm and 2.8 percent when the target was a 
subsidiary. Results are similar to Moeller et al.’s work (2007) employing a 3-day window for 
CARs. Moller et al. (2007) studied a sample of 4,322 U.S. acquisitions announced between 
1980 and 2002 and found that for all stock-financed acquisitions, the value of the bidder 
declined by 2.3 percent when the target was a public firm, whereas it increased by 3.4 percent 
when the target was a private firm. Their results are also supported by Conn et al. (2005) who 
reported significantly loss in bidder abnormal returns in acquisitions involving a public target 
when analysing a sample of U.K. M&As between 1984 and 2000.  
 
Contradicting this line of studies, Bradley and Sundaram (2004) show that private firms 
decrease the wealth effect of the bidder. Analysing a sample of over 12,000 U.S. acquisitions 
between 1990 and 2000 and measuring abnormal returns in a window of 1 day and 24 days 
after the M&A announcement date, the authors found that bidder announcement returns were 
significantly negative (-10.09%). In particular, all-stock payments decreased the value of the 
bidder firm by 6.35 percent for public acquisitions, whereas a decrease of 14 percent was noted 
for private acquisitions. It can be argued that private firms are associated with high risks as 
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their information is less transparent than public firms, hampering synergy estimation of the 
target firm.  
 
2.3.3.3. Merger relatedness 
Unrelated acquisitions24 refer to the two firms involved in an M&A deal being from different 
industries. Researchers have not reached a consensus on whether diversifying acquisitions 
improves the value of a firm. Datta et al. (1992) in a review study identified the wealth of 
shareholders in a related acquisition was created through a transfer of core skills, economies of 
scale, economies of scope and the value enhancement from the market power. The wealth of 
shareholders in an unrelated acquisition is created through risk diversification, cheaper access 
to capital, and value enhancement resulting from operational efficiency.  
 
Morck et al. (1990) found diversified acquisitions are associated with lower bidder abnormal 
returns, reasoning that there was a lack of experience when managers step into an unrelated 
field. In support of this, Berger and Ofek (1995), by comparing the stand-alone value of the 
firm and the market value of the firm in a diversified M&A deal, find that the market value of 
the firm following a diversified acquisition was on average between 13 percent and 15 percent 
loss in abnormal returns. Denis et al. (2002) claimed that neither global diversification strategy 
nor industrial diversification strategy can create value for the firm. Contradicting this thread of 
literature, Comment and Jarrell (1995) noted that corporate diversification increased the wealth 
of shareholders in 1980s, identifying that diversification strategy as enhancing the firm’s value 
through economies of scale.  
 
 
                                                          
24 Also known as diversified or conglomerate acquisitions. 
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2.3.3.4. Merger attitudes 
The attitude of a merger can be broadly split into two, namely, solicited (friendly) and 
unsolicited (hostile). A hostile deal refers to a deal opposed by the board of the target 
management. Servaes (1991) reports loss in bidder announcement returns of hostile deals, 
reasoning that the hostile bid results in high offer premiums or an increase of the probability 
that a deal will fail. And in either case, bidders receive negative market reactions. In  contrast, 
friendly bids create value for both the bidder and the target firms, according to Morck et al. 
(1988).  
 
Schwert (2000) wrote that “the distinction between hostile and friendly offers is largely a 
reflection of negotiation strategy” and “hostile takeovers mean different things to different 
people”, implying that hostile takeovers do not reveal useful information to the market. The 
author finds little evidence of the relationship between bidder announcement returns and hostile 
deals based on the SDC data. The findings support the view that target managers opposing 
hostile bids either because they are entrenched or because they use it as a bargaining strategy, 
which contradicts Lang et al.’s view (1989) that target managers opposing hostile takeovers 
signals to the market that their firm is well managed and creates value for the combined firm.   
 
2.3.3.5. Merger choice 
The choice of an acquisition includes tender offers and mergers. Tender offers are a share 
purchase directly proposed to target shareholders, whereas mergers involve a negotiation 
between the boards of the two firms involved. There are two advantages to initiating an 
acquisition with tender offers, rather than mergers. First, tender offers avoid lengthy 
negotiation processes. Golubov et al. (2012) indicate that the speed of deal completion for 
tender offer is greater than that of the merger. They found that tender offers are approximately 
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55 days shorter than mergers in a sample of completed bids: 1,650 completed deals out of a 
1,836 M&A sample. Secondly, initiating tender offers does not need the prior approval or a 
contract with the target management (Betton et al., 2008), reducing bidder managers’ efforts.   
 
However, tender offers are relatively costly for bidders. Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015), by 
analysing a sample of hand-collected U.S. acquisitions announced between 2007 and 2012, 
found that tender offers were associated with higher offer premiums than mergers since tender 
offers may indicate the market that targets would generate large synergies for the combined 
firm. In this sense, the authors should expect a positive relationship between tender offers and 
bidder gains. However, they do not provide direct evidence in support of this implication. 
Instead, they find that tender offers incur negative bidder abnormal returns, as bidders initiating 
a tender offer are regarded as bad news. Moeller et al. (2004) support their view with positive 
bidder abnormal returns associated with tender in a sample of completed U.S. acquisitions25. 
The finding is more appealing for tender offers involving a larger bidder than a smaller bidder 
(Offenberg and Pirinsky, 2015). It can be concluded that tender offers, though costly, reduce 
the speed of the M&A process that turns out to be effective for M&As.  
 
It is expected the use of tender offers increase the firms’ M&A performance. Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) indicate that tender offers are associated with higher bidder and target 
announcement returns than those of mergers. They reported 29 percent of abnormal returns to 
target shareholders in tender offers compared with 16 percent to mergers, and 4 percent in 
tender offers compared with zero gains in mergers. Franks and Harris (1989) reported 24 
percent abnormal returns in the month of the announcement date to the target shareholders, 
                                                          
25 Offenberg and Pirinsky (2015) suggest that tender offers are more likely to be associated the deal is completed 
than mergers.  
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which are significantly higher than those recorded in tender offers (14.8%). Bidders also enjoy 
high abnormal returns in tender offers, reporting a positive 1.2 percent abnormal returns in 
tender offers, higher than those in other offers (-3.6%).   
 
Many additional studies have provided explanations of the fact that abnormal returns in tender 
offers are higher than those of mergers. Bradley et al. (1988) suggest positive target returns in 
tender offers are a result of increased competitiveness of the market, reasoning that the 
introduction of the William Act in 1968 is the main driving force. However, this view has been 
challenged by Franks and Harris (1989), who found positive returns to the U.K. targets both 
before and after 1968. Martin (1996) and Dong et al. (2006) suggest that tender offers are likely 
to be those acquisitions financed by cash that conveys the market good news. Kohers et al. 
(2007) suggest bidders’ propensity for using tender offers is larger in the cases where targets 
are defensive and there are multiple bidders. This line of studies suggests that bidders can better 
explore synergies when proposing tender offers.      
 
2.3.3.6. Size and relative size 
The size of each firm involved in an M&A deal is also an important factor influencing M&A 
performance of the firm. Agrawal et al. (1992) were the first to account for the size of the firm 
when examining the bidder long-term abnormal returns, as there are a large number of large 
firms in their sample. Further to this, Moeller et al. (2004) find bidder size is a key factor in 
explaining bidder’s performance. These authors examined the relationship between bidder size 
and firm performance in the M&As and find that managers of large bidders tend to destroy 
more of the firm’s value than their smaller counterparts, reasoning that managers of large firms 
who do not have any restrictions regarding using the firm’s resources potentially dissipate these 
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resources in M&As. Evidence that bidder size and bidder gains are negatively correlated is also 
supported in prior M&A studies (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Moeller et al., 2005).   
 
In addition, target size is also a crucial factor in assessing M&A performance. Analysing a 
sample of 3,691 U.S. mergers between 1990 and 2007, Alexandridis et al. (2013) find a 
negative relationship between target size and bidder gains. In particular, announcement returns 
to large targets were 2.37 percent lower than small targets and bidder announcement returns 
decrease by 1.1 percent for every standard deviation increases in target size. The authors 
explain this as post-merger integration problem of large deals, as they are complex, hence, they 
are hard to create value for the firm. According this theme in the literature, relative size as well 
as the size of the two firms are essential in examining M&A performance of the firm and should 
therefore be included (Agrawal et al., 1992; Loderer and Martin, 1992).26  
 
Relative size is the deal value scaled by the bidder value, which captures the materiality of the 
deal decision to the bidder. A larger ratio indicates that the M&A decision is relatively more 
important to the bidder. Relative size measures the value of the two firms involved in an M&A 
deal, exhibiting a substantial impact on M&A outcomes. Asquith et al. (1983), by examining 
the effect of relative size of the target and bidder on bidder gains, noted a very small target firm 
relative to the bidder does not increase the value for the bidder. While a target firm whose size 
is about half of the bidder generates 1.8% higher abnormal returns for the bidder than the target 
whose size is only one-tenth of the bidder. In line with this, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) argue 
that a small target relative to the bidder may fail to raise the market’s attention, leading to 
insignificant market reactions to the bid announcement, which is supported by Loderer and 
Martin (1990) who include private acquisitions in their M&A sample.  
                                                          
26 These authors adjust for size of the firm in assessing a firm’s long-term stock returns.   
Chapter 2. Literature Review: M&A Performance 
 
74 
 
2.3.3.7. Market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio (MTBV) reflects the firm’s prospects, which is also a crucial factor in 
assessing M&A performance of the firm. In a core paper, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that 
the post-merger performance of the glamour bidder (i.e. firms with higher MTBV) is 
significantly worse than that of the value bidder (i.e. firms with lower MTBV) regardless of 
the choices of mergers and payment methods. The authors attempt to justify this finding with 
three hypotheses: the performance extrapolation hypothesis, the method of payment hypothesis 
and the Earnings Per Share (EPS) myopia hypothesis. 
 
Analyzing a comprehensive U.S. acquisition comprising 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers 
between 1980 and 1991, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found that glamour bidders underperform 
value bidders in a three-year period following acquisitions. Their study showed that bidders in 
mergers underperformed their match firms significantly by 4 percent while bidders in tender 
offers enjoyed positive abnormal returns of 9 percent. These results suggest that the market 
tends to over-extrapolate the past performance of the glamour firms. The market believes that 
firms with high MTBV tend to have high past stock returns and high growth in cash flows and 
earnings, leading to an overestimation of the firms’ performance around the announcement 
date. It is suggested that the market belief to the firm’s performance enhances managerial 
confidence and result in an overpayment, which leads to the same prediction of the hubris 
management hypothesis. In addition, the authors revealed that glamour bidders prefer stocks 
to cash as a means of payment for acquisitions, as stocks are overvalued by the market in the 
presence of the market’s over-extrapolation bias. In the long term, market correction to 
overvalued stocks downgrades the price, leading to negative abnormal returns. However, their 
results do not provide any additional support for the prediction that the EPS is an important 
determinant for the glamour bidders’ underperformance.  
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Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) provide similar findings when examining a sample of 
successful U.K. acquisitions between 1983 and 1995. They used two proxies for glamour/value 
stocks: price-to-earnings ratio (PER) and MTBV and assessed the firm’s performance with 
various benchmark models. Their results showed that the value bidders outperformed the 
glamour bidders over three years in the post-merger period, arguing that underperformance in 
the long term is due to the fact that the U.K. market forbids the market to over-extrapolate the 
firm’s past performance.  
 
Pachare (2010) explains the extrapolation phenomenon with the level of market power that a 
firm possesses. He proposes that higher market power possessed by the firm relative to its 
industry peers is associated with a stronger positive investors’ belief in the firm’s prospects. 
Their study indicates that firms with high market power tends to increase the market’s over-
extrapolation, leading a stronger short-term momentum followed by stronger long-term 
reversals.  
 
On the whole, the studies cited above show that MTBV should be included in assessing the 
M&A performance of the firm for both the short and long terms. Fama and French (1993), 
criticizing the work of Agrawal et al. (1992), who do not adjust for MTBV while assessing the 
firm’s M&A performance suggest that MTBV is able to capture a large proportion of the 
average stock returns for the firm. Therefore, it is essential to include MTBV in an M&A study.    
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2.4. Prospect theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were the first to propose prospect theory, which is a descriptive 
theory of decision-making under risks. Such a decision-choice model decipts an S-shaped value 
function, showing concave for gains and convex for losses. There is a diminishing sensitivity 
in the loss and gain domains, and such a trend in loss domain is much steeper than in gain loss. 
This leads to an implication that given an equal change in these two domains people tend to be 
more sensitive to losses rather than gains, i.e. loss-aversion tendency. Since people care about 
the loss more than the gain, they tend to be risk-seeking when experiencing losses and risk-
averse when enjoying gains. However, gauging gain and loss is subjective. The expected 
expected utility27 theory (i.e. EUT)  judges people’s feelings about the gain and loss with a zero 
value, the positive outcome is described as a gain, whereas the negative outcome is regarded 
as a loss. And the theory uses weighted average of outcomes to measure the expected value of 
the choice.28 
 
One of the leading features of prospect theory is that the gain and loss is determined by a 
specific value point, termed as the reference-dependence bias. Even though the outcome is 
postive, it can be regarded as a mental loss if it is below the expectation. In addition, unlike 
EUT, which potrays the outcome of a decision, prospect theory puts much more emphasis on 
a decision-making process, since it outlines how the change of the value affects the outcome 
of a decision. Prospect theory has been widely applied to address various fields of study over 
the decades. Barberis (2013) summarised three important implications of prospect theory: 
diminishing sensitivity, loss-aversion tendency and reference dependence, and these were 
derived from two types of evidence: human-related experiments and empirical evidence.  
                                                          
27 The utility is the value placed on outcome.  
28 According to the EUT, The expected value of the choice is sum of the product of the probability and outcome 
values of each probability.   
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A number of studies document empirical evidence in support of prospect theory. Northcraft 
and Neale (1987) conducted an experiment on the estimates of house price. They found that 
the experienced house agents estimate house prices in relation to a random house-listing price. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002), using the discontinuity analysis, found that current CEOs raise 
new equity in accordance with the share price at the time they started to charge the firm. Shefrin 
and Statman (1985) observed that investors tend to sell winner stocks too early and keep the 
loser stocks too long. In a similar vein, Odean (1998), by studying the detailed trading records 
of 10,000 accounts from 1987 to 1993, which were collected from a large discount of brokerage 
house, found that individual investors were less likely to sell loser stocks to realise paper loss, 
indicating that the loss-aversion is a prevalent feature in the stock market. 
 
2.4.1. Diminishing sensitivity 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest diminishing sensitivities in both the loss and gain 
domains. According to their experiment, subjects tend to be more sensitive when the 
temperature changes from 3 degrees to 6 degrees than if it changes from 13 degrees to 16 
degrees. This assumption also applies to the monetary situation where a loss of $10 has more 
impact on a person with $100 than on a person with $1000. It is suggested that the change of 
the value affects people’s feelings rather than the final states. Finally, the experiment also 
documented that people have a loss-aversion tendency insofar as they are reluctant to realise 
losses relative to the reference point. It has been explained that experiencing pain makes a 
greater impression than experiencing pleasure. 
 
2.4.2. Reference dependence 
A key distinguishing feature between prospect theory and expected utility theory is the 
reference-dependence. Prospect theory describes gains and losses on a bias of a given specific 
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point, which serves as the benchmark. Kahneman (2003) maintained that prospect theory 
captures the decision-making process whilst the expected utility theory simply reflects an 
outcome of the decision-making process, failing to address the effect of the change of the value 
on people’s feelings. The reference-dependence preference also predicts that decision-makers’ 
personal judgements are subjective to an established level of reference, and they are satisfied 
when returns are higher than the reference point and dissatisfied when the returns are lower.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) conducted a series of human-subject experiments, affirming 
that the estimates of participants are influenced by a random number in case of uncertainty. 
Subjects were allocated in different groups and asked the percentage of African countries in 
the United Nations. With insufficient information about this unfamiliar area, subjects randomly 
estimated a number in relation to the arbitrary number provided by the experiment. The median 
estimates for the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were 10 for the group 
given the number of 25, and 65 for the group given the number of 45. Therefore, Tversky and 
Kahneman identified the reference point effect on the decision-making process. 
 
2.4.3. Loss-aversion tendency 
Loss-aversion theory posits that investors generally have a tendency to not be willing to realise 
loss (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), where the loss is relative to a reference point. In addition, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) indicate a diminishing sensitivity suggesting the utility for 
returns diminish in both gain and loss domains. The loss-aversion tendency has entered trading 
behaviour as a disposition effect. Prior studies have put forward loss aversion theory in 
different fields of finance. Using a realised gain and lose model, Barberis and Xiong (2009) 
indicate the disposition effect to describe investors’ trading behaviour. Mehra and Prescott 
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(1985) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) suggest that the disposition effect should provide an 
explanation for the equity premium puzzle.29 
 
2.4.4. Prospect theory and M&As 
Baker et al. (2012) were the first to put forward the idea of applying reference point theory to 
M&As. Studying a comprehensive sample of U.S. public acquisitions, the authors found that 
the reference point price measured with the target 52-week high, has a substantial impact on 
M&A participants’ decisions-making process. Their study indicates that the target 52-week 
high serves as bargaining power for the target who negotiates with the bidder. Since the value 
of the firm is hard to estimate and lacking time in which to process the information, target 
shareholders tend to believe the target 52-week is their firm’s fair value and approve the deals 
if offer price is paid according to this reference point price. Target managers who avoid being 
accused of failure to meet the commitment to the firm attempt to justify the offer price with 
this reference point price. This is similar to bidders who have to justify how much they should 
pay for the targets to obtain the deal. According to Baker et al. (2012), the bidder may reason 
that ‘if the target was valued at a certain level just a few months ago, shouldn’t we, with our 
ability to realise synergies, value it near or above the same level?’, implying that the M&A 
pricing decisions made is not only influenced by the reference point but also by the managerial 
overconfidence, since bidders do not have any solid evidence regarding the target’s value.  
 
Baker et al’s study (2012) showed that the target 52-week high is significantly positively 
related to the offer premium and bidders receive negative market reactions around the takeover 
announcement date when paying for acquisitions based on the target 52-week high. The authors 
                                                          
29 Benartzi and Thaler (1995), building on the study of Mehra and Prescott (1985), proposed the myopia loss-
aversion as a solution to the equity premium puzzle.  
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reason that targets are less likely to give up firms unless the offer premium can compensate 
their mental loss, measured relative to a reference point price. The bidder whose aim is to 
successfully obtain the deal is likely to pay a price relative to the target 52-week high to avoid 
the loss-aversion of the target. According to the analysis of Baker et al. (2012) regarding the 
relationship between deal success and the target 52-week high, it was found that paying 
according to the target reference point increases the likelihood of deal succeeding. While, on 
the other hand, bidder shareholders find a price relative to the target 52-week high as an 
overpayment, since high offer premiums transfer their wealth to that of the target shareholders 
and lead the managers hard to recover following the transaction, thus negatively react to the 
bid announcement. Their findings are consistent with implications of prospect theory. 
 
Following Baker et al’s idea (2012), Chira and Madura (2015) focused on takeover probability 
and the reference point effect. Chira and Madura (2015) suggest that bidders should also assess 
their value according to the bidder reference points, finding that optimistic managers who are 
more likely to acquire their firms (i.e. a management buyout) than the outsiders when the firm’s 
price is low relative to the 52-week high. In addition, their study documented that a firm with 
the nearness 52-week high is probably the bidder, whereas a firm with the farness 52-week 
high is probably the target in an M&A deal, indicating the role of the firm’s 52-week high 
played as the firm’s bargaining power.     
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Abstract 
There is no consensus on how much a target is worth except there are perceptions of the manager and 
the market to the firm’s valuation. This chapter examines the reference point theory of M&As, a 
behavioural finance theory that aims to explain what determines the decision of M&A pricing. The 
researcher put forward Baker et al.’s idea (2012) of finding a strong reference point effect on various 
key aspects of U.S. M&As in the U.K. market, where the reference point effect is expected to have 
stronger explanatory power for offer premiums and the market reactions due to the unique features 
of this market. In this chapter, the reference point effect was used to analyse offer premiums and 
bidder announcement returns of a sample of 155 cross-border and 451 domestic acquisitions into the 
United Kingdom. Using the target firm’s 52-week high as the reference price, an overall significantly 
positive relationship between the reference price and offer premiums was established. In addition, a 
reference point distinguishes the takeover motives of domestic bidders from cross-border bidders. It 
was established that offer premiums driven by the target 52-week high lead to negative market 
reactions for domestic bidders, suggesting evidence of overpayment. However, there is little evidence 
of overpayment in cross-border bidders who pay in accordance with the target 52-week high. The 
findings of this chapter are consistent with prospect theory. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
“Necessity never made a good bargain.” 
Benjamin Franklin 
 
Valuating a target firm is a difficult task for bidders. A sizable stream of M&A research has explained 
the price that a bidder offers for the target from various perspectives of the bidder firm, such as the 
synergy hypothesis and the overpayment hypothesis (Moeller et al., 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2012). 
Under the synergy hypothesis, offer premiums can be viewed as an exchange of the expected 
synergies following acquisitions (Antoniou, et al., 2008), while under the overpayment hypothesis, 
offer premiums are a result of overpayments, which are largely because of managerial overconfidence 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
 
The price that the bidder offers to the target is an outcome of the negotiation between the boards of 
the target and the bidder, and such a price involves the perception of the managerial view of the firm’s 
valuation. Since how large the M&A offer premiums are paid for the target determines the wealth 
distribution between the target and the bidder shareholders, an offer cannot be made without an 
agreement between the two firms involved. With this in mind, analysing takeover motives from either 
the bidder or the target side alone does not fully account for the rationale behind the offer price.  
 
In this chapter, the reference point theory of M&As was established to explain the offer price. The 
theory was first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), depicting how people make decisions 
under risks. Putting this in the context of M&As, the theory sheds light on how managers make major 
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investment decisions facing complex situations. Apart from those behaviour finance theories that 
explain M&A motives from the outcome of the deal, prospect theory allows use to directly observe 
the managerial decision-making process of the offer premium.  
 
Edmister and Walkling (1985) suggest that the offer premium reflects the bargaining power of the 
management teams of the target and the bidder, implying that valuing a firm requires a series of 
cognitive biases of the management team of the bidder and the target. Due to the complexity of the 
M&A activity, the offer premium cannot be set precisely. Therefore, addressing the M&A valuation 
effect requires further investigation from the perspective of managerial cognitive biases. 
 
The reference point effect is an important implication of prospect theory developed by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), affirming that people have a pre-determined piece of information in mind and 
gauge losses and gains according to it, and people’s feelings about the loss and gain tend to diminish 
according to the reference point. They are more sensitive to the value that is nearer the reference point 
than far from it (i.e. diminishing sensitivities). In addition, prospect theory posits that people are 
generally loss-aversion, in that they are not willing to realise loss relative to the reference point they 
have settled upon. The implications of the reference point theory have been highlighted in 
psychological research (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and also applied in financial and economic 
research (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Barberis and Xiong, 2009). 
 
A firm’s 52-week high is publicly available information and serves as a salient reference price in 
previous literature (Heath et al., 1999; Huddart, et al., 2009; Burghof and Prothmann, 2011; Baker et 
al., 2012). In Tversky and Kahneman (1974), people tend to rely heavily on a single piece of 
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information while making decisions. The 52-week high has been widely reported by some financial 
media, which shapes investors’ impression. In addition, investors are likely to be influenced while 
lacking information. Burghof and Prothmann (2011) suggest that the 52-week high effect is more 
pronounced when there is high level of information uncertainty. 
 
Baker et al. (2012) proposed the reference point theory for M&As, examining how target valuation 
could alter the offer premium. These authors were the first to put forward the idea of applying the 
reference point effect on an M&A testing ground. The theory explains the offer premium from a 
psychological perspective from both the bidder and the target sides. The authors indicate that the 
reference point measured by the target 52-week high is positively related to the offer premium. They 
find that bidders tend to offer a price for their targets relative to the target 52-week high, which 
suggests that both targets and bidders are influenced by the reference dependence bias (i.e. the 
reference point effect). In addition, it was found that the market tends to react negatively to the bidder 
announcement when the offer price is paid according to the target 52-week high, which implies that 
the target 52-week high is employed to reinforce the bargaining position of the target during the 
course of the deal negotiation. If a high offer price destroys the wealth of bidder shareholders, why 
bidders pay in accordance with the target 52-week high. On the other hand, what facilities the target 
in using the reference point requires further examination.  
 
This chapter provides further evidence in relation to the reference point effect on the offer premium 
the U.K. market. The reference point effect in a comprehensive public acquisition sample of both 
U.K. domestic bidders and cross-border bidders into U.K. public targets will be investigated. A 
comprehensive public acquisition sample of both domestic and cross-border will enable assessment 
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of the role of the reference point effect plays in a different setting outside U.S. market. Previous 
studies show the level of bidding competition is more intensive in the U.K. takeover market than any 
other takeover market in the world (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Alexandridis et al. (2010) 
found that higher level of competition is accompanied by positive target announcement returns, 
higher offer premiums and negative bidder announcement returns. Their findings suggest that public 
targets in a more competitive market have relatively greater bargaining power in M&A activity, and 
are likely to translate it into higher offer premiums based on their 52-week high. Targets in such an 
environment are more likely to use a reference point price to negotiate for a possible high price from 
the bidder. Therefore, the researcher hypothesises that the reference point theory for M&As is 
pronounced in the U.K. market, which is also competitive. 
 
The researcher contributes to this thread of literature by directly examining the role of reference point 
theory in the setting of cross-border M&As of U.K. targets. Erel et al. (2012) and Uysal et al. (2008) 
affirm that the likelihood of acquisitions increases when the target nation is closer to the bidder nation, 
which suggests geographical distance impedes information transmission in matters of investments. 
Domestic bidders are supposed to have informational advantages over cross-border bidders due to 
the sophisticated local networks. Therefore, it is expected that cross-border bidders lacking 
information about their targets are more likely to put more weight behind publicly accessible 
information such as the target 52-week high. Therefore, bidders might have to offer a premium based 
on the target 52-week high.30 
                                                          
30 Croci et al. (2012) provided an alternative explanation regarding information asymmetry and offer premiums, arguing 
that bidders with favourable asymmetry information tend to offer higher premiums. Bidders can therefore be expected to 
regard the target 52-week high as its potential profit-generating ability, and offer high premiums when the target 52-week 
high supports the favourable asymmetry information they might have.    
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Furthermore, strong investor protection in the U.K. market could potentially reinforce the reference 
point effect. Under the shareholder-oriented legislation environment, U.K. target managers are 
unlikely to pursue private benefits at shareholders’ expense (Armour and Skeel, 2007). Wulf (2004), 
however, found U.S. evidence that agency conflicts between the target manager and the shareholder 
result in low offer premiums as target managers accept cheap offers associated with larger personal 
benefits. Therefore, the reference point effect should be more pronounced in markets with stronger 
investor protection than those without. In this pursuit, the U.K. market also provides an ideal testing 
ground for the reference point theory. 
 
Accounting for the majority of the deals in the European countries, the U.K. takeover market is the 
second largest market in the world (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Croci et al., 2010; Gugler et al., 
2012).31 Recent decades have seen a rapid growth of cross-border bidders’ acquisitions of U.K. public 
targets. Many additional studies focus on the cross-border M&As into the U.K. market. Danbolt (1995) 
attributes the U.K. takeover boom in the late 1980s to the growth of cross-border acquisitions. 
Following his study, Gregory and O'Donohoe (2014) analysed 119 cross-border bidders into the 
United Kingdom over the period 1990-2005, where the cross-border acquisitions took up to 41% of 
their U.K. public acquisition sample. 
 
                                                          
31 By studying comprehensive European acquisitions announced between 1997 and 2000, Faccio and Masulis (2005) 
reported a large proportion of deals involving U.K. bidders (65.3%) and U.K. targets (47.0%). Croci et al. (2010) indicate 
that U.K. takeover market is an active takeover market which accounts for 65% of mergers in Europe. By studying the 
U.K. completed mergers during the fifth merger wave, Gugler et al. (2012) found that the U.K. experiences a similar 
takeover trend compared with the United States. In the U.K. M&A market, the overall transaction value reached $360 
million in 2000. At the same time, the total transaction value for the M&A market in other major European countries was 
$260 million. 
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Given the strong investor protection in the U.K. market, cross-border M&As directed at U.K. targets 
provide a natural hedge against any economic and political instability for the bidder. To the best 
knowledge of this researcher, this is the first study using a cross-border M&A sample to test the 
reference point theory of M&As in the U.K. market. The findings of this chapter imply that stronger 
investor protection enhances the target bargaining power, increasing the probability of the target 
requires higher offer premiums from the bidder based on the target 52-week high. 
 
The results of this chapter are consistent with the implications of prospect theory. This chapter yields 
two main findings. First, it became apparent that the target 52-week high is significantly positive 
relative to the offer premiums, suggesting that an offer price linked to the target 52-week high is 
perceived as a reference point for the target shareholders in both domestic and cross-border M&As. 
With the prospect theory framework, targets are generally loss-aversion, in that they are reluctant to 
accept an offer that is significantly below the reference point, hence pushing their managers to 
negotiate for higher offer premiums. Targets find it easier to require high offer premiums from the 
cross-border bidders than from the domestic bidders. However, it was found that bidders no longer 
pay based on the target 52-week high when the current price deviates greatly from it. It is possible 
that the target’s current price is less likely to reflect its best performance in the recent past, leading 
bidders to walk away. Our results therefore imply that bidders are bounded by rationality.32  
 
Secondly, the market reacts negatively to the bid announcement in the sample consisting of both 
domestic and cross-border M&As, which suggests that the market views an offer price based on the 
                                                          
32 Despite the fact that bidders make decisions based on the superficial information they possess they have rationality of 
preventing things from going wrong.  
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target 52-week high as an overpayment. While investigating the role of the reference point effect in 
these two subsamples and using the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable of the offer 
premium, it was established that the offer premium driven by the reference point effect does not make 
any greater difference to the bidder announcement returns under the 2SLS estimator than by OLS in 
the cross-border M&A sample. It does, however, lead to more negative bidder announcement returns 
under 2SLS in the domestic M&A sample. These results show in the case of domestic bidders who 
offer a price according to the target 52-week high tends to be perceived as overpayment, whereas the 
market has already taken the reference point effect into consideration for bidders making cross-border 
M&As.  
 
Two distinct contributions have been made to M&A literature. First, to the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this is the first study to test the reference point effect using cross-border M&A sample. 
The cross-border M&A sample was used as a control sample for the domestic M&A sample to 
investigate the reference point effect in a setting where there exists larger information disadvantages. 
It is expected that the reference point effect more pronounced among cross-border bidders given they 
have a less sophisticated information networking than their domestic counterparts. Therefore, the 
reference point theory helps explain how bidders value targets in an environment of information 
uncertainty.  
 
Second, the reference point theory distinguishes the motive of domestic bidders from cross-border 
bidders acquiring U.K. public targets. The offer premium based on the reference point has a 
significantly negative impact on domestic bidders’ announcement returns yet an insignificant impact 
on cross-border bidders’ announcement returns. It can be argued that shareholders of domestic 
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bidders may believe that managers pay too much for the target, based on the target 52-week high, and 
thus react negatively to the bidder announcement, whilst those of cross-border bidders may take the 
target 52-week high for granted.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review related 
to the offer premium, prospect theory, and cross-border acquisitions. Section 3 develops hypotheses 
with regard to the reference point effect. Section 4 summarises our data and presents the methodology 
used in this chapter. Section 5 analyses our results. Section 6 concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Cross-border M&As in the U.K.  
The level of cross-border acquisitions in the U.K. has grown rapidly over the past three decades. 
Danbolt (1995) held that the U.K. takeover boom during the 1990s was largely because of the increase 
of cross-border acquisitions. His study documents that cross-border acquisitions into the U.K. 
accounted for 58% of the total value of this market in 1990. Erel et al. (2012) conducted a study into 
a sample of 56,978 cross-border acquisitions in 48 countries between 1990 and 2007, taking up one 
third of worldwide acquisitions. It was found that the volume of cross-border acquisitions increased 
from 2002 to 2007, reaching to 45% of all M&A activities up to 2007. Of particular note, U.K. targets 
were engaged in 6,753 cross-border acquisitions. 
 
The level of U.K. M&A activity has turned the market into an active takeover market. Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) in a sample of European M&As over the period of 1997 to 2000 reported that a 47% 
of acquisitions involved U.K. targets. Consistent with their study, Croci et al. (2010) found that the 
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level of U.K. M&As took up 65% of takeover activities in Europe between 1990 and 2005, suggesting 
that U.K. is the most active takeover market in Europe. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) argue that 
the U.K. takeover market was even more active than the U.S. for its strong shareholder right 
protection and strict legislative environment. Alexandridis et al. (2010) ascribe the activity of the U.K. 
takeover market to intense competition. Their study shows that the number of competing bids in the 
U.K. was more than that in the United States. 
 
Research has identified the motives of cross-border acquisitions. For example, Danbolt (2004) noted 
that cross-border acquisitions may not be simply driven by value maximisation as to the same degree 
as domestic acquisitions. Instead, bidder managers are prone to increase their power, status and salary 
through cross-border acquisitions. Doukas (1995) and Doukas and Travlos (1988) argue that cross-
border acquisitions play a value-enhancing role as they integrate the imperfect capital markets across 
countries, while Erel et al. (2012) noted that cross-border acquisitions were driven by the high quality 
of governance standards. Their worldwide evidence shows that in countries with a higher quality of 
corporate governance, accounting standards have stronger shareholder protection for the combined 
entities. Rossi and Volpin (2004) provided some similar findings, showing that the volume of M&A 
activity is significantly larger in countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder 
protection. Their findings imply that cross-border acquisitions act as a tool for a country with a 
substandard legislative environment to access a country with a better legal environment. 
 
One particular U.K. study by Danbolt (2004) identified the international risk diversification 
hypothesis as the most plausible explanation regarding the motive of cross-border acquisitions in the 
the U.K. compared with the market access hypothesis and the exchange rate hypothesis. Based on a 
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sample of 514 domestic and 116 cross-border acquisitions in the U.K. setting over the period between 
1986 and 1991, Danbolt found that targets gained significantly higher abnormal returns in the cross-
border acquisitions than in the domestic acquisitions. In addition, his study shows that geographical 
distance between the bidder country and the target country affects the wealth effect of the target 
shareholder. The target abnormal returns were found to be significantly higher when bidders are based 
outside the U.K. market. However, his results were not robust when different event windows were 
employed in his study. 
 
Despite the fact that substantial research has identified the benefits brought by cross-border 
acquisitions, valuing a target is a more difficult task for cross-border bidder managers than for 
domestic bidder managers given different accounting standards, cultures and a large amount of 
asymmetric information country by country. Danbolt (2004) noted that cross-border bidders were 
prone to pay higher offer premiums for their targets due to the size of valuation error caused by these 
differences between countries.   
 
Uysal et al. (2008) in their study of the relationship between geography and bidder returns in the U.S. 
context found that bidders tended to gain higher returns when acquiring a closer rather than a farther 
target, which is because of the information advantage obtained from geographical proximity. The 
authors argue that information is likely to be coded, transmitted, and interpreted in a nearer country 
rather than a more distant one. In addition, local managers are likely to obtain information through 
their social networks.  
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By studying an international cross-border acquisition sample, Erel et al. (2012) found the likelihood 
of acquisitions increases when a bidder country is closer to its target country. Their results show 
significantly positive coefficients of geographical proximity at a 1% level to explain the bidder returns. 
Together, bidders engaging in cross-border acquisitions may encounter information barriers that 
potentially cost the bidder and benefit the target. 
 
3.2.2. The reference point effect on the U.K. 
While most work has focused on the U.S. market, it is interesting to explore the reference point effect 
on cross-border acquisitions in the U.K. public targets. First, the high level of competitiveness in the 
U.K. market entitles its targets to greater bargaining power, which makes the reference point effect 
pronounced. Danbolt (2004) affirm that the cross-border target effect means that U.K. targets are 
outperformed in cross-border acquisitions rather than in domestic counterparts due to risk 
diversification. In line with his work, Alexandridis et al. (2010), by investigating a sample of global 
M&A activity over the period of 1990 and 2007, found that the level of competition increases with 
target abnormal returns and the offer premium, and decreases with bidder abnormal returns. Their 
results show that when the market is more competitive, targets are more likely to translate their 
bargaining power into benefits. It is generally believed that cross-border bidders have less information 
advantage than domestic bidders, which reduces their bargaining power over their targets. With this 
in mind, U.K. targets are more likely to ask for an offer price based on a reference price favouring 
their shareholders from cross-border bidders than domestic bidders.  
 
Secondly, less severe of agency conflicts between the manager and the shareholder in the U.K. could 
potentially enhance the reference point effect. Although it is generally believed that the corporate 
Chapter 3. Reference Point Theory on Cross-Border and Domestic M&A Deals: U.K. Evidence 
 
94 
 
governance system in the U.K. is consistent with the U.S. (La Porta et al. 2000), yet the U.K. has a 
better corporate governance system in relation to M&As compared with the US. Armour and Skeel 
(2007) in their review of U.S. and U.K. takeover regulations conclude that the U.K. has self-regulation 
takeover regulations which are strongly orientated towards the shareholder’ interests, whereas the 
U.S. law system entitles managers to absolute discretionary power over the firms. In addition, in the 
context of takeover defences the authors suggest that the U.K. takeover code implicitly bans any 
“frustrating actions” against their shareholders, which is different from the United States. Thus, 
takeover regulations in the U.K. can potentially reduce the conflicts of interests between the manager 
and the shareholder. The bargaining power of target managers is enhanced under more stringent 
regulations and target managers can require higher offer premiums from outward bidder managers in 
M&As. 
 
The corporate governance system is firmly rooted in the legal environment of a country. Research 
has established some contradictory findings in relation to the divergence of the legal environment 
effect on shareholder valuation in cross-border acquisitions. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) 
analysed bidders’ acquisitions of the worldwide targets over the period of 1985 and 1995 and found 
that bidders tend to pay higher offer premiums to targets with weaker legal environment compared 
with the United States. Thus, targets with more information asymmetry and poorer corporate 
governance system tend to accept lower offer premiums, which leaves the bidders opportunities to 
explore the benefits.33 
                                                          
33 Addressing the U.K. market, Antoniou et al. (2008) noted that the lower offer premium does not benefit bidders. 
However, their study does not include cross-border acquisitions. 
 
Chapter 3. Reference Point Theory on Cross-Border and Domestic M&A Deals: U.K. Evidence 
 
95 
 
Hagendorff et al. (2008), analysing the bidder returns of financial firms between 1996 and 2004 in 
the context of the U.S. and Europe, found that target countries with a weaker legal environment are 
more likely to accept fewer offer premiums. Unlike Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), Hagendorff 
et al. (2008) argued that information asymmetry and severe agency problems lead to a decrease in 
the offer premium. 
 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) studied a sample of listed bidders’ acquisitions of both listed and 
unlisted targets in Europe during the fifth M&A wave. They revealed bidders obtain positive returns 
when acquiring targets regardless of their legal environment. They ascribed targets in stronger legal 
environment compared with bidders to the bootstrapping effect that bidders have incentives to get 
access to better corporate governance system. Based on their study, targets in a strict legal 
environment are expected to have greater bargaining power than those in a less strict legal 
environment. 
 
On the whole, studies have highlighted how the legal environment impacts the bargaining power of 
both the bidder and the target in the context of M&As. However, results are mostly driven in the U.S. 
or the European sample in different sample periods (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Hagendorff et 
al., 2008, Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Little has been done relating to the issue of the U.K. 
market. Given that the U.K. is a more active and competitive market than that of any other country in 
the world due to the stringent shareholder protection and legal environment (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005; Alexandridis et al., 2010), target managers are entitled to greater bargaining 
power and tend to demand higher offer premiums accordingly. Bidders from countries with relatively 
a weak legal environment compared with the U.K. are more likely to pay higher offer premiums in 
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exchange for stronger shareholder protection. With a higher level of information asymmetry, bidders 
are more likely to be misled by the value of the target, thus valuing targets based on readily available 
information. Results regarding the reference point effect being more pronounced on cross-border 
M&As. 
 
3.2.3. The target 52-week high as a reference point price 
Over the years, attention has focused on a firm’s 52-week high as a reference price. The 52-week 
high is widely reported by a range of media on a daily basis, such as the Wall Street Journal, Yahoo 
Finance, Financial Times, or the South China Morning Post, leading investors to gain full access to 
information and may use it to assess the firm’s performance. 
 
Prior research has identified the 52-week high’s salient role as the reference point in the decision-
making processes. Baker et al. (2012) applied the reference point theory in a comprehensive sample 
of U.S. public acquisitions, documenting that the reference price measured with the target 52-week 
high had a substantial impact on M&A decisions-making process. The target 52-week high is found 
to be significantly positively related to the offer premium and bidders receive a negative market 
reaction around the takeover announcement date when paying for acquisitions based on the target 52-
week high. The authors explained it with the reference point theory, reasoning that targets are less 
likely to give up firms unless the offer premium can compensate target shareholders’ mental loss 
relative to the reference price. Their statement implies the reason that bidders pay in accordance with 
the target 52-week high is to avoid target shareholders’ loss-aversion, and thus increase the likelihood 
of deal completion. It was found that shareholders negatively react to the bid announcement since 
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they believe paying based on the target 52-week high is too high. Baker et al’s findings (2012) are 
consistent with the implications of prospect theory. 
 
The 52-week high is significant in explaining investors’ behaviour in a variety of studies. Heath et al. 
(1999), for example, found a relationship between individual stock option exercise decisions and the 
reference point. Their study includes stock option exercise decisions made by over 50,000 employees 
at seven publicly traded corporations and finds that the number of employee stock option exercise 
activities nearly doubles when the stock price exceeds the maximum price of the previous year. The 
authors reason that individual investors have a reference price relative to the maximum stock price 
when exercising stock options. 
 
Huddart et al. (2009) provided evidence in a large sample that there is high trading volume around 
the past price extremes. Using the weekly observations of 2,000 firms spanning 24 years from 1982 
to 2006, the authors found that the past price extremes are significantly related to the trading volume 
at the 1% level. The results continue to hold after controlling for a series of variables that have 
significant impact on the trading volume addressed in earlier studies. The authors attribute the 
salience of the past price extremes to bounded rationality and attention hypotheses that individual 
investors tend to rely heavily on past price extremes, since they are limited in obtaining and analysing 
information. Their study complements evidence that the 52-week high has a strong effect on the 
trading decisions of the investor. 
 
In a similar vein, Burghof and Prothmann (2011) suggest that the 52-week high effect can be 
explained by the anchoring bias hypothesis, affirming that the 52-week high has strong predictive 
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power when there is a high level of information uncertainty. Investors can obtain profits under a 
greater level of information uncertainty by focusing on the 52-week high strategy. Their results 
indicate significant reference point effect on the trading behaviour of the investor. 
 
The use of a certain piece of information as a reference point has been well documented in Tversky 
and Kahneman's work (1974). It has been well known that human minds are likely to focus on a single 
event and overlook other events that lead to different consequences when making decisions. Their 
concept has been put forwarded into various studies and the firm’s 52 week high has been widely 
adopted as a reference point candidate for its simplicity. Following these studies, the investor’s 
decisions in conjunction with the firm’s 52-week high were measured. 
 
Following Tversky and Kahneman’s work (1974), Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest the over-
extrapolation hypothesis indicating that investors put considerable weight behind the past 
performance of the firm and attribute a higher expectation to the firm’s M&A performance when it 
achieves a decent past performance, whilst they may underreact to a firm with a worse past 
performance. Their study suggests that investors have a tendency to make predictions by exploring 
the firm’s past performance. Based on the assumption that the market is not efficient, investors’ biases 
on the past price information are likely to come into play in estimating the firm’s future performance.  
 
3.2.4. M&A offer premiums  
M&A offer premiums are an important factor that have received great deal of attention from 
shareholders, as it directly determines how the value of the deal is distributed between the bidder and 
the target shareholders. Bidders who pay high offer premiums for the target firms tend to signal to 
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their short-horizon shareholders that the firm is hard to generate wealth in the short run even though 
it is possible for the firm to create value in the long term. On the other hand, target shareholders 
benefit from high offer premiums. With this in mind, a higher offer premium is generally associated 
with negative market reactions to the bidder firms but with positive market reactions to the target 
firms. Prior literature on the offer premium has largely focused on the two completing hypotheses: 
the synergy and the overpayment hypotheses. The synergy hypothesis tends to rationalise the motive 
of bidders paying for the target firm as being to create value for the firm, suggesting that managers 
serve the best interests of their shareholders should finding positive NPV projects, and premiums paid 
for a target are in exchange for potential earnings to be created by a combined entity. The 
overpayment hypothesis suggests that bidders are overconfident or the agency problems of the firm 
are severe, leading managers to offer the target higher premiums in exchange for the control of the 
target firm.   
 
To justify the motive of offer premiums, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) tested three hypotheses 
of M&A motives in a U.S. study. Their work provided a way of distinguishing synergy from 
overpayment by looking at the correlation between target and total gains. It is suggested that 
correlation should be positive if the bid is solely driven by synergy but negative if the bid is solely 
driven by agency problem, and zero if the bid is solely driven by hubris. Their results indicate that 
synergy and agency problem primarily explain the motives of U.S. M&As, with which Hodgkinson 
and Partington (2008), agreed in their study of a sample of U.K. M&As over both the short- and long-
term windows, finding that bids are largely motivated by synergy and hubris, and that there is weak 
evidence of agency-motivated bids. 
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Re-addressing the offer premium in the U.K. market, Antoniou et al. (2008) found that the synergy 
hypothesis has more explanatory power than the overpayment hypothesis. Their study is based on a 
sample of 396 successful U.K. public acquisitions between 1985 and 2004. The authors divide the 
bidder sample into the higher, medium, and lower offer premium sub-portfolios, and conduct both 
the short- and long-term analysis for each sub-portfolio. It was found that the short-term combined 
abnormal returns (i.e. synergy) were positively correlated with the offer premium, and the long-term 
abnormal returns to bidders did not show any significant differences between the higher and the lower 
offer premium sub-portfolios. It is therefore suggested that synergy is a more plausible motive than 
overpayment in explaining the offer premium in the United Kingdom. 
 
Another area of literature addresses the offer premium with the overpayment hypothesis. In earlier 
research, Roll (1986) found that hubris-infected managers are engaged in value-destroying bids. 
Reviewing a series of U.S. and U.K. studies, the author concludes that managers are accused of 
overpaying targets. They tend to believe that they have better-than-average skills which lead them to 
dominate the market. As a matter of fact, neither the bidder nor the target managers can make correct 
predictions as to a firm’s performance around the takeover announcement date. Their results show 
that the combined entity generates significantly negative abnormal returns following acquisitions, 
reasoning that managers are irrational and the market is efficient, thus managers are unable to explore 
mispricing of the market and thus overpaying for their targets due to an overestimation of the expected 
synergies.  
 
In the light of this, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) investigated a sample of 106 large acquisitions 
and found evidence of hubris-infected CEOs. These authors focused on large acquisitions 
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representing important decisions for the firms, tending to expose their CEOs to extensive risks. Their 
study shows that bidders who achieve a decent performance in the recent past receive praise from the 
media, together with higher salaries from their firms, which become the most important factors 
leading them to believe that they are important in the firm. Thus, they are affected by hubris while 
making major investment decisions. Their study suggests that the bidder’s recent performance, the 
recent media praise for the CEOs, the CEO’s self-importance, and the composite index of these three 
factors are positively correlated with the size of the offer premium, incurring negative market reaction. 
Hayward and Hambrick's findings (1997) suggest that higher offer premiums are paid by hubris-
infected CEOs. 
 
Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. M&As over the period of 1980-2001, Moeller et al. (2004) 
established a positive relationship between the offer premium and the value of the bidder firm. The 
authors provided various plausible reasons to explain why larger bidders tend to overpay for their 
targets than their smaller bidders. First, larger firms generally have less concerned ownership than 
smaller firms, leading to a weaker link in the interests between the manager and the shareholder. 
Secondly, managers in a large firm are likely to be more overconfident as they are able to allocate 
resources more easily, without any obstacles. Thirdly, larger firms are more constrained in finding 
growth opportunities than smaller firms, thus managers are more likely to dissipate resources in 
unnecessary projects, which destroy the wealth of their shareholders. Their findings indicate that 
bidder managers of a larger firm, due to greater autonomy, are likely to be more overconfident than 
those of a smaller firm. 
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However, Alexandridis et al. (2013) found little evidence that value-destroying acquisitions are 
caused by large M&A offer premiums to the target shareholders and reason that the negative source 
of the firm’s value is the neglect of the M&A integration process. They find an overall negative 
relationship between the target size and the offer premium. Their study reported that the mean 
(median) premium for the larger target is 38% (32%), whereas the mean (median) premium for the 
smaller target is 54% (45%). Though a lower offer premium is paid to the larger target, it does not 
create value for the firm. The authors assert that larger targets are value destroying for bidders, due 
to bidders’ neglect of the target post-merger integration. 
 
Incorporating both the synergy and overpayment hypotheses into the M&A study and using the 
quadric model for a sample of 49 banking industry M&As between 1995 and 2004, Díaz et al. (2009) 
found both the synergy hypothesis and the overpayment hypothesis come into play in their M&A 
sample. More specifically, the authors suggest a non-linear relationship between the offer premium 
and bidder abnormal returns. The lower level of the offer premium paid to the target shareholders 
tends to create synergies for the firm, whilst the value of the combined entity is destroyed when the 
offer premium further increases. Based on these results, the authors suggest the synergy hypothesis 
is able to explain the lower level of the offer premium and the overpayment hypothesis is able to 
explain the higher level. 
 
Many additional studies have largely explained the offer premium in relation to these two competing 
hypotheses. Bowman and Richards (2013) suggest that a higher offer premium is used in exchange 
for the market power of the bidder, which generates synergy following acquisitions. Soegiharto (2009) 
in his study of 3184 mergers between 1990 and 2010 finds no evidence that CEO hubris affects the 
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offer premium. By studying 81 European banking M&A over the period of 1994 to 2000, Diaz and 
Azofra (2009) found that bidders tend to pay more for targets that have attractive characteristics, such 
as it is larger size and has a decent recent performance. These authors argue that managers can have 
substantial private benefits when acquiring another bank successfully, indicating that agency 
problems are a source of overpayment. By contrast, Kim et al. (2011) argued that the offer premium 
is to reflect upon the bank managers’ willingness for future growth. In that case, there are no conflicts 
of interests between the manager and the shareholder and the primary purpose of paying M&A offer 
premiums is to exchange for the control of the target firm.  
 
3.2.5. Reference point price and the offer premium  
Prospect theory offers new insights into the M&A offer premiums. It addresses the fact that prices 
offered to the target shareholders not only originate from market reaction but also provides many 
additional considerations to explain the behaviour of the main M&A participant. It differs from those 
behavioural finance explanations relating to deal synergies and provides access to the market looking 
at the negotiation process of the two firms. Since the offer premium is the outcome of negotiation 
between the boards of the two firms involved, it reflects how the two firms think about the deal during 
the course of the negotiation. Given a lack of information to observe the negotiation process of the 
two firms, a high offer premium may signal to the market that the takeover target tends to dominate 
the negotiation table and it is able to demand a price favouring their shareholders. Bidders, on the 
other hand, will defend their position by providing market evidence that the target has the potential 
to create synergies following an M&A deal, thus rationalising the M&A offer premiums. How much 
a bidder firm should offer for the target firm is far too complex, whilst a single salient piece of public 
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information is more likely to impress the investors’ minds. By borrowing this, the bidder tends to 
rationalise his/her motive for paying for the target and avoids being blamed on the market.   
 
Baker et al. (2012) found that bidders tend to offer the target a price that is based on the target 52-
week high, indicating that bidders believe that they can beat the target 52-week high and thus create 
synergies. However, their results show that the offer premium driven by the target 52-week high is 
negatively related to the bidder announcement returns. The authors studied the role of the target 52-
week high plays in M&As. By doing so, they examined the OLS regression results for the bidder 
announcement returns on the offer premium and compare these with the 2SLS regression results for 
the bidder announcement on the offer premium, where the target 52-week high is used as an 
instrumental variable of the offer premium. Baker et al. expect less negative or even positive market 
reactions to bidders under the 2SLS compared with those by the OLS if the target 52-week high 
reflects higher synergies and a more negative or a less positive bidder announcement returns if the 
target 52-week high indicates overpayment.  
 
Baker et al. (2012) suggest the role of the target 52-week high is an overpayment. Specifically, the 
coefficient of the offer premium predicted by the OLS estimator is -0.040, suggesting that an increase 
of 10% for the offer premium leads to a 0.4% decrease in the bidder announcement returns, while 
using the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable of the offer premium. So, when using the 
2SLS estimator, the coefficient for the offer premium becomes -0.245, suggesting that the target 52-
week high leads to more negative bidder announcement returns. Their results indicate that the market 
believes the bidders’ offer to the target, whose current price is far below its 52-week high, is an 
overpayment whereas the bidder may believe such a target leaves the firm more room for synergy 
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creation. Therefore, the manager and the shareholder tend to interpret this certain piece of price 
information differently.   
 
3.3. Hypothesis development  
According to prospect theory, people tend to gauge gains and losses relative to a reference point, and 
are unwilling to realise mental loss relative to this particular point. Since valuing a target is a difficult 
task in M&As, the 52-week high is likely to be used for its simplicity. Burghof and Prothmann (2011) 
suggest the use of a reference price increases with the level of information uncertainty. Moreover, the 
52-week high reflects a firm’s recent best performance which provides predictions for the future 
performance (George and Hwang, 2004). Finally, based on some experimental evidence from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman and Tversky's works (1979), investors tend to rely on 
a piece of information while deciding an atmosphere of risk and uncertainty. In the meantime, the 52-
week high as a reference price has been drawing the attention of the investor through a massive report 
by the financial media.   
 
The use of the reference point can be explained by the psychological influence of both the bidder and 
the target. Target shareholders may find it hard to gauge managerial performance in M&A activity, 
since they do not know for how much exactly their firm should be sold. Lacking information and time 
in which to process the information related to the deal, target shareholders are likely to estimate their 
firm based on a straightforward relevant price measure, such as the 52-week high. With a strong loss- 
aversion tendency, they are not willing to see their firm, sold at a price significantly below their 52-
week high.  
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The psychological influence among the target shareholders has a substantial impact on the decision-
making processes of their manager. If the target manager sells a firm at a price far below the 52-week 
high without a rational motive, the shareholders must blame their managers by arguing that they 
would have been better off if they had not sold the firm. Managers thus may incur legal risks. The 
magnitude of the premium received by the target manager can be seen as a judgement of whether or 
not the manager aims to protect the wealth of their shareholders. It has been shown that U.K. has a 
high quality of corporate governance system, which leads to less severe conflicts of interests between 
the managers and the shareholders. In this stringent legal environment and shareholder protection, 
the wealth of the target shareholders is the first priority. Target managers would bargain for the 
premium based on the 52-week high, which is a visible price for the market. Baker et al. (2012) 
indicate that bidders tend to pay a price based on the target 52-week high if it is closer to the target 
current price, arguing that it might be a true reflection of the real performance of the target. Together, 
a positive correlation between offer premiums and the reference price measured by the target 52-
week high in the U.K. market is expected. 
 
H1a: There is a positive correlation between offer premiums and the reference price in the U.K. 
market. 
 
According to Erel et al. (2012) and Uysal et al. (2008), cross-border bidders have greater 
disadvantages in gathering information than domestic bidders due to geographical distance. As the 
level of information asymmetry increases, cross-border bidders are less likely to accurately estimate 
the true value of the target, whereas domestic bidders tend to collect exclusive information from their 
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local social networks. In such a case, cross-border bidders are more likely to measure firm valuation 
based on the target 52-week high.  
 
In addition, a more competitive market environment tends to increase target bargaining power, thus 
enhancing the reference point effect. Targets may find it easier to negotiate the offer premium based 
on their 52-week high with the cross-border bidders than with the domestic bidders. In Edmister and 
Walkling (1985), the offer premium is the outcome of negotiation. In the light of this, targets could 
require higher premiums when they have greater bargaining power. Therefore, a stronger reference 
point effect on cross-border acquisitions toward U.K. targets is expected.  
 
H1b: There is a positive correlation between offer premiums and the reference price when cross-
border bidders acquire U.K. targets. 
 
Moeller et al. (2004) suggest that overpayment increases the wealth of the target shareholder and 
decreases the wealth of the bidder shareholder. The target 52-week high is perceived as the recent 
best performance of the firm. Bidder managers are expected to possibly a lower price so as to increase 
the wealth of their shareholders. Bidder shareholders may simply believe their managers pay too 
much if their payment is based on the target recent best performance. It is generally believed that an 
overpayment leads to a negative market reaction since bidder shareholders may believe such 
premiums paid to the target are hard to recover following acquisitions. There, bidders’ performance 
around the announcement date are expected to be negatively correlated to the offer premium when 
deals are made with regard to the reference price.  
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H2: Bidder short-run performance is negatively correlated to offer premiums when deals are made 
with regard to the reference price. 
 
3.4. Data and methodology  
3.4.1. Data 
The initial sample contained 4,324 acquisitions of U.K. public firms announced between January 1, 
1985, and December 31, 2014, extracted from Thomson One Mergers and Acquisitions Database. 
The Database contains deal-related information, including the deal number, the DataStream Code of 
the firm, which is used to match a firm’s accounting data from DataStream, the transaction value, the 
shares percentage acquired by the bidder during the course of the transaction and share percentage 
the bidder owned after the transaction, which will aid in determining whether a firm’s control has 
been transferred in a transaction, the payment method, deal choice, deal type, deal attitude, SIC code 
of the firm from which it can be judged whether or not the deal is diversified.  
 
The sample involved 3,078 U.K. domestic acquisitions and 1,246 cross-border acquisitions into the 
United Kingdom. Deals with a missing offer premium has been cleaned, yielding 1,826 acquisitions. 
Observations with missing value of bidder 5-day CARs around the announcement date were excluded, 
which left a sample of 1,435 acquisitions.34 Acquisitions with the information of payment method 
were required, which left a sample of 1,212 acquisitions. Variables of both bidder and target firm 
characteristics used in the regressions were not a missing value, which resulted in a final sample of 
606 acquisitions, with 451 domestic acquisitions and 155 cross-border acquisitions.  
                                                          
34 The sample size reduces mostly because of bidders from countries without stock market returns, which is in line with 
Erel et al. (2012). 
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Table 3.1 depicts the summary statistics for a sample of 606 public acquisitions studied in this chapter. 
The mean value for the deal was $606.4 million. Of these 606 acquisitions, 380 were all-cash 
acquisitions, 108 were all-stock acquisitions. There were 292 diversified acquisitions, 25 hostile 
acquisitions, and 408 tender offers in the sample.  
 
Figure 3.1 plots a time-series of number of deals for the full sample, the U.K. domestic sample, and 
the cross-border sample. Overall, the sample period analysed covered the fifth and the sixth merger 
waves, from 1993 to 1999, and started from 2003, respectively. The number of deals for the three 
samples share a similar trend over the sample period. The number of deals increased throughout the 
1990s, and peaked in 1999. They started to increase from 2003 after a sharp decrease in 2000, the 
year the stock market crashed. The number of deals increased for several years from 2003 and 2006 
before they declined in 2007.  
 
Figure 3.2 plots the time-series of total deal value for the full sample, the U.K. domestic sample, and 
the cross-border sample. The overall trend of the total deal value is consistent with that reported in 
Figure 3.1. Interestingly, the overall trend of the total deal value of the cross-border acquisitions has 
changed more dramatically than that of the domestic deals, and is larger than that of the domestic 
sample in certain periods, such as 1999 to 2000, 2005 to 2007, and 2012 to 2013.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of bidder nations. The sample consists of bidders from 13 countries. 
Amongst them, a large majority are U.K. bidders, taking up 74.42% of the full sample. Of 451 cross-
border acquisitions, 67 acquisitions involve U.S. bidders who dominate foreign bidders in the cross-
border acquisition sample, taking up 43.22%. These results may imply that U.S. firms who share the 
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same language and have a similar cultural background to the U.K. firms are more likely to undertake 
an acquisition of a U.K. target.  
 
The thesis defines the offer premium (the target 52-week high) as the logarithmic term difference 
between the offer price (the target’s highest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior 
to the announcement date) and target stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date.35 The 
measure of offer premiums reflects the target expected gains during M&As, a concept which has been 
widely used in related literature (Betton et al., 2009, Eckbo, 2009).36  
 
A histogram of the difference between the offer premium and the target 52-week high, as shown in 
Figure 3.3. The x-axis is in the range of -500% to 500%, and the y-axis shows the density. The shape 
of the histogram indicates the extent to which the target 52-week high approaches the offer premium 
within the sample.  
 
The reference point effect on offer premiums was studied by controlling for a series of deal, bidder, 
and target characteristics, as reported in Table 3.3. Edmister and Walkling (1985) documented that 
cash payments are associated with higher offer premiums compared with stock payments, since 
targets require higher offer premiums to compensate for the tax expense generated by capital gains. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) suggest that diversified mergers lead to greater uncertainty about bidder 
                                                          
35 Offer Premiums = log (Offer Pricei,t) – log (Stock Pricei,t-30). Target 52-week high = log (Target 52-week Highest Stock 
Pricei,t-30) – log (Stock Pricei,t-30). The next trading day’s stock price was used when an offer was announced at a weekend. 
The logarithmic term was used to counter the positive skewness bias of offer prices. 
36 Prior research measures offer premiums with target abnormal returns (Schwert, 1996) questioned by Eckbo (2009). The 
results are robust when a wide range of measures used for offer premiums, including target abnormal returns similar to 
Schwert’s approach and the target’s price in a week and 3 months before the announcement date.   
Chapter 3. Reference Point Theory on Cross-Border and Domestic M&A Deals: U.K. Evidence 
 
111 
 
value, which implies that targets should be reluctant to accept risky offers unless higher offer 
premiums are offered in compensation. A positive relationship between offer premiums and hostile 
acquisitions is expected, since bidder managers pay higher offer premiums to persuade target 
managers to accept an offer that may risk their professional career following a takeover. Bradley et 
al. (1988) suggest that tender offers are associated with higher offer premiums since payment for the 
manager goes to the shareholder.  
 
Relative size is the deal value divided by the bidder market value. The market value (MV) is defined 
as the current share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares, expressed in the logarithmic 
form. The market-to-book value (MTBV) is defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity divided by the balance sheet of ordinary (common) equity in the company. Target volatility is 
the standard deviation of target daily returns over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement. Run-ups are the pre-bid run-up prices calculated from 365 calendar days prior to the 
takeover announcement date to seven calendar days before the takeover announcement date [-365, -
7]. All continuous data were winsorised at 1% and 99% levels to eliminate the outlier effect that both 
extremely small or larger figures bias our results.  
 
Relative size is defined as deal value divided by bidder’s market value, which measures the deal scale. 
Previous research has highlighted a significant impact of the size effect on the offer premium (Asquith 
et al., 1983; Dong et al., 2006). Firm size was measured as logarithmic term of market value of firms. 
The mean value for firm size in the sample is larger for bidders than targets, 6.588 to 4.894, suggesting 
that takeover bidders are generally stronger than their targets. This result is consistent with prior 
M&A literature (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). A positive relationship between the offer 
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premium and bidder size, and a negative relationship between the offer premium and target size are 
expected. According to Moeller et al. (2004), larger bidders tend to pay more for targets as they are 
concerned with fewer restrictions in utilising the firm’s resources and thus become overconfident. 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) suggest a robust negative relationship between the offer premium and target 
size, implying that bidders’ acquisitions of a larger target are followed by a more complex process 
for synergy creation, leading bidders to pay for targets with lower offer premiums in exchange for 
expected synergies.  
 
Firm’s growth opportunities were measured with market-to-book value (MTBV), which is consistent 
with Rau and Vermaelen (1998). A higher MTBV indicates that the firm has a better investment 
opportunity, whilst a firm with a lower MTBV suggests that the firm is short of investment 
opportunities. Mean (median) bidder market-to-book value for the sample is on average higher than 
that of the target, which suggests acquisitions involve a higher growth opportunities bidder and a 
lower growth opportunities target. This is also predicted by the Q hypothesis of M&As (Lang, Stulz, 
and Walkling 1989). A higher Q bidder is more likely to create synergies through acquiring a lower 
Q target, thus it is willing to pay higher offer premiums for the targets. It is expected that offer 
premiums are positively correlated to the bidder MTBV and are negatively correlated to the target 
MTBV. A similar prediction can be made when the MTBV is a proxy for the firm’s valuation as per 
Dong et al.’s work (2006). Thus, a high MTBV firm indicates that the firm is likely to be perceived 
as a more overvalued firm whilst a low MTBV firm suggests the firm is likely to be perceived as 
undervalued. It should be expected that a higher MTBV bidder in an attempt to dilute their 
overvaluation tend to offer higher offer premiums to acquire a firm that is potentially being 
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undervalued (i.e. the lower MTBV targets). Therefore, in both cases, the offer premium is positively 
(negatively) related to the bidder (the target) MTBV.  
 
Pre-takeover price run-ups of both the bidder and the target (RunUps) were also controlled for while 
analysing the reference point effect on the offer premium. Schwert (1996) found that the target price 
run-ups increase the takeover costs of the bidder, indicating a dollar increases in target price run-up 
leads to an increase of 1.13 dollars for the offer premium. It is suggested that the price run-ups are a 
result of the market-wide valuation, leading the researcher to control for both the bidder and target 
price run-ups. A mean (median) price run-up for the bidder is higher than that for the target. In 
addition, the chapter accounts for the target volatility (Volatility) using the standard deviation of 
target daily returns for the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. 
Volatility of the firm represents the information asymmetry of the firm. A firm with high information 
asymmetry tends to signal to the market that the firm is associated with high risks. Therefore, it can 
be expected that the bidder tends to pay a higher offer premium when the true position of the target 
firm is hard to justify.  
 
The reference point effect on bidder announcement returns has been investigated by controlling  for 
a set of deal and bidder characteristics, since these factors have significant impacts on bidder 
announcement returns, which are documented in prior M&A literature (Travlos, 1987; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998; Alexandridis et al., 2010). More specifically, the method of payment for 
acquisition (i.e. whether a means of payment for finance an acquisition is purely financed by stocks, 
or cash), deal relatedness (i.e. whether or not the two firms involved in an acquisition is in the same 
industry), deal type (i.e. tender offer or merger) and deal attitude (i.e. whether the deal is unsolicited) 
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were also accounted for. As to bidder characteristics, bidder size, bidder growth opportunities and 
bidder pre-takeover period price run-ups were also taken into consideration.   
 
Table 3.4 reports the mean value of a list of variables for two samples studied in this chapter: the 
cross-border and the domestic acquisitions. The mean offer premium paid by the cross-border bidder 
is 34.7%, which is significantly higher than that paid by the domestic bidder (27.6%), with a mean 
difference of 7.1% at 1% significance level. There is no significantly difference for bidder abnormal 
returns calculated by either the market-adjusted model or the market model. The mean value for the 
target 52-week high is 27.7% for the cross-border acquisition sample, which is 4.4% higher than for 
domestic acquisitions, suggesting that the reference point effect is more pronounced in the cross-
border acquisition sample than in the domestic acquisition sample. The cross-border bidder is found 
to be stronger than the domestic bidder, reflected in significantly larger MV and higher MTBV than 
those of the cross-border acquisition sample, suggesting that cross-border bidders who are more 
disadvantageous in terms of information than domestic bidders should be strong enough to overcome 
information asymmetry. The statistics further indicate that the information asymmetry for the cross-
border bidders tends to be larger than for their domestic counterparts.  
 
3.4.2. Methodology  
3.4.2.1. Piecewise linear regression and local polynomial smooth procedure 
A non-linear relation between the offer premium and the target 52-week high is expected, based on 
the shape of the value function proposed by prospect theory. According to prospect theory, targets 
have a reference point in mind when selling the firms. Target shareholders may feel loss about the 
deal their managers make when they receive a price that is lower than their 52-week high. This loss-
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aversion occurs when targets lose the control of the firm. They may argue that the firm can perform 
at a level similar to their 52-week high if their managers had not accepted the offer. Therefore, bidders 
should take this into consideration and offer a price that is similar to the target 52-week high to 
compensate the target’s mental feeling about the loss of control of the firm.  
 
The OLS estimator was not applied in this context as it is a linear model assuming that the offer 
premiums consistently increase with the target 52-week high. However, it is not the case as bidders 
may walk away if the target’s current price is hard to capture its 52-week high price. Therefore, the 
piecewise linear regression was employed to examine the relationship between the offer premium and 
the target 52-week high. The piecewise linear function is a function of different linear segments, and 
does not require an assumption of the shape of the data, which facilitates the analysis. It is worth 
noting that bidders may not be able to offer a price to the target, whose current price is unlikely to 
reflect their 52-week high. Bidders who pay according to such a 52-week high may find it hard to 
rationalise the M&A motive to their shareholders. In addition, the marginal pain of the target 
decreases when mental loss increases, leading additional costs according to the target reference point 
to be reductant. Therefore, bidders may push up a price to acquire a target with a price closer to the 
reference price and may not be willing to pay higher offer premiums for a target with a significantly 
lower current price than the reference price. This suggests a consideration of diminishing sensitivities, 
which is one implication of the prospect theory, while building the model to study the reference point 
effect on the offer premium. The value function suggests that in both loss and gain domains, marginal 
considerations tend to diminish relative to a reference point.  
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Though the quadratic function has been widely used in estimating the non-linear relationship, Gould 
(1993) argue that the quadratic estimator has a reverse effect, which makes the slope hard to be 
determined. The author suggests that the piecewise linear function outperforms both the linear 
function and quadratic function in fitting the true shape of observations. Morck et al. (1988) 
conducted a piecewise linear function to examine the relationship between management ownership 
and the firm’s market value.   
 
The local polynomial estimator will be employed, such a technique is to take the average of several 
neighbourhood points and smooths the chart. Avery (2013) suggests that a local polynomial estimator 
is the best linear smoother for point estimation. As depicted in Figure 3.4, the offer premium increases 
with the target 52-week high, and this relationship can be observed clearly in three linear segments 
with different slopes. The lower linear segment lies below 30% of the target 52-week high, the middle 
linear segment is in the range of 30% and 70% of the target 52-week high, and the upper linear 
segment is above 70% of the target 52-week high. 37 The piecewise linear function is presented in the 
following, where the coefficient is the change in slope from the preceding group.  
 
 , 30(1) min 52 ,0.3i tf weekhigh                                                                                                          (3.1) 
 
  , 30(2) max 0,min 52 0.3,0.4i tf weekhigh                                                                                   (3.2) 
 
 , 30(3) max 52 0.7,0i tf weekhigh                                                                                                    (3.3) 
                                                          
37 The F-test and the Chow test were performed to examine the break points for the three target 52-week high segments 
and the results show that the three segments are significantly different.  
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, 1 2 3 ,(1) (2) (3)i t i tOfferPremiums f f f                                                                                  (3.4)                                                                     
 
where , 3052 i tweekhigh   is defined as the logarithmic term difference between the target’s highest 
stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the target stock 
price 30 days prior to the announcement date. f (1) through f (3) are the transformation of the target 
52-week high, the sum of f (1) through f (3) is equal to the target 52-week high. 
1 , 2  and 3  are 
the coefficients for each linear segment, which represent the slopes of each segment.     
 
3.4.2.2. Short-term event study 
Short-term event study is a statistical tool for empirical research, and captures the market reaction 
around the announcement date of M&As. Franks and Harris (1989) suggest that changes in stock 
market should be fully captured in the several days around takeover announcement dates. Following 
Brown and Warner (1985) who suggest that the standard procedures are well-specified and have 
indicative power on firm performance, the daily stock returns with the short-term event study is 
examined.  
 
3.4.2.2.1. Market-adjusted model  
Brown and Warner's standard short-term event study (1985) was used to calculate the CARs for the 
bidder and the target in the five-day window (-2, 2) around the announcement date. The share returns 
from the daily share price were calculated as follows: 
 
, , , 1ln lni t i t i tR P P                                                                                                                                (3.5) 
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where ,i tR  is the daily normal return of the firm i on day t, ,i tP  denotes the share price of firm i on 
day t, and , 1i tP   denotes the firm’s share price lagged by a day.
   
 
, , , 1ln lnm t m t m tR P P                                                                                                                                        (3.6) 
 
where ,m tR  relates to the daily normal return of the firm i while ,m tP  and , 1m tP   refer to the stock price 
of the firm on day t and lagged by a day, t-1. The FTSE All-Share Index was used to proxy for the 
value-weighted market index in the United Kingdom. The total market country index was used for 
the other countries, which is defined as “TOTMK” plus “Country Code” in Datastream. For example, 
US market index is “TOTMKUS”. The difference in the logarithm of the price was used performed 
to capture the compound effect of the share price (Fama et al., 1969, Brown and Warner, 1985). The 
abnormal returns was calculated with the market-adjusted model: 
 
, , ,i t i t m tAR R R                                                                                                                                    (3.7)                                                                                                                               
 
where ,i tR  denotes the return of firm i on day t and ,m tR  denotes the value-weighted market index 
return of firm i on day t. The market-adjusted model assumes that α = 0 and β = 1 in our sample. The 
abnormal returns (i.e. ARs) are summed to yield the CARs for the firm over the five-day window (-
2, 2) around the announcement date as follows: 
 
, ,
0
n
i t i t
i
CAR AR

                                                                                                                                  (3.8)                                                                                                                           
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The market-adjusted model, as one of the main standard event methodologies, is widely employed to 
measure firm takeover performance around the announcement date (Dong et al., 2006, Guo and 
Petmezas, 2012). The model is believed to be particularly appropriate to assess the ARs of the firm, 
as the model takes the market wide influence on the individual firm into consideration. We use 
market-adjusted model to calculate CARs three and five days around the takeover announcement 
date.38  The 5-day CARs are reported as our main results while the 3-day CARs are used as a 
robustness test. 
 
In order to assess the mean difference of CARs for the subsamples of domestic and cross-border 
M&A deals, we employ t-statistics which is according to Seiler (2004). It allows the researcher to 
investigate whether there are any distinguished characteristics of each portfolio CARs. The formula 
is presented as follows: 
 
( ) /
T
T
AR
t
AR n
                                                                                                                                                               (3.9)                                                                                                                           
 
where  TAR  denotes to the sample mean and as noted by Lyon et al. (1999:173), ( )TAR  denotes to 
the cross-sectional sample standard deviation for the sample of n firms. 
 
3.4.2.2.2. Market Model 
M&A literature also suggests abundant methods to be available to detect the short-term abnormal 
returns. The market model was used as an alternative short-term event method to calculate the firms’ 
                                                          
38 See also Fuller et al. (2002) and Faccio and Masulis (2005). 
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announcement returns, which is following Eckbo et al. (2016), who used the market model for a U.S. 
study, and Gregory (1997), who used this method for a U.K. study. The model is specified as follow:  
 
1it mt itR R                                                                                                                            (3.10) 
 
where 
itR  denotes holding period returns for firm i in the period t, mtR  denotes the value-weighted 
market index. Similar to the market-adjust model, the FTSE All-Share Index was employed as a proxy 
for the U.K. and total market country index was used for the other countries, which is defined as 
“TOTMK” plus “Country Code” in DataStream, as described in the methodology session of market-
adjusted model.  it  denotes the error term. The market model parameters were estimated over the 
window from 261 to 28 trading days prior to the announcement date [-261,-28], and calculate CARs 
in both 3-day and 5-day event windows, and reported as robustness tests.  
 
3.4.2.3. Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate regression was used to examine the effect of offer premiums and the reference point 
on firms’ short-run performance. According to Draper and Paudyal (2008), multivariate analysis is 
superior in analysing the causation relation between the market reaction and related variables. 
 
, , ,
1
N
i t i i t i t
i
CAR X  

                                                                                                              (3.11)             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
where ,i tCAR  denotes the short-run CAR of firm i on day t, ,
1
N
i i t
i
X

  denotes all the explanatory 
variables in the model, and ,i t  denotes the error term. 
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3.4.2.4. Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
A 2SLS estimator was constructed to test the effect of offer premiums on bidder performance around 
the announcement date using the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable (IV). The use of IV 
is to control endogenous variable. In this chapter, the regression of the offer premium on bidders 
CARs was suspected with endogeneity issues. If the market views an offer price based on the 
reference point as an overpayment, there are more negative market reactions generated by the 2SLS 
estimator than the OLS estimator, and if the market views an offer price based on the reference point 
as synergies, there are more positive market reactions generated the 2SLS estimator than the OLS 
estimator. With the target 52-week high, the chain response of the offer premium to the bidder 
announcement returns was able to examine. The use of the target 52-week high as an instrumental 
variable is based on the theory of the offer premium. Larcker and Rusticus (2010), in their study 
regarding the use of instrumental variables, suggest that instrument variables are eventually justified 
by the theory. Equations of the two stages of the 2SLS estimator were presented as follows:  
 
First stage: 
                                                                                            
(3.12) 
 
 
Second Stage:  
, 1 , , ,
1
N
i t i t i i t i t
i
CAR OfferPremiums x   

   
                                                                                          
(3.13)
       
 
                                                                                            
 
where ,i tOfferPremiums  in the first stage regression were calculated as the logarithmic term 
difference between the offer price  and target stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date. 
,i tOfferPremiums , presented in the second stage, were the fitted value obtained from the first stage 
, 1 , ,52i t i t i tOfferPremiums weekhigh    
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regression. ,52 i tweekhigh  is the target reference point, which is defined as the logarithmic term 
difference between the target’s highest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date and target’s stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date. The fitted value 
from the first stage regression was obtained and used to replace the offer premiums in the second 
stage regression. The target 52-week high is used as an instrumental variable of offer premiums as it 
reflects the target performance, which is uncorrelated with bidder announcement returns and strongly 
correlated with the offer premium.  
 
The validity tests of the use of IV by performing Hausman test as well as the first-stage F-test were 
conducted. The null hypothesis of Hausman test is that OLS has no measurement error or OLS 
estimates are efficiency. The null hypothesis of the first-stage F-test suggests that there is no relation 
between the endogenous variable and the instrumental variable (or there is no weak instrument 
problem). According to Stock et al. (2002), the sampling distribution is generally nonnormal when 
weak instrument problems exists, which lead to an unreliable estimation. Therefore, the first-stage F 
test was employed to combat this problem, Stock et al. indicate the first-stage F-statistics should be 
large enough to reject the null hypothesis.   
 
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. The reference point effect on the offer premium 
In this session, the piecewise linear regression of the offer premium on the reference point effect will 
be conducted. Based on the prediction of prospect theory value function, our hypothesis proposes that 
there is a positive correlation between offer premiums and the reference price in the U.K. market. 
The main variable of interest to be investigated is the target 52-week high. Other variables that have 
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important impacts on the offer premium according to the M&A literature were controlled for in the 
regressions.     
 
The researcher first examines the correlation between the offer premium and the target 52-week high 
with kernel density graph. As reported in Figure 3.3, the offer premium is highly correlated to the 
target 52-week high. In most cases, offer premiums are paid around the target 52-week high, 
suggesting that the reference point effect is pronounced in the sample.  
 
Based on the diminishing sensitivity, it was expected that the offer premium tends to be more relevant 
to the target 52-week high in the lower 52-week high level for the rationale that the target’s current 
price is likely to reflect its recent best performance, leading the bidder to believe that it is possible to 
generate synergies following an M&A deal, while the offer premium is less relevant to the target 52-
week high in the higher 52-week high level, implying that the bidder may walk away when the target’s 
current price is unlikely to reflect its recent best performance.  
 
Figure 3.4 supports our prediction by portraying a non-linear relationship between the target 52-week 
high and offer premiums. The function predicts that targets have less marginal consideration about 
loss. As noted earlier in the methodology section, the first linear segment lies below 30% of the target 
52-week high (i.e. Low52-week high), the second linear segment lies between 30% and 70% of the 
target 52-week high (i.e. Mid52-week high), the third linear segment lies above 70% of the target 52-
week high (i.e. High52-week high). 
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Table 3.5 shows a positive relationship between the offer premium and the target 52-week high, which 
supports our hypothesis H1a. Specification (1) shows that a 10% increase of the target 52-week high 
leads to an increase of 2.08% of the offer premium (coefficient = 0.208, t = 5.180). As we expected 
earlier, the offer premium is less relevant to the target 52-week high when the level of the target 52-
week high is high or the current price is unrealistically far below the target 52-week high. Thus, it 
leads us to study the reference point effect on the offer premium in the three different segments 
predicted in the piecewise linear regression: the low target 52-week high, the mid target 52-week high 
and the high target 52-week high. Specification (2) reports the target 52-week high on the offer 
premium without any other control variables. It can be seen that the fitness of the specification is only 
5.5%, which means the model might not be well-specified. Three different sets of variables in the 
specifications (3) to (5) were taken into accounted. Specifically, the deal and target characteristics 
were controlled in specification (3), deal and bidder characteristics were controlled for in 
specification (4).     
 
Specification (5) of this table shows the main results for the reference point effect on the offer 
premiums. The offer premium is less relevant to the target 52-week high when the level of the target 
52-week high increases. The offer premium increases by 4.33% for a 10% increase in the low level 
of the target 52-week high, and increases by a 2.05% for a 10% increase in the middle level of the 
target 52-week high, whereas the high level of the target 52-week high is insignificantly related to 
the offer premium.39 Results obtained in this table suggest that bidders pay according to the target 52-
week high. However, they are rationally limited when the target 52-week high is unable to provide 
any rationale motive for a higher price. In that case, bidders may find it hard to pay according to the 
                                                          
39 Our results are also consistent when controlling for the firm’s leverage and year-, industry-, and firm-fixed effects.  
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target 52-week high, which could create wealth for their shareholders when the target’s current price 
deviates unrealistically far from the target 52-week high. The results obtained in this table can be also 
interpreted within the prospect theory framework: while the price that deviates more from the 
reference point tends to decrease the marginal considerations about the loss of the target (if the target 
views selling the firm as a loss), leading higher M&A offer premiums are reductant for the bidder. 
By doing so, bidders tend to be reluctant to pay offer premiums according to the target 52-week high 
when the target 52-week high is high. The results are more pronounced compared with the U.S. 
findings of Baker et al. (2012).  
 
The results reconcile several predictions of prospect theory. People have reference-dependence bias 
in that their decision on the offer premium is based on a salient piece of price information. Specifically, 
the offer price is found to be set based on the target 52-week high. Bidders use the target’s recent best 
performance as a reference price to suggest that the primary M&A motive for the bidder is synergy 
generation, since targets whose reference point price is closer to their current performance is likely 
to convince bidders to pay according to their reference prices.     
 
The results are also in line with the diminishing sensitivity of prospect theory. It can be seen that the 
lower level of the target 52-week high has more substantial impacts on the offer premium than the 
higher levels. Bidder managers in the lower segment of the target 52-week high tend to believe 
acquiring targets whose current price deviates greatly from the reference price is likely to leave more 
room for synergy exploration and thus pay generous for targets than the scenario when the target’s 
current price is closer to the reference price. While in the higher segments of the target 52-week high, 
bidder managers tend to believe the target 52-week high is unable to deliver real support for the true 
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performance of the target, leaving the reference point effect on the offer premium less relevant. This 
is in line Baker et al's view (2012) that bidders are cautious about those targets, whose current price 
deviates greatly from the 52-week high, since they are more likely associated with bankruptcy risks, 
violating the reference point effect. It is also possible that target managers are unable to bargain a 
higher offer premium based on a high level of reference points.  
 
Further, investors generally have a loss-aversion tendency, and such losses are gauged in relation to 
the reference point. Based on these results, bidders pay a price related to the target 52-week high to 
compensate for target shareholders’ mental loss when giving up the control of the firm. Target 
shareholders, whose firm’s current price is close to the 52-week high, may presumably believe that 
the firm would be better off if it was not acquired. In that case, bidders have to compensate the targets’ 
loss with an offer premium.  
 
In addition to those explanations above in relation to prospect theory, it is expected that the stronger 
legal environment and shareholder protection in the U.K. market than any other market may result in 
a stronger reference point effect. One possible explanation is that in a market where the interests of 
target managers and shareholders are closely aligned, managers are less likely to conduct any 
frustrated actions against their shareholders. Thus, target managers are likely to reinforce their 
bargaining power in M&As.40   
 
                                                          
40 The effect of corporate governance on the firm’s bargaining power is a recommendation for future research highlighted 
in the Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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It is worth noting that that the variable Cross Border is positively related to the offer premium, 
reported in Table 3.5. Cross Border is a binary variable, taking value of 1 if acquisitions are 
undertaken by cross-border bidders and 0 otherwise. Our results are in accord with the view of Rossi 
and Volpin (2004) that stronger shareholder protection results in lower costs of capital favouring the 
intense competition environment, increasing offer premiums. According to Edmister and Walkling 
(1985), the offer premium represents the bargaining power of negotiators. In the U.K. settlement, 
cross-border bidders have less bargaining power than domestic bidders engaging in acquisitions, 
resulting in larger M&A offer premiums.  
 
According to this prediction, the reference point effect will be further tested by cross-border 
acquisition and domestic acquisition subsamples. It is proposed that there is a positive correlation 
between offer premiums and the reference price when cross-border bidders acquire U.K. targets. 
Targets with greater bargaining power are more likely to use the reference point to require a higher 
offer premium.  
 
Table 3.6 shows a slightly stronger reference point effect on the offer premium for the cross-border 
acquisition subsample than for the domestic acquisition subsample. Several possible explanations for 
this finding are offered. First, it is suggested that geographical difference creates greater information 
barriers for cross-border bidders than for domestic bidders, which weakens cross-border bidders’ 
bargaining position. With less information about the target, cross-border bidders are likely to estimate 
the target value with more relevant and easily obtainable information such as the target 52-week high.  
 
Chapter 3. Reference Point Theory on Cross-Border and Domestic M&A Deals: U.K. Evidence 
 
128 
 
Further, it can be argued that one of the main takeover motives for cross-border bidders is to access 
the foreign capital market to integrate their resources, and obtain strong shareholder protection when 
bidders from a country with relatively weaker shareholder protection than the target country. With 
this in mind, cross-border bidders are likely to be influenced by the target 52-week high. According 
to Alexandridis et al. (2013), acquiring large targets is a complex task which requires considerable 
information, while it is impossible to assess the firm value given limited time and information. Thus, 
valuing targets based on its target 52-week high simplify the acquisition process, giving cross-border 
bidders quick access to the U.K. market. It is quite common that cross-border bidders are relatively 
those large companies, as they should be strong enough to overcome barriers. According to Moeller 
et al. (2004), managers from large companies have easier access to the firm’s resources, making them 
more likely to overpay for targets.   
 
Information disadvantages arising from geography weaken bidder bargaining position. Compared 
with Baker et al.’s work (2012) focusing on the reference point effect on U.S. domestic M&A deals, 
results obtained in this chapter show that the target 52-week high has greater predictability for offer 
premiums for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions in the United Kingdom. Cross-border and 
domestic bidders tend to have similar bargaining power, as reflected in the coefficients of the target 
52-week high. However, the size effect distinguishes the two subsamples. Bidder size is more 
significant for domestic acquisitions than for cross-border acquisitions, suggesting that domestic 
bidders tend to be more consistent with the hubris hypothesis cited in Moeller et al.’s work (2004), 
affirming that a larger firm is likely to be more overconfident than that of a smaller firm. The further 
analysis aims to explore why cross-border bidders tend to pay similar M&A premiums relative to the 
target 52-week high as domestic bidders.   
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In Table 3.6, the offer premium is positively related to the relative size, bidder size, the pre-bid target 
run-up price and hostile mergers. It is also found that the offer premium is negatively related to target 
size, target MTBV, target stock volatility, all-stock financed acquisitions and all-cash financed 
acquisitions. These results are consistent with prior research (Schwert, 2000; Betton et al., 2008; 
Eckbo, 2009). It is worth noting that the size of the bidder and target play an important role in offer 
premiums. A larger bidder tends to pay generously for a smaller target, consistent with the findings 
of Moeller et al. (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2013). Contrary to the tax implication hypothesis, it 
is suggested that the offer premium is negatively related to all-cash acquisitions, as reported in 
specification (4). It can be interpreted as follows: cash is the greatest liquidity asset that can instantly 
meet the target’s demands, thus the use of cash increases the bidder’s bargaining power, reducing 
offer premiums.  
 
To ensure that the model used here does not suffer from a muliticollinearity problem, i.e. the main 
variable has enough explanatory power to the dependent variable, a test of variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is employed. The test assumes that there is no correlation between the regressors when the VIF 
value falls below 10.  The presence of a multicollinearility problem in the model though does not 
reduce the predictability of the model as a whole, however it increases the variance of the model, 
making the model unstable, and reduces the accuracy of each individual variable included in the 
regressions. The results obtained show little evidence of multicollinearity problems.41 
 
                                                          
41 It was found that the mean value for VIF is 1.75, and there is no VIF value beyond 4. The highest VIF value is 3.32, 
which is the bidder MV, the second highest VIF value is 2.94, which is the target MV. The chapter reports the main results 
of VIF test but omits the table for the sake of brevity.  
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3.5.2. The reference point effect on bidder announcement returns 
This section examines the reference point effect on bidder announcement returns. A 2SLS regression 
using the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable will be conducted. The rationale of using 
the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable is because the offer premium is not a clean 
measure, as it either represents the synergy or an overpayment. Hence, in order to discover the role 
of the reference point effect on CARs, the 2SLS estimator is used. If the offer premium (driven by 
the reference point effect) in the 2SLS leads to fewer announcement returns for the bidder than in the 
OLS, the reference point plays a role of overpayment, otherwise, the reference point indicates the role 
of synergies. It is proposed that bidder short-run performance is negatively correlated to offer 
premiums when deals are made with regard to the reference price. 
 
Table 3.7 shows that bidder announcement returns are either insignificantly or significantly 
negatively related to the offer premium in different subsamples, as reported in specifications (1), (3), 
and (5) respectively. It appeared that cross-border bidders pay higher offer premiums but outperform 
domestic bidders. An acquisition of a U.K. target is good news to shareholders of cross-border bidders 
who might believe that their rights to be protected in a more stringent legal environment, and thus 
react positively to the bid announcement.    
 
It is expected that the target 52-week high increases the offer premium, which further decreases the 
bidder announcement returns. The Hausman test shows a p-value of 0.0004, suggesting that the 2SLS 
estimator is more efficiency than the OLS estimator. The first-stage F-test shows a p-value of 0.000042, 
indicating that the target 52-week high is a valid instrumental variable for the offer premium. A more 
                                                          
42 See Stock et al. (2002) for a survey of weak instrument problems. 
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negative relationship between bidder announcement returns and the offer premium became apparent 
when using the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable compared with those without using 
the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable, as shown in specifications (2) to (1), (4) to (3), 
and (6) to (5) respectively. The market reacts more negatively to a bid announcement when bidders 
pay based on the target reference price, suggesting that the reference price indicates an overpayment 
in the U.K. M&As.43  
 
These results are in line with prior M&A research. According to Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Moeller 
and Schlingemann (2005), it is expected that the strength of shareholder protection in the U.K. would 
weaken the bargaining power of cross-border bidders, thus using the target 52-week high is more 
likely to receive shareholders’ consent. The sample was divided into cross-border and domestic 
acquisition subsamples, as reported in specifications (2) and (3), and it was found that the target 52-
week high driven offer premiums were significantly negative related to announcement returns of 
domestic bidders, and were not significantly related to those of cross-border bidders,44 suggesting 
that shareholders of cross-border bidders acquiesce more easily with the target 52-week high as the 
reference price. This chapter also provides additional support to the work of Kuipers et al. (2009), 
who found that cross-border bidders in pursuit of stronger shareholder protection in the U.K. will pay 
higher offer premiums as compensation. Further, the bidder size for cross-border acquisitions is more 
negatively related to bidder announcement returns, which is consistent with the findings of Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) that small bidders tend to be more cautious than the large bidders. Taken together, 
                                                          
43 Similar conclusions can be drawn by using the market model in a window of 261 to 28 trading days prior to the takeover 
announcement date. The results are reported in Table 3.9.  
44 The obtained results of this chapter are robust to bidder announcement returns calculated with the market model.   
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cross-border bidders who have less bargaining power might have to pay higher premiums according 
to the target 52-week high.  
 
3.6. Robustness checks 
3.6.1. The target 52-week high as a reference point 
In this subsection, robustness results are provided for the target 52-week high as a reference point by 
first employing other price measures related to the target 52-weeks: the target 52-week minimum and 
the target 52-week mean. Moreover, the target monthly returns prior to the takeover announcement 
date are utilised the expectation that the bidder may also extrapolate the past performance of the target. 
  
Results on regressions of the offer premium on the reference point are robustness after checking for 
different price measures related to the target 52-weeks. The target 52-week minimum and the target 
52-week mean were taken into consideration besides the target 52-week high in terms of the reference 
point price, as reported in Table 3.8. Huddart et al. (2009) provided an overall review with regard to 
the reference price using both 52-week highs and 52-week lows. In a similar way, the target 52-week 
mean is also considered as the reference price. It is generally believed that the target 52-week prices 
tend to attract a great deal of investors’ attention, making more conservative investors likely to focus 
on the firm’s mean value over 52 weeks prior to the announcement date since it reflects the firm’s 
performance in a certain period of time rather than a snapshot price. The results show that the target 
52-week high remains strong after checking for those proposed reference point price measures.  
 
In addition, robustness checks were carried out by including the target past returns prior to the 
takeover announcement date when studying the reference point effect on the offer premium (see Table 
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3.9). According to Rau and Vermaelen’s extrapolation hypothesis (1998), market investors tend to 
forecast a firm’s prospects based on its past returns, creating a strong performance momentum around 
a bid announcement for those with best past performance. Therefore, targets’ past returns of each 
month were taken into consideration, reflecting the firm’s returns over the past months, which are 
more likely be a proxy for the market perception of the firm’s valuation than a single item of price 
information (i.e. the target 52-week high). The extrapolation effect on the offer premium was studied 
by including the target past returns up to 12 months prior to the takeover announcement date. In 
particular, specification (2) controls for the target monthly returns for the recent three months prior 
to the takeover announcement date, specification (3) controls for the target monthly returns for the 
recent six months prior to the takeover announcement date, and specification (4) controls for the 
target monthly returns up to a year prior to the takeover announcement date. It was found that the 
offer premium is positively related to the target 52-week high. Once again, our results show that the 
target 52-week high is a proper measure for the reference point in an M&A deal. 
 
3.6.2. The reference point effect on the offer premium by market conditions 
In addition, the reference point effect on the offer premium by the market wide valuation was 
examined. Investors’ have a rationale that bidders may under- or over-react to a target’s valuation 
when the market valuation fluctuates. The sample periods are classified into High-, Low- and Neutral-
valuation markets according to Bouwman et al.'s method (2009). Results of Table 3.10 show that the 
reference point effect is strong when the market-wide valuation is either high or low. It can be 
interpreted that a high market valuation is likely to push the target’s current price closer to the 52-
week high, making bidders to believe that they can outperform the target’s recent performance. While 
a low market valuation makes the bidder to believe that, the target 52-week high is a true indicator 
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for the target’s performance given that no other factors drive the firm’s value beyond or below its 
fundamental value. Moreover, it was found that cross-border acquisitions tend to pay higher offer 
premiums when the market valuation is high, implying that the high market wide valuation increases 
information asymmetry and thus reinforces the target’s bargaining position over cross-border bidders.  
 
3.6.3. The reference point effect on the offer premium across different subsamples 
The reference point effect on the offer premium was studied by different nations with the expectation 
that bidders whose nation was farthest away compared with that of the U.K. firms would tend to have 
greater information barriers and be more likely to rely on the target 52-week high. In addition, the 
reference point effect on the offer premiums in different M&A subsamples was analysed: the payment 
method for the M&A deals, whether or not the deal is diversified and whether the deal involves a 
negotiation between the boards of the two firms (i.e. tender offers and mergers).   
 
A target’s bargaining position is likely to be reinforced when the distance involved between the two 
firms’ home countries is large. The M&A sample was divided into two subsamples, the one includes 
acquisitions comprising U.K. bidders, the other comprising acquisitions involving U.S. bidders, 
farthest away compared with other cross-border bidders (see Table 3.11). It can be seen that the offer 
premium increases by approximately 6% in the U.S. bidders compared with 4% in the U.K. domestic 
bidders. Greater distance between the two nations impedes the transaction, making the bidder more 
likely to look at the target reference point. The results obtained in this table are consistent with those 
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of Erel et al. (2012) and Uysal et al. (2008), finding that geographical distance plays a role in 
information dissemination.45     
 
The reference point effect on offer premiums across different subsamples by deal information was 
also tested. The reference point effect on the offer premium being tested by the method of payment 
(see Table 3.12), by whether or not the deal is diversified reported in (see Table 3.13), and the type 
of merger reported in (see Table 3.14). Taken together, the results show that the target 52-week high 
as a proxy for the reference point effect is very pronounced in different subsamples, and has a 
substantial impact on the offer premium in different M&A subsamples.   
 
3.6.4. The reference point effect on bidder announcement returns 
Table 3.15 tabulates results on regressions of the offer premium on the bidder announcement returns 
and with the target 52-week high as an instrumental variable of the offer premium. Instead of using 
the market-adjust model to calculate the firm’s abnormal returns around the announcement date, the 
market model is also used. The market model parameters were estimated based on an event window 
from 261 to 28 trading days prior to the announcement date, i.e. [-261,-28]. The results obtained from 
the market model are consistent with those by the market-adjusted model. More specifically, a 10% 
increase in the reference point driven offer premium decreased the bidder announcement returns by 
1.83% in the full M&A sample. While dividing it into two subsamples, the reference point effect leads 
to more negative bidder announcement returns for domestic bidders than for cross-border bidders. 
                                                          
45 It can be argued that the information asymmetry are relatively low due to culture similarity between the two countries. 
However, the sample included in this chapter is small, which is likely to result in bias in the results. Further investigation 
by including more observations needs to be done to explain whether the culture or the distance between the countries 
matter the bargaining power. We leave it to the future research, since the focus of this chapter is to test the target reference 
point effect on the firm’s valuation. 
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In addition, bidder abnormal returns in a 3-day window around the takeover announcement date were 
examined using both market-adjusted model and market model. The reference point effect on bidder 
3-day announcement returns calculated with the market-adjusted model is reported in Table 3.16, and 
results with the market model are reported in Table 3.17, which are consistent with the main results 
reported in Table 3.7.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the reference point theory of M&As in the U.K. context has been examined. It was 
found that the reference price measured by the target 52-week high is significantly positively related 
to the offer premium. The reference point effect plays an important role in valuing the target firm. 
Both the bidder and the target have reference-dependence bias, but the rationales behind using the 
reference point need to be clarified in terms of different parties. Targets with greater bargaining power 
are likely to use the reference point to ask for more offer premiums. It can be argued that bidders 
paying according to the reference point in favour of targets is either because of the overconfidence or 
because of information barriers. However, it is evident that the reference point effect is no longer 
sensitive to bidders when the target’s current price deviated greatly from its reference price (or the 
high level of the target 52-week high).  
 
Further, the sample was extended to cross-border acquisitions and it was found that the reference 
point effect is more pronounced to the cross-border acquisition subsample than to the domestic 
acquisition subsample. It can be interpreted as follows: targets have greater bargaining power over 
cross-border bidders than over domestic bidders, and they are likely to translate it into higher offer 
premiums. Cross-border bidders may find it difficult in overcoming information barriers and might 
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have to pay an offer price based on the reference point. They might as well actively pay based on the 
target 52-week high, the reason of being to reinforce their competitiveness to enter the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Finally, bidders paying based on the reference point receive negative market reactions, since 
shareholders tend to believe that the managers are paying too much, thereby destroying their wealth. 
The finding also suggests that bidder shareholders are pessimistic about their own profit-generating 
ability. Together, results obtained in this chapter are consistent with the predictions of prospect theory.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for M&A sample 
This table reports summary statistics for a sample of M&As announced between 1985 and 2014. The number N 
is the number of deals per year. The third and fourth columns are the mean and the median of the deal value 
respectively, reported in million U.S. dollars. The fifth and sixth columns present the method of payment 
information. Number of stock only (number of cash only) is defined as the method of payment is 100% by stock 
(cash). The number of diversified acquisitions, hostile acquisitions and tender offers are reported from the seventh 
to ninth columns. “Diversification” refers to diversified deals in which the primary two Standard Industry 
Classification codes are different between bidders and targets. “Hostile” refers to hostile bids.  “Tender” refers to 
tender offers.  
Year N 
Deal Value ($mil) 
     Mean           Median 
No. of  
Cash Only 
No. of  
Stock Only 
No. of  
Diversified 
No. of  
Hostile 
No. of  
Tender 
1985 1 16.10  16.10  1 - 1 - - 
1986 1 14.00  14.00  1 - 1 - - 
1987 9 283.07  223.10  6 2 5 1 3 
1988 10 135.52  72.36  8 - 5 - 4 
1989 10 650.56  34.37  9 - 7 1 3 
1990 3 225.56  115.07  2 - 1 - 1 
1991 19 294.68  87.39  12 1 15 3 10 
1992 8 248.12  31.89  4 2 7 1 4 
1993 11 38.71  27.08  6 1 5 1 7 
1994 21 160.01  42.18  15 3 8 2 10 
1995 23 358.74  41.67  18 - 8 2 9 
1996 20 644.40  133.14  10 6 14 1 11 
1997 33 356.98  60.41  24 6 14 1 25 
1998 56 655.03  78.95  34 14 21 1 40 
1999 65 943.50  121.28  32 12 37 2 53 
2000 58 533.48  153.60  37 12 28 3 47 
2001 25 907.36  77.90  15 3 11 - 19 
2002 20 946.02  24.98  14 4 3 - 19 
2003 17 595.35  123.59  10 4 4 - 13 
2004 22 461.28  120.23  12 7 13 - 16 
2005 35 1037.71  330.44  20 7 19 2 25 
2006 21 1082.69  210.80  12 4 10 2 19 
2007 34 724.03  47.57  23 5 15 - 23 
2008 13 376.26  55.36  10 1 7 1 11 
2009 11 676.23  94.18  5 4 6 - 10 
2010 26 315.46  22.95  19 3 15 - 9 
2011 7 221.69  182.65  4 2 3 1 4 
2012 13 444.14  64.08  10 2 4 - 6 
2013 7 817.49  98.24  3 1 3 - 5 
2014 7 570.73  83.14  4 2 2 - 2 
Total 606 606.40  85.19  380 108 292 25 408 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of bidder nations 
This table presents the number of acquisitions and percentage of the number of acquisitions by bidder nations. 
The summary statistic are based on a sample of 606 public acquisitions toward U.K. public targets announced 
between 1985 and 2014. Bidders are publicly listed firms in their domestic stock markets.  
Bidder Nation Number of acquisitions Percentage 
Australia 5 0.83 
Canada 9 1.49 
France 13 2.15 
Germany 16 2.64 
Hong Kong 5 0.83 
Ireland-Rep 4 0.66 
Italy 5 0.83 
Japan 9 1.49 
Netherlands 7 1.16 
South Africa 7 1.16 
Switzerland 8 1.32 
United Kingdom 451 74.42 
United States 67 11.06 
Total 606 100.00 
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for variables 
This table presents the means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables. Panel A presents dependent 
variables used in the regressions. Offer premiums are defined as the logarithmic term difference between the offer 
price and the target stock price 30 days prior to the takeover announcement. Bidder 5-day CARs are bidder 5-day 
announcement returns calculated by the market-adjusted model. Panel B presents independent variables, our main 
variable the target 52-week high is defined as the logarithmic term difference between the target highest stock 
price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement and the target stock price 30 days prior to 
the announcement. Deal characteristics, including the method of payment, deal attitude, type of deals, cross-border 
deals and relative size. Here stock, cash, diversification, hostile, tender offer and cross-border are dummy variable, 
taking value of 1 if acquisitions are 100% stocks, 100% cash, diversified merger, hostile merger, tender offer, and 
cross-border acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. Relative size is the deal value divided by the bidder market value. The 
market value (MV) is defined as the current share price multiplied by number of ordinary shares, expressed in 
logarithmic form. The market-to-book value (MTBV) is defined as the market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity divided by the balance sheet of ordinary (common) equity in the company. Target volatility is the standard 
deviation of target daily returns over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement. Run-ups 
are the pre-bid run-up prices calculated from 365 calendar days prior to the takeover announcement date to seven 
calendar days before takeover announcement date [-365, -7]. Accounting variables were collected one month prior 
to the announcement date, and continues variables were winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels.  
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 Mean Median  Std Dev 
Offer Premiums  0.294  0.263  0.206  
Bidder 5-day CARs  -0.002  -0.003  0.070  
Panel B: Independent Variables  
Target 52-week High 0.244  0.185  0.226  
Deal Characteristics 
Stock  0.178 - 0.383 
Cash  0.627 - 0.484 
Diversification  0.482 - 0.500 
Hostile  0.041 - 0.199 
Tender 0.673 - 0.469 
Cross Border 0.256 - 0.437 
Relative Size  0.353  0.150  0.549  
Bidder Characteristics 
Bidder ln(MV) 6.588  6.625  2.190  
Bidder MTBV 2.490  1.760  4.617  
Bidder RunUps 0.088  0.028  0.423  
Target Characteristics 
Target ln(MV) 4.894  4.760  1.846  
Target MTBV 2.471  1.575  4.063  
Target RunUps -0.013  0.005  0.382  
Target Volatility  0.022  0.020  0.012  
Number of Observations 606     
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics for variables by cross-border and domestic subsamples 
This table presents the means of variables by U.K. domestic and cross-border acquisition sample. The first column shows the mean value of variables in cross-border acquisitions. 
The second column shows the mean value of variables in U.K. domestic acquisitions. Differential is the mean difference between the cross-border and the U.K. domestic. The 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses and calculated using the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference between the cross-border sample and the U.K. domestic 
sample. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
  Cross-Border U.K. 
Differetial 
(Cross-Border-U.K.) 
Offer Premiums 0.347*** 0.276*** 0.071*** 
 (19.492) (29.799) (3.743) 
Bidder 5-day CARma -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (-1.115) (-0.328) (-0.719) 
Bidder 5-day CARmm -0.010* -0.003 -0.007 
 (-1.800) (-0.824) (-1.096) 
Target 52-week High 0.277*** 0.233*** 0.044** 
 (13.763) (22.783) (2.100) 
Relative Size 0.211*** 0.401*** -0.190*** 
 (8.531) (14.140) (-3.756) 
Bidder ln(MV) 8.010*** 6.100*** 1.910*** 
 (58.203) (60.994) (10.121) 
Bidder MTBV 3.191*** 2.250*** 0.941** 
 (13.000) (9.511) (2.197) 
Bidder RunUps 0.089** 0.087*** 0.002 
 (2.474) (4.463) (0.048) 
Target ln(MV) 5.538*** 4.673*** 0.865*** 
 (39.692) (54.172) (5.135) 
Target MTBV 2.761*** 2.372*** 0.389 
 (8.647) (12.307) (1.029) 
Target RunUps 0.005 -0.020 0.025 
 (0.146) (-1.153) (0.696) 
Target Volatility 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.003*** 
  (24.188) (37.340) (2.883) 
Number of Observations 155 451   
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Table 3.5: The piecewise linear regressions of offer premiums on the target 52-week high 
      , 1 , 30 2 , 30 3 , 30 ,min 52 ,0.3 max 0,min 52 0.3,0.4 max 52 0.7,0i t i t i t i t i tOfferPremiums wh wh wh              
This table reports piecewise linear regression results for offer premiums on 52WeekHigh, controlling for various deal and firm characteristics. We document three individual 
target reference point (i.e. 52WeekHigh) levels: Low52wh (0-30%), Mid52wh (30%-70%), High52wh (70% or above). Colum (1) reports the relation between the offer premium 
and the target 52-week high, column (2) reports the relation between offer premiums and the three individual levels about the 52WeekHigh, column (3) controls for target and 
deal characteristics, column (4) controls for the bidder and deal characteristics, column (5) controls for bidder, target and deal characteristics. Variable definitions are as in the 
notes of Table 3.3. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is 
reported alongside the coefficients. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offer premiums Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
52wh 0.208*** (5.180)                  
Low52wh   0.322*** (3.618) 0.440*** (4.800) 0.326*** (3.692) 0.433*** (4.912) 
Mid52wh   0.122 (1.057) 0.221** (1.985) 0.139 (1.217) 0.205* (1.807) 
High52wh   0.150 (0.451) 0.178 (0.549) 0.001 (0.002) 0.089 (0.260) 
Stock     -0.071*** (-2.933) -0.063** (-2.476) -0.079*** (-3.380) 
Cash     -0.077*** (-3.461) -0.052** (-2.283) -0.075*** (-3.522) 
Diversification     0.010 (0.669) 0.018 (1.179) -0.005 (-0.342) 
Hostile     0.080* (1.781) 0.047 (1.028) 0.084** (2.048) 
Tender     0.065*** (3.509) 0.070*** (3.812) 0.028 (1.486) 
Cross Border     0.085*** (4.258) 0.049** (2.256) 0.046** (2.294) 
Relative Size     -0.030* (-1.831) -0.023 (-1.318) 0.045** (2.375) 
Target ln(MV)     -0.023*** (-4.785)   -0.060*** (-7.869) 
Target MTBV     -0.002 (-1.275)   -0.004** (-2.417) 
Target RunUps     0.112*** (3.638)   0.087*** (2.704) 
Target Volatility     -2.553*** (-3.641)   -2.926*** (-4.238) 
Bidder ln(MV)       0.006 (1.361) 0.045*** (6.337) 
Bidder MTBV       0.001 (0.513) 0.002 (1.179) 
Bidder RunUps       0.044** (2.013) 0.025 (1.187) 
Constant 0.244*** (21.468) 0.229*** (16.271) 0.375*** (7.906) 0.164*** (3.430) 0.284*** (5.986) 
N 606   606   606   606   606           
R2 0.052   0.055   0.185   0.138   0.260           
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Table 3.6: The piecewise linear regression of offer premiums on the target 52-week high of cross-border 
and domestic acquisitions into the United Kingdom 
This table reports the piecewise linear regression results for offer premiums on the target reference point of both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions into the U.K. market. It was documented three individual target reference 
point levels: Low52wh (0-30%), Mid52wh (30%-70%), and High52wh (70% and above). Column (1) reports the 
results for cross-border acquisitions. Column (2) reports the results for U.K. domestic acquisitions. Variable 
definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. Equation is presented in the note of Table 3.5. Robustness t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and 
* respectively, is reported alongside the coefficients. 
Offer Premiums (1) (2) 
 Cross-Border  U.K. Domestic 
Low52wk 0.480*** (2.779) 0.404*** (4.191) 
Mid52wk 0.402 (1.600) 0.093 (0.768) 
High52wk -0.149 (-0.226) 0.186 (0.469) 
Stock -0.151** (-2.110) -0.072*** (-2.963) 
Cash -0.063 (-1.241) -0.077*** (-3.285) 
Diversification -0.010 (-0.310) -0.002 (-0.097) 
Hostile -0.021 (-0.358) 0.157*** (2.748) 
Tender 0.072* (1.931) 0.008 (0.377) 
Relative Size 0.130* (1.682) 0.047** (2.451) 
Target ln(MV) -0.044** (-2.202) -0.069*** (-8.700) 
Target MTBV -0.004 (-1.402) -0.004** (-2.232) 
Target RunUps 0.138** (2.518) 0.050 (1.370) 
Target Volatility -3.049* (-1.967) -2.894*** (-3.576) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.024 (1.388) 0.054*** (7.266) 
Bidder MTBV 0.015*** (2.651) 0.001 (0.666) 
Bidder RunUps 0.023 (0.531) 0.024 (1.014) 
Constant 0.317*** (2.701) 0.291*** (5.562) 
N 155   451  
R2 0.286   0.274  
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Table 3.7: The OLS regression of bidder announcement returns on offer premiums 
 
First stage: 
  
 
Second Stage:  
, 1 , , ,
1
N
i t i t i i t i t
i
CAR OfferPremiums x   

     
This table presents both OLS and 2SLS regression results of bidder market-adjusted model 5-day announcement 
returns (CAR5) on the offer premium. The target 52-week high is used as an instrumental variable of the offer 
premium. We report the regressions for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions into the United Kingdom. 
Hausman test and first-stage F-test are reported below the table. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 
3.3. Details of the methodology were presented in the Methodology Section of this Chapter. Robustness t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and 
* respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 CAR5 Full Sample Cross Border  U.K. Domestic 
  OLS  IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.019 -0.207*** 0.015 -0.134 -0.036** -0.258*** 
 (-1.360) (-3.268) (0.587) (-1.454) (-2.095) (-2.634)    
Stock 0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.012 0.008 -0.005    
 (0.807) (-0.291) (0.106) (-0.430) (0.762) (-0.408)    
Cash 0.026*** 0.017* 0.001 -0.007 0.030*** 0.016    
 (3.506) (1.892) (0.048) (-0.346) (3.509) (1.351)    
Diversification -0.012** -0.008 0.003 0.005 -0.014** -0.009    
 (-2.151) (-1.225) (0.311) (0.431) (-2.144) (-1.119)    
Hostile 0.003 0.017 -0.003 -0.008 0.008 0.038    
 (0.177) (1.010) (-0.148) (-0.368) (0.421) (1.436)    
Tender 0.002 0.016* -0.001 0.015 0.003 0.016    
 (0.345) (1.864) (-0.047) (0.935) (0.465) (1.542)    
Relative Size -0.012** -0.019*** 0.017 0.019 -0.014** -0.022*** 
 (-2.142) (-2.667) (0.907) (0.905) (-2.230) (-2.666)    
Bidder ln(MV) -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.008** -0.010** -0.004** -0.003    
 (-3.848) (-2.629) (-2.324) (-2.540) (-2.508) (-1.577)    
Bidder MTBV 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001    
 (0.962) (1.297) (0.170) (1.013) (0.938) (0.820)    
Bidder RunUps -0.015** -0.008 -0.017 -0.012 -0.016** -0.010    
 (-2.173) (-0.971) (-1.341) (-0.827) (-2.007) (-1.043)    
Constant 0.029** 0.074*** 0.046 0.106* 0.025 0.082*** 
 (2.128) (3.465) (1.199) (1.903) (1.635) (2.691)    
N 606 606 155 155 451 451    
R2 0.079 . 0.074 . 0.105 .    
Hausman test 
X2 = 12.57   
(p = 0.0004) 
        
First-stage F test 
X2 = 13.23   
(p = 0.0000) 
        
, 1 , ,52i t i t i tOfferPremiums weekhigh    
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Table 3.8: Robustness test: Controlling for other relevant price measures 
This table presents the piecewise regression results for offer premiums on the target 52-week high, controlling for 
other price measures that might be used as the reference point prices. Column (1) reports the relation between 
offer premiums and the target 52-week high. Column (2) reports the results by controlling for the target 52-week 
minimum (52wMin), which is the target lowest stock prices over the recent 52 weeks, which is measured as 
logarithmic term difference between target lowest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date and the target stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date, column (3) reports the 
results by controlling for the target 52-week mean (52wMean), which with a similar measure to the target 52-
week high and 52-week minimum. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Offer Premiums Other Price Measures 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Low52wh 0.322*** 0.313*** 0.265** 
 (3.618) (3.224) (2.394) 
Mid52wh 0.122 0.122 0.092 
 (1.057) (1.053) (0.766) 
High52wh 0.150 0.150 0.109 
 (0.451) (0.448) (0.326) 
52wMin  0.010  
  (0.310)  
52wMean   0.055 
   (0.890) 
Constant 0.229*** 0.234*** 0.243*** 
 (16.271) (10.507) (11.747) 
N 606 606 606 
R2 0.055 0.056 0.057 
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Table 3.9: Robustness test: Controlling for target past returns 
This table presents the piecewise regression results for offer premiums on the target 52-week high, controlling for 
other price measures that used as the reference points. Column (1) reports the regression results by controlling for 
segments of the target 52-week high, which is the target highest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 
days prior to the announcement date and the target stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date, column 
(2) reports the results by controlling for the target past returns in one, two and three months prior to the takeover 
announcement date, column (3) controls for the target past returns up to 6 months prior to the takeover 
announcement date, column (4) controls for the target past returns up to one year prior to the takeover 
announcement date. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Offer Premiums (1) (2) (3) (4)    
Low52wk 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.336*** 0.298**  
 (3.618) (3.413) (3.376) (2.388)    
Mid52wk 0.122 0.104 0.115 0.114    
 (1.057) (0.868) (0.941) (0.742)    
High52wk 0.150 0.150 0.164 -0.206 
 (0.451) (0.452) (0.428) (-0.392)    
Target return t-1  0.038 0.034 0.005    
  (0.540) (0.467) (0.065)    
Target return t-2  -0.078 -0.065 -0.108    
  (-1.012) (-0.803) (-1.101)    
Target return t-3  0.036 0.016 0.027    
  (0.509) (0.217) (0.286)    
Target return t-4   0.103 0.094    
   (1.288) (0.884)    
Target return t-5   -0.070 -0.055    
   (-0.813) (-0.486)    
Target return t-6   -0.111 -0.082    
   (-1.341) (-0.710)    
Target return t-7    -0.103    
    (-1.040)    
Target return t-8    -0.140    
    (-1.422)    
Target return t-9    -0.112    
    (-1.314)    
Target return t-10    0.091    
    (1.050)    
Target return t-11    -0.132    
    (-1.309)    
Target return t-12    -0.121    
    (-1.355)    
Constant 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.236*** 
 (16.271) (14.332) (13.818) (10.927)    
N 606 602 573 418    
R2 0.055 0.059 0.066 0.070    
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Table 3.10: Robustness test: Reference point effect on offer premiums by market-wide valuation 
This table presents the piecewise regression results for offer premiums on the target 52-week high by market 
valuation. High Market is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if takeover months in the top 25% above past 5-
year average de-trended P/E of the UK market or market valuation is high, 0 otherwise. Specifications (1)-(3) 
report the results when market-wide valuation is high (i.e. High), low (i.e. Low) and neutral (i.e. Neutral) 
respectively. Details of this methodology were presented in methodology section of the Chapter 4. Other variable 
definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. Equation is presented in the note of Table 3.5. Robustness t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and 
* respectively, is reported alongside the coefficients. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 High Low Neutral 
Offer premiums Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Low52wh 0.494*** (4.322) 0.761*** (2.704) 0.119 (0.725) 
Mid52wh 0.181 (1.156) 0.136 (0.517) 0.431* (1.709) 
High52wh 0.297 (0.683) -0.245 (-0.365) -0.669 (-0.818) 
Stock -0.042 (-1.417) -0.066 (-1.063) -0.164*** (-3.354) 
Cash -0.021 (-0.784) -0.079 (-1.492) -0.162*** (-3.843) 
Diversification 0.005 (0.235) 0.035 (0.951) -0.053* (-1.772) 
Hostile 0.065 (1.339) -0.032 (-0.308) 0.112* (1.807) 
Tender 0.029 (1.136) 0.045 (1.041) 0.017 (0.465) 
Cross Border 0.049* (1.954) 0.068 (1.410) 0.000 (0.004) 
Relative Size 0.080*** (3.260) 0.058 (1.013) 0.030 (1.199) 
Target ln(MV) -0.073*** (-7.514) -0.038** (-2.063) -0.070*** (-4.785) 
Target MTBV -0.006** (-2.589) 0.004 (0.856) -0.006 (-1.183) 
Target RunUps 0.098** (2.397) 0.071 (0.864) 0.071 (1.189) 
Target Volatility -2.925*** (-3.026) -3.282*** (-2.988) -2.505 (-1.407) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.055*** (5.833) 0.030** (2.197) 0.060*** (4.093) 
Bidder MTBV 0.000 (0.037) 0.001 (0.207) 0.006* (1.882) 
Bidder RunUps 0.042 (1.587) -0.041 (-1.172) 0.041 (0.883) 
Constant 0.227*** (4.113) 0.184* (1.820) 0.383*** (3.326) 
N 300   110   196   
R2 0.324   0.291   0.319   
  
Chapter 3. Tables & Figures 
 
148 
 
Table 3.11: Robustness test: U.K. and U.S. bidder subsamples 
This table reports the piecewise linear regression results for offer premiums on 52WeekHigh of both U.K. and U.S. 
bidders’ acquisitions of U.K. targets. We document three individual target 52WeekHigh levels: Low52wh (0-30%), 
Mid52wh (30%-70%), and High52wh (70% and above). Column (1) reports the results for U.K. domestic 
acquisitions. Column (2) reports the results for U.S. bidders’ acquisitions of U.K. targets. Variable definitions are 
as in the notes of Table 3.3. Equation is presented in the note of Table 3.5. Robustness t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively, 
is reported alongside the coefficients. 
 (1) (2) 
 Offer premiums U.K. Domestic Cross-Border Subsample (U.S. bidders) 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Low52wk 0.404*** (4.191) 0.593** (2.488) 
Mid52wk 0.093 (0.768) 0.376 (0.943) 
High52wk 0.186 (0.469) -0.661 (-0.633) 
Stock -0.072*** (-2.963) -0.296** (-2.547) 
Cash -0.077*** (-3.285) -0.096 (-0.861) 
Diversification -0.002 (-0.097) -0.032 (-0.537) 
Hostile 0.157*** (2.748) -0.149 (-1.446) 
Tender 0.008 (0.377) 0.141*** (2.773) 
Relative Size 0.047** (2.451) 0.242 (1.158) 
Target ln(MV) -0.069*** (-8.700) -0.053* (-1.976) 
Target MTBV -0.004** (-2.232) -0.009 (-0.986) 
Target RunUps 0.050 (1.370) 0.166 (1.585) 
Target Volatility -2.894*** (-3.576) -6.084*** (-2.822) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.054*** (7.266) 0.047 (1.442) 
Bidder MTBV 0.001 (0.666) 0.025** (2.141) 
Bidder RunUps 0.024 (1.014) 0.003 (0.046) 
Constant 0.291*** (5.562) 0.239 (1.045) 
N 451   67            
R2 0.274   0.453            
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Table 3.12: Robustness test: Reference point effect on offer premiums by the method of payment 
This table presents the piecewise linear regression results of offer premiums on the target 52-week high in different 
payment method subsamples. Column (1) includes acquisitions that are purely financed by Cash, column (2) 
includes those that are purely financed by stocks and column (3) includes those financed by a mixture of cash and 
stocks. Other control variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. Equation is presented in the note of Table 
3.5. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% 
level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported alongside the coefficients. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Offer premiums Cash Stocks Mixed 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Low52wh 0.420*** (3.557) 0.397** (2.138) 0.378* (1.774) 
Mid52wh 0.248 (1.490) 0.150 (0.688) 0.348* (1.666) 
High52wh 0.319 (0.661) 0.292 (0.432) -0.891 (-1.557) 
Diversification 0.016 (0.786) -0.060* (-1.784) 0.015 (0.459) 
Hostile -0.006 (-0.094) 0.278*** (3.813) 0.169*** (2.801) 
Tender 0.055** (2.496) -0.053 (-1.188) -0.063 (-1.021) 
Cross Border 0.045* (1.912) 0.016 (0.245) 0.022 (0.433) 
Relative Size 0.056* (1.829) 0.061 (1.505) 0.102** (2.324) 
Target ln(MV) -0.049*** (-5.431) -0.087*** (-3.812) -0.114*** (-4.953) 
Target MTBV -0.005** (-2.428) 0.001 (0.106) -0.004 (-1.100) 
Target RunUps 0.092** (2.329) 0.063 (0.889) 0.151** (2.042) 
Target Volatility -3.632*** (-4.064) -1.707 (-1.318) -1.280 (-0.605) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.041*** (5.060) 0.052** (2.305) 0.100*** (4.415) 
Bidder MTBV 0.004 (1.544) 0.000 (0.011) 0.002 (0.750) 
Bidder RunUps 0.018 (0.582) 0.055 (1.486) -0.082 (-1.480) 
Constant 0.172*** (3.332) 0.334*** (4.129) 0.222* (1.835) 
N 380   108   118   
R2 0.269   0.350   0.341   
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Table 3.13: Robustness test: Reference point effect on offer premiums for diversified and undiversified 
M&A deals 
This table presents the piecewise linear regression results of offer premiums on the target 52-week high in different 
payment method subsamples. Column (1) includes only diversified acquisitions (i.e. Diversificiation), column (2) 
includes only undiversified acquisitions (i.e. Relatedness). Other control variable definitions are as in the notes of 
Table 3.3. Equation is presented in the note of Table 3.5. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported 
alongside the coefficients. 
  (1) (2) 
Offer premiums Diversification Relatedness 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Low52wh 0.468*** (3.515) 0.377*** (3.155) 
Mid52wh 0.187 (1.261) 0.261 (1.551) 
High52wh 0.168 (0.393) -0.115 (-0.213) 
Stock -0.097*** (-3.032) -0.064* (-1.891) 
Cash -0.061** (-2.003) -0.079** (-2.587) 
Hostile 0.041 (1.028) 0.123 (1.592) 
Tender 0.019 (0.727) 0.034 (1.309) 
Cross Border 0.023 (0.843) 0.063** (2.155) 
Relative Size 0.027 (1.039) 0.053* (1.961) 
Target ln(MV) -0.046*** (-3.970) -0.071*** (-6.489) 
Target MTBV -0.002 (-0.759) -0.007*** (-2.734) 
Target RunUps 0.072 (1.581) 0.107** (2.393) 
Target Volatility -2.444*** (-2.595) -3.757*** (-3.538) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.037*** (3.662) 0.051*** (4.731) 
Bidder MTBV 0.002 (0.837) 0.002 (0.700) 
Bidder RunUps 0.008 (0.237) 0.035 (1.280) 
Constant 0.264*** (4.323) 0.321*** (4.576) 
N 292   314   
R2 0.200   0.323   
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Table 3.14: Robustness test: Reference point effect on offer premiums for tender offers and mergers 
This table presents the piecewise linear regression results of offer premiums on the target 52-week high in different 
payment method subsamples. Column (1) includes only tender offers (i.e. Tender), column (2) includes only 
mergers (i.e.Merger). Other control variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. Equation is presented in 
the note of Table 3.5. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 
5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported alongside the coefficients. 
  (1) (2) 
Offer premiums Tender Merger 
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Low52wh 0.410*** (4.167) 0.402** (2.389) 
Mid52wh 0.218* (1.718) 0.151 (0.670) 
High52wh -0.295 (-0.809) 0.846 (1.143) 
Stock -0.086*** (-3.557) -0.122* (-1.693) 
Cash -0.070*** (-3.307) -0.103 (-1.497) 
Diversification -0.021 (-1.162) 0.035 (1.108) 
Hostile 0.078* (1.793) 0.113*** (2.925) 
Cross Border 0.059** (2.482) -0.000 (-0.005) 
Relative Size 0.047** (2.296) 0.186** (2.393) 
Target ln(MV) -0.070*** (-7.117) -0.053*** (-4.546) 
Target MTBV -0.003 (-1.209) -0.006** (-2.479) 
Target RunUps 0.051 (1.374) 0.147*** (2.710) 
Target Volatility -3.034*** (-3.916) -2.193 (-1.478) 
Bidder ln(MV) 0.051*** (5.689) 0.043*** (3.950) 
Bidder MTBV 0.001 (0.763) 0.003 (0.683) 
Bidder RunUps 0.025 (1.023) -0.007 (-0.179) 
Constant 0.330*** (7.075) 0.250** (2.312) 
N 408   198   
R2 0.280   0.247   
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Table 3.15: Robustness test: Market model for 5-day CARs 
This table presents both OLS and 2SLS regression results of bidder market model 5-day announcement returns 
(CAR5mm) on the offer premium. We estimate market model parameters over the window from 261 to 28 trading 
days prior to the announcement date [-261,-28]. The target 52-week high is used as an instrument. We report the 
regressions for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions into the United Kingdom. Hausman test and first- 
stage F-test are reported below the table. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. The 2SLS equation 
is presented in the note of Table 3.7. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 CAR5mm Full Sample Cross-Border Bidders U.K. Bidders 
  OLS  IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.016 -0.183*** 0.022 -0.152 -0.036** -0.210**  
 (-1.155) (-2.982) (0.866) (-1.551) (-2.135) (-2.302)    
Stock 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.021 0.006 -0.004    
 (0.575) (-0.393) (-0.139) (-0.689) (0.597) (-0.352)    
Cash 0.027*** 0.019** 0.008 -0.002 0.030*** 0.019*   
 (3.573) (2.103) (0.399) (-0.089) (3.544) (1.707)    
Diversification -0.011* -0.007 -0.002 0.000 -0.011* -0.007    
 (-1.950) (-1.145) (-0.162) (0.029) (-1.730) (-0.958)    
Hostile 0.003 0.016 -0.003 -0.009 0.010 0.033    
 (0.207) (0.967) (-0.147) (-0.389) (0.500) (1.337)    
Tender -0.001 0.011 -0.005 0.013 0.000 0.010    
 (-0.171) (1.343) (-0.421) (0.769) (0.036) (1.041)    
Relative Size -0.012** -0.018*** 0.016 0.019 -0.014** -0.020*** 
 (-2.118) (-2.618) (0.844) (0.838) (-2.283) (-2.657)    
Bidder ln(MV) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.004*   
 (-4.267) (-3.130) (-2.625) (-2.793) (-2.708) (-1.945)    
Bidder MTBV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001    
 (1.164) (1.457) (0.550) (1.383) (1.048) (0.958)    
Bidder RunUps -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.030* -0.043*** -0.039*** 
 (-5.934) (-4.321) (-2.709) (-1.924) (-5.527) (-4.274)    
Constant 0.032** 0.072*** 0.050 0.120** 0.028* 0.072**  
 (2.407) (3.501) (1.258) (2.030) (1.850) (2.554)    
N 606 606 155 155 451 451    
R2 0.134 . 0.123 . 0.161 .    
Hausman test 
X2 = 10.02   
(p=0.0016) 
        
First-stage F test 
X2= 13.23   
(p= 0.0000) 
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Table 3.16: Robustness test: Market-adjusted model for 3-day CARs 
This table presents both OLS and 2SLS regression results of bidder market-adjusted model 3-day announcement 
returns (CAR3ma) on the offer premium. The target 52-week high is used as an instrument. We report the 
regressions for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions into the United Kingdom. Hausman test and first- 
stage F-test are reported below the table. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. The 2SLS equation 
is presented in the note of Table 3.7. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
CAR3ma Full Sample Cross Border Bidders U.K. Bidders 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.017 -0.175*** 0.017 -0.105 -0.031** -0.220**  
 (-1.304) (-3.191) (0.899) (-1.332) (-2.131) (-2.578)    
Stock 0.009 0.000 0.006 -0.006 0.009 -0.002    
 (0.993) (0.029) (0.211) (-0.248) (0.966) (-0.139)    
Cash 0.028*** 0.020** 0.010 0.003 0.031*** 0.019*   
 (3.809) (2.557) (0.469) (0.171) (3.912) (1.811)    
Diversification -0.010** -0.007 0.006 0.007 -0.014** -0.009    
 (-2.096) (-1.215) (0.666) (0.699) (-2.357) (-1.343)    
Hostile 0.002 0.014 0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.031    
 (0.185) (0.968) (0.077) (-0.169) (0.396) (1.355)    
Tender 0.004 0.015** -0.003 0.010 0.007 0.017*   
 (0.721) (2.110) (-0.233) (0.743) (1.069) (1.926)    
Relative Size -0.008 -0.013** 0.012 0.013 -0.009 -0.015**  
 
(-1.195) (-2.133) (0.493) (0.731) (-1.383) (-2.180)    
Bidder ln(MV) -0.003** -0.002 -0.004* -0.006* -0.002 -0.001    
 
(-2.424) (-1.526) (-1.720) (-1.841) (-1.338) (-0.693)    
Bidder MTBV 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000    
 
(0.579) (1.002) (0.078) (0.927) (0.566) (0.532)    
Bidder RunUps -0.013 -0.007 -0.016 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008    
 
(-1.582) (-1.025) (-1.100) (-0.973) (-1.389) (-0.951)    
Constant 0.009 0.047** 0.014 0.063 0.006 0.055**  
 (0.780) (2.541) (0.384) (1.316) (0.505) (2.063)    
N 606 606 155 155 451 451    
R2 0.075 . 0.055 . 0.102 .    
Hausman test 
X2 = 7.02   
(p=0.0083)      
First-stage F test 
X2= 6.41   
(p= 0.0003)      
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Table 3.17: Robustness test: Market model for 3-day CARs 
This table presents both OLS and 2SLS regression results of bidder market model 3-day announcement returns 
(CAR3mm) on the offer premium. We estimate market model parameters over the window from 261 to 28 trading 
days prior to the announcement date [-261,-28]. The target 52-week high is used as an instrument. We report the 
regressions for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions into the United Kingdom. Hausman test and first- 
stage F test are reported below the table. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 3.3. The 2SLS equation 
is presented in the note of Table 3.7. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
CAR3mm Full Sample Cross Border Bidders U.K. Bidders 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.015 -0.151*** 0.026 -0.119 -0.033** -0.173**  
 (-1.133) (-2.848) (1.482) (-1.437) (-2.207) (-2.184)    
Stock 0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.013 0.007 -0.001    
 (0.768) (-0.066) (0.065) (-0.494) (0.766) (-0.073)    
Cash 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.012 0.004 0.030*** 0.021**  
 (3.829) (2.731) (0.629) (0.231) (3.930) (2.233)    
Diversification -0.010** -0.007 0.001 0.003 -0.012** -0.009    
 (-2.078) (-1.315) (0.129) (0.270) (-2.094) (-1.353)    
Hostile 0.002 0.013 0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.024    
 (0.220) (0.899) (0.264) (-0.071) (0.348) (1.112)    
Tender 0.002 0.011 -0.005 0.010 0.004 0.012    
 (0.315) (1.636) (-0.431) (0.723) (0.652) (1.422)    
Relative Size -0.009 -0.013** 0.008 0.010 -0.010 -0.015**  
 
(-1.355) (-2.297) (0.357) (0.538) (-1.542) (-2.257)    
Bidder ln(MV) -0.004*** -0.003** -0.006** -0.008** -0.002 -0.002    
 
(-3.042) (-2.150) (-2.101) (-2.229) (-1.584) (-1.056)    
Bidder MTBV 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000    
 
(0.902) (1.283) (0.452) (1.432) (0.762) (0.745)    
Bidder RunUps -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.026* -0.021 -0.027*** -0.024*** 
 
(-3.154) (-3.138) (-1.741) (-1.646) (-2.921) (-3.012)    
Constant 0.014 0.047*** 0.018 0.077 0.011 0.047*   
 (1.285) (2.628) (0.515) (1.536) (0.866) (1.889)    
N 606 606 155 155 451 451    
R2 0.108 . 0.093 . 0.135 .    
Hausman test 
X2 = 3.96   
(p=0.0471)      
First-stage F test 
X2= 6.41   
(p= 0.0003)      
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of number of deals by bidders 
This figure plots the time-series distribution of the number of deals for the full sample, the U.K. domestic sample, 
and the CrossBorder sample. The U.K. domestic sample contains U.K. public bidders acquire U.K. public targets; 
The Cross-Border sample contains those foreign public bidders acquire U.K. public targets. Y-axis indicates the 
number of deals, X-axis represents year, spanning from 1985 to 2014.  
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of value of deals by bidder types 
This figure plots the time-series distribution of the total value of deals for the full sample, the U.K. domestic 
sample, and the CrossBorder sample. The U.K. domestic sample contains U.K. public bidders acquire U.K. public 
targets; The CrossBorder sample contains those foreign public bidders acquire U.K. public targets. Y-axis indicates 
the value of deals in billion U.S. dollars, X-axis represents year, spanning from 1985 to 2014. 
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Figure 3.3: Offer premiums relative to the target 52-week high 
This figure presents the density of the difference between offer premiums and the target 52-week high, where 
Offer Premiums is the logarithmic term difference between the offer price and the target stock price 30 days prior 
to the takeover announcement and 52WeekHigh is the logarithmic term difference between the target’s highest 
stock prices over the 335 calendars ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the target stock price 30 
days prior to the announcement date.   
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Figure 3.4: Nonlinear relation between offer premiums and the target 52-week high 
This figure presents the nonlinear effect of the target 52-week high on offer premiums, where Offer Premiums is 
the logarithmic term difference between the offer price and the target stock price 30 days prior to the takeover 
announcement and 52WeekHigh is the logarithmic term difference between the target highest stock price over the 
335 calendars ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the target stock price 30 days prior to the 
announcement date. We use local polynomial regression to smooth scatter plots, and set our sample where both 
offer premiums and the target 52-week high are larger than 0, and less than 100%. 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the misvaluation hypothesis using a relative reference point (RRP) in the M&A 
market. The reference point is the deviation of a firm’s current stock price from its 52-week high, 
which reflects investors’ perception of the firm’s valuation. The market perceives the firm to be 
overvalued when its current price is close to the 52-week high and to be undervalued when the current 
price falls below its 52-week high significantly. The RRP indicates the extent to which the bidder is 
more overvalued relative to the target. The sign of bidders’ overvaluation is revealed especially if 
bidders pay takeover targets with stocks and with higher offer premiums. It was found that the RRP 
accommodates the implications with respect to the misvaluation hypothesis. The results of this 
chapter show that bidders prefer stock payments when the RRP increases, indicating that bidders are 
overvalued and use their stocks to accelerate the process of overvaluation dilution. It became clear 
that the RRP is positively related to the offer premium, suggesting that a relatively more overvalued 
bidder tends to overpay for the target for the purpose of diluting overvaluation. With regard to the 
relationship between the RRP and M&A outcomes, it became apparent that the RRP is found to be 
positively related to target announcement returns, and is negatively related to the bidder 
announcement returns. It also became apparent that the RRP is positively related to the stock bidders’ 
long-term abnormal returns. This result shows evidence of bidders’ rationality, eliminating concerns 
about paying according to the RRP results in underperformance. Thus, the results are consistent with 
the predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis and reference point theory.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 
“Why could the typical investor expect any better success in trying to buy at low levels and sell at 
high levels than in trying to forecast what the market is going to do? Because if he does the former 
he acts only after the market has moved down into buying levels or up into selling levels. His role is 
not that of a prophet but of a businessman seizing clearly evident investment opportunities. He is not 
trying to be smarter than his fellow investors but simply trying to be less irrational than the mass of 
speculators who insist on buying after the market advances and selling after it goes down. If the 
market persists in behaving foolishly, all he seems to need is ordinary common sense in order to 
exploit its foolishness.” 
Benjamin Graham (1949: 31)  
 
The misvaluation hypothesis explains an important motive of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities. The theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicts that the stock market drives 
M&As. Overvalued bidders who serve the long-term interests of the shareholders will dilute 
overvaluation through stock-financed acquisitions, as using stocks would accelerate such a dilution 
process. The misvaluation hypothesis holds that bidders are rational whereas the market is irrational,46 
which violates the efficiency market hypothesis and differs from what Roll’s (1986) hubris 
management predicts. Following Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Dong et al. (2006) provided direct 
evidence that bidders overpay for targets as long as bidders are overvalued relative to targets. Ang 
and Cheng (2006), who investigated the long-term performance of stock bidders, found a positive 
                                                          
46 Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that bidders are rational as they could time the market and use overvalued stocks 
as a means of payment for acquisitions rather than holding them until they are corrected in the market. Bidders would pay 
a price that is lower than the estimated synergy created by the combination of firms. The model assumes a target and a 
bidder with stock volumes K and K1 respectively, price per unit Q and Q1 (where Q1>Q) and price per unit for the combined 
equity S. As synergies can be achieved when S(K+K1)-(KQ+K1Q1)>0 the bidders would pay a price P to gain synergies 
as long as it lies between Q and S, or Q<P<S.  
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relationship between overvalued stocks and long-term performance. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) provided a behavioural model suggesting that fully rational individuals make mistakes as they 
tend to overestimate synergies, especially when market-wide valuation is high (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 
2005). 
 
Conventional misvaluation measures face three major challenges. First, the measures relating to a 
firm’s fundamental value cause estimation biases. Different firms could measure their assets in 
different accounting approaches, such as adopting fair value and historical cost approaches vary 
across the firms, which lead to variation of the firm’s fundamental value. Companies are also found 
to manipulate accounting figures to raise the firm’s value, which is especially prevalent prior to the 
financial crisis period. Secondly, existent misvaluation measures are mainly based on historical or 
forward-looking information, such as price-to-book value (P/B), price-to-residual income value (P/V) 
and earnings per share (EPS), which are less likely to reflect the latest status of the firm. Thirdly, the 
frequently used ratio of MTBV is a proxy for both mispricing and investment opportunities of the 
firm. According to Di Giuli (2013)47, firms with better investment opportunities should also increase 
the practice of using stocks in acquisitions, leading to the same prediction as the misvaluation 
hypothesis. 
 
This chapter constructs a novel misvaluation measure: the relative reference point (RRP), which is 
derived from the reference point effect48. Baker et al. (2012) defined the target reference point as the 
                                                          
47 Di Giuli (2013) proposed some post-merger investment-related proxies to disentangle the effects of mispricing and 
investment opportunities.  
48 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that with the reference point effect that people rely heavily on a single salient 
piece of information while making decisions. Prior research has highlighted the 52-week high as a reference price ( Kliger 
and Kudryavtsev, 2008; Barberis and Xiong, 2009). 
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deviation of a target’s current stock price from its 52-week high.49 Following this, the bidder reference 
point in this chapter is defined as the deviation of a bidder’s current stock price from its 52-week high, 
reflecting the extent to which the bidder is overvalued. It is argued that the firm’s 52-week high offers 
the market an insight that the firm is overvalued, given that a firm’s 52-week high is the outcome of 
a series of good news occurred in the past, the price will move toward to the firm’s fundamental value 
once the price momentum disappears. When a firm’s current price is close to its highest stock price 
over the year prior to takeover announcement, it suggests that the firm is still strong in price 
momentum and should be reluctant to push up the price on the rationale that the firm is already 
overvalued, whilst if a firm’s current price falls significantly below the 52-week high, substantiating 
the market’s belief that the 52-week high is a sign of overvaluation. Based on this, the RRP is defined 
as the difference between the target and the bidder reference points, indicating the extent to which the 
bidder is relatively more overvalued than the target (i.e. the relatively more overvalued bidders).50  
 
Baker et al. (2012) realised that the offer premium is positively related to the target reference point, 
as the target uses its reference point to reinforce the bargaining position and demand high offer 
premiums in an M&A deal, especially when the current price deviates significantly from its 52-week 
high.51 On the other hand, bidders paying offer premiums based on the target 52-week high would 
argue that they can outperform the target’s recent high and could generate synergies for the combined 
firm following an M&A deal. In order to achieve the deal, bidders tend to pay for the target according 
                                                          
49 Their paper used’ the target reference point’ and ‘the target 52-week high’ interchangeably. In this chapter, the reference 
point refers to the difference between the firm’s highest stock price over the period of 52 weeks prior to the M&A 
announcement (52-week high) and the firm’s current price at the M&A announcement date. Such an approach makes this 
reference point easier to interpret. 
50 The construction of RRP is presented in the methodology section of this chapter.  
51 They found a nonlinear relationship between the offer premium and the target 52-week high. In each segment, the offer 
premium increases with the target 52-week high.  
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to its 52-week high. Their data support this view, finding that an offer price paid according to the 
target 52-week high increase the deal success rate.  
 
However, the idea of investigating the target 52-week high effect on the offer premium can explain 
the negotiation process between the management teams of the two firms and how the firm is priced. 
Baker et al. (2012) failed to reveal the bidders’ M&A motive as one cannot tell whether the proposed 
offer price is a result of strangeness of the bargaining power of the target or any other considerations 
of bidders. Their paper shows that bidders who believe that paying for acquisitions according to the 
target 52-week high can generate wealth for shareholders. As a matter of fact, it destroys their wealth, 
reflected in negative bidders’ announcement returns. Negative market reactions have been found 
when bidders paying for acquisitions according to the target reference point results from overpayment. 
Unlike those market investors, who are less experienced or lacking of information about the firms, 
bidder managers can have more information about target’s value, and thus their M&A pricing 
decisions should not be based on a single price number. It leads us to the question of whether bidders 
have a similar view with the market with respect to the reference point. Specifically, the market might 
believe that the target 52-week high represents a sign of poor performance when the target’s current 
price falls below the 52-week high significantly, since it is less likely to rebound to the 52-week high, 
whereas bidders paying for takeover targets according to the target reference point might believe that 
the target is currently undervalued. It is evident that assessing a firm’s short-term performance does 
not enable direct observation. Rather than short-selling the target’s stocks, bidders paying offer 
premiums according to the target reference point have confidence in managing the deal afterwards. 
Therefore, it can be argued that offer premiums based on the reference point are to guarantee 
acceptance of the deal.  
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Another important question is whether the market also takes a look at the bidder reference point for 
a similar reason to that for the target reference point, as this is also readily available to the public. 
Simple intuition suggests that the market believes the bidder 52-week high is a highly relevant piece 
of price information about the target value and treats it as a reference point, just like the target 52-
week high. The bidder reference point offers bidder managers an insight into how much they are able 
to pay for the target. The bidder believes that the target 52-week high reflects the firm’s potential 
profit-generating ability, and pays M&A offer premiums based on this, with the incentive of restoring 
targets’ price discounts. On the other hand, target managers regard the bidder reference point as how 
much in offer premiums they can possibly negotiate for when selling the firm. Baker et al. (2012) 
found that targets demand high offer premiums based on the target 52-week high, relying on the 
assumption that targets are not overvalued, otherwise they may be less likely to sell the firm for a 
higher offer premium if they are undervalued. Therefore, the RRP reflects the market perception of a 
firms’ valuation. The proxy explains relative valuations from the market angle, eliminating concerns 
about any biases of a firm’s fundamental value.  
 
Since both the target and the bidder reference point have a value in explaining how M&As are 
structured, solely investigating the target reference point or the bidder reference point does not fully 
account for the reference point effect on the M&A valuation. It should be expected that the market 
will look at the bidder reference point believing that bidders whose current price is close to the 52-
week high are likely to create value given that they have performed well recently. This could also 
reinforce the bargaining power of the bidders in an M&A deal, resulting in a lower offer premium 
paid for the target, similar to Chira and Madura’s view (2015). In this situation, when bidders pay for 
targets with a high offer premium, this would lead the market to believe that there is an overpayment. 
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However, according to the misvaluation hypothesis, managers could time the market by paying with 
overvalued stocks for acquisitions. If the RRP is a suitable representation for relative valuations, 
bidders looking at reference points of the two firms involved are actually going to time the market. If 
this is the case, it remains largely unexplored why bidders rely on their reference point while paying 
for the target, given better understanding about the firm.  
 
The RRP is able to capture the market perception of the misvaluation of the two firms involved in an 
M&A deal. Unlike Dong et al. (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) who provide a 
different view of bidder and target’s misvaluation,52 this researcher provides direct evidence that the 
reference point should unify the investors’ view on the misvaluation of the two firms involved. George 
and Hwang (2004) find misvaluation is driven by investors’ reactions. Lacking private information, 
investors are reluctant to bid up a stock price when it is close to the 52-week high, based on the 
rationale that it is previous good news that has driven a firm’s value beyond its fundamental value, 
leading them to believe that a firm maybe overvalued. In contrast, investors should also be reluctant 
to sell stocks of a firm whose price is far below the 52-week high, as this indicates that the firm maybe 
undervalued. Extending their argument in the context of M&As, it becomes possible that managers 
are theoretically highly committed in creating long-term value for the firm instead of enjoying short-
term profits from possible mispricing phenomena. Rather than Dong et al. (2006) who used the 
difference between bidder’s and target’s P/B and P/V as proxies for the relative valuations between 
the two firms, which are based on the firms’ fundamental value and argued that there is no actual 
misvaluation but rather a managerial perception of misvaluation, the case of possible misvaluation 
                                                          
52 Dong et al. (2006) proposed price-to-book value and price-to-residual income value for bidder misvaluation whereas 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) proposed a misvaluation measure based on an assumption that targets are rational, 
and they overestimate merger synergies when valuation errors are sizable.  
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with the RRP from a market perspective is examined.      
 
To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the role of the bidder 
reference point in the context of M&A valuation. Following Baker et al. (2012), who proposed the 
target reference point to explain how much bidders should pay for the acquisition target, it is 
suggested that the bidder reference point would lead bidders to consider how much they are able to 
pay for the acquisition target. Bidders who have performed poorly recently may find it difficult to 
provide any rationale to pay the target with high offer premiums, while bidders whose stock price is 
close to its 52-week high should be regarded as rich in financing resources, and thus dominate the 
negotiation table, resulting in a low offer premium. It is much easier for them to persuade their 
shareholders that the firm is stable and they can manage the deal well afterwards. In addition, in order 
to boost a firm’s value and retain the market’s confidence in the firm, bidders should initiate an M&A 
bid by sticking to the reference point, a way the market can judge, while remaining silent when the 
firm’s price is close to the 52-week high tends to be very risky for the firm’s prospects. Barberis and 
Xiong (2009) suggest that investors tend to sell stocks whose value has recently risen. Grinblatt and 
Kelaharju (2001) and Huddart et al. (2009) report large abnormal sales’ volumes around the 52-week 
high.  
 
Another reason that bidders look at their own reference point is simply because bidder reference point 
is an important component for managers to time the market. It is expected that managers can exploit 
mispricing, as in the prior M&A literature that bidders are likely to pay with stocks for acquisitions 
when they are overvalued (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong et al., 2006). However, the proxies used in 
their papers for misvaluation do not accurately reflect the information such as a firm’s prospects and 
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managerial effectiveness, whilst the stock price is a relatively more comprehensive information.53 
Therefore, it is suggested that the RRP, indicating the extent to which the market’s misperception of 
the firm’s valuation, should provide similar findings as those predicted in the misvaluation hypothesis.  
 
The RRP also signals to the target firm what price it could potentially negotiate with the bidder. If 
targets believe, using the reference point, that they are overvalued, they would find it even harder to 
justify this (overvaluation) given that they tend to be generally smaller and lack better investment 
opportunities than bidders. This leads them to accept even more overvalued stocks for liquidity 
purposes. In addition, an increase in the RRP also leads the target shareholders to believe that takeover 
bidders are more attractive as it is more likely for the bidder to hit its reference price again more than 
the target does. Hence, they might perceive that selling their firm to a well-run bidder would be more 
likely to create value. According to Burch et al. (2012), targets tend to reserve bidders’ overvalued 
stocks, maintaining that highly-valued bidders perform well or have better investment opportunities. 
Therefore, stocks of the relatively more overvalued bidders are more attractive to targets.   
 
Using M&As to investigate the relationship between the RRP and M&As is of great interest mainly 
for two reasons. First, the RRP is a direct misvaluation measure that captures the market’s perception 
of the firm’s valuation, avoiding biases caused by a firm’s fundamental characteristics (Lin et al., 
2011). M&As serving as a major corporate investment activity draw a great deal of investors’ 
attention. With limited information and limited time in which to process that information, investors 
are likely to make decisions based on the most current market perceptions of a firm’s valuation, 
                                                          
53 The existence of mispricing in the short term has been confirmed even if the market is efficient, such as investors’ 
underreaction (Debondt and Thaler, 1985).  
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making the RRP a suitable valuation proxy for this testing ground. Secondly, the RRP will facilitate 
the M&A process. Bidders can identify the relative overvaluation through the RRP, as an increase of 
the RRP would potentially drive a relatively more overvalued bidder to dilute overvaluation through 
acquisitions.  
 
Analysing a sample of 1,878 U.S. domestic public acquisitions announced between 1985 and 2014 
and using the RRP to test the predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis, it was found that the 
propensity to use stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions increases with the RRP, which is 
more pronounced when market-wide valuation is high. The results of this chapter are robust after 
applying additional controls. Moreover, the relatively more overvalued bidders tend to pay higher 
offer premiums. The results continue to hold after endogeneity checks that may become necessary 
due to omitted variable biases. Finally, multivariate analysis results show that the RRP plays a role in 
bidders’ overpayment in the short term. However, it became evident that higher offer premiums paid 
by the relatively more overvalued bidders are translated into less negative abnormal returns in the 
long term, suggesting that bidders who pay for acquisitions according to the RRP protect the wealth 
of shareholders. Overall, the findings in this chapter are consistent with the predictions of the 
misvaluation hypothesis and reference point theory.  
 
This chapter makes three distinct contributions to the literature. Firstly, it explains the misvaluation 
hypothesis from the perspective of the reference point. A dynamic valuation framework with the RRP 
is developed, based on market perception of a firm’s valuation. The RRP overcomes the effect of 
market-wide valuation for an individual firm, as the two firms involved experience the same market 
conditions. A firm’s current price that is close to its 52-week highest point is more likely to be driven 
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by market-wide conditions (sentiment) and therefore associated with larger market valuation errors, 
increasing the probability of the firm being overvalued. Using the RRP, it is possible to examine how 
the valuation difference of the deviation of the two firms drives M&As. Hence, the bar is raised to 
the market level, eliminating estimation biases arising from the use of a firm’s fundamental value. 
Furthermore, the RRP is easily observable, which encourages investors to use it as a valuation 
benchmark. The Results of This chapter suggest that the RRP is able to accommodate the implications 
of the misvaluation hypothesis.  
 
Secondly, the chapter provides direct evidence that more experienced investors behave similarly to 
less experienced investors in major corporate investment decisions. However, the market and 
managers may interpret the reference point effect differently as the market looks at the offer premium 
paid according to the RRP as a result of overpayment by hubris-infected bidders, while bidders paying 
for acquisitions according to the RRP is as a result of timing the market. The results indicate the less 
negative long-term abnormal returns for the relatively more overvalued stock bidders compared with 
the relatively less overvalued (or more undervalued) stock bidders.    
 
Thirdly, this chapter offers a new insight into the method of payment hypothesis. It is suggested that 
the sign of relative overvaluation is well identified by the RRP, which relaxes the assumptions of 
irrational targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and valuation error misled targets (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004) related to the target’s motive of accepting overvalued stocks,54 as both bidders 
and targets can identify any relative overvaluation in an M&A deal. Bidders paying stocks instead of 
                                                          
54 Common assumptions on whether the target will accept the overvalued stocks suggest that targets either have a cash-
out purpose (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) or are misled by the market perception (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004). 
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cash for a larger RRP acquisition reduce offer premiums while paying cash in a lower RRP acquisition 
reduce offer premiums compared with the case of the higher RRP acquisitions. Hence, the RRP 
justifies the method of payment choice.   
      
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a range of literature that is 
related to the misvaluation hypothesis and reference point theory of M&As. Section 3 designs 
hypotheses with regard to the relations between RRP and the method of payment, offer premiums and 
M&A outcomes in the short and long runs. Section 4 summarises the data and presents the 
methodologies. Section 5 analyses the empirical results. Section 6 conducts further robustness checks 
regarding the role of the RRP played in the M&A surveyed. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
4.2.1. The misvaluation hypothesis 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a theoretical model of M&As based on the assumption that the 
market is inefficient whereas managers are rational. With the assumption of the misvaluation 
hypothesis, managers are able to explore the market’s mispricing given that firms are not fairly valued. 
The authors suggest relative valuations of the two firms involved in an M&A deal as an important 
factor explaining why M&As are initiated, the method of payment choice for financing M&As, and 
the valuation consequences of the M&A wave. Their theoretical model predicts that bidders sacrifice 
the short-term benefits in exchange for the firm’s long-term value. Overall, the model has raised two 
important implications to be investigated: the method of payment choice and the long-term 
performance of the combined firm.    
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The misvaluation hypothesis is related to the method of payment hypothesis. It suggests that the 
method of payment choices would reflect bidders’ M&A motive. Bidders who offer targets with 
stocks have long-term horizons, in that they aim to create value instead of reaping mispricing benefits 
in the short run. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that the net long-term effect of stock deals would 
generate short-term losses but long-term ‘gains’. Though stock-financed acquisitions bring forth 
negative returns to the bidder in the long run, those acquisitions benefit bidders who pay with stocks 
that were significantly overvalued prior to any acquisitions. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (2003: 
301), ‘returns are just not as negative as they would have been without the acquisition’, which 
suggests that overvalued stocks used as a means of payment for acquisitions are treated as a cushion 
for the collapse of the stocks in the long run. In this respect, a firm’s value is enhanced with 
overvalued stocks even though there are negative long-term returns. 
 
Moreover, the misvaluation hypothesis suggests that the method of payment clarifies the market 
important information about a firm’s value. It is generally believed that bidders who pay targets with 
stocks would signal to the market that their firms are overvalued or their firms are relatively more 
overvalued than the targets, whilst targets paid with cash are perceived to be undervalued relative to 
their fundamental value. This is also consistent with the signalling hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
(1984). The major difference between the two hypotheses regarding the method of payment is that 
the signaling hypothesis assumes that investors are asymmetrically informed in that they do not have 
private information about the other firm and pay with stocks to deal with uncertainty, whereas the 
misvaluation hypothesis relaxes this assumption and posits that the primary motive of paying with 
stocks is that managers try to time the market and aim to create value for the firm. Therefore, the 
misvaluation hypothesis interprets the long-run reason for the bidder to finance an M&A deal, 
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reasoning that managers who pay with overvalued stocks try to time the market.   
 
The theoretical model of misvaluation hypothesis has given rise to many important implications. First, 
the issue on whether all-stock acquisitions are driven by misvaluation has raised doubts. Savor and 
Lu (2009) imply that all stock acquisitions are driven by misvaluation, assuming that managers try to 
time the market by paying for targets with overvalued stocks and highly valued bidders have the 
greatest incentive to undertake an acquisition. Their study focuses on long-term performance of stock 
bidders and finds that though stock acquisitions destroy the firm value, stock bidders of successful 
deals outperform those who fail to complete an M&A deal. Analysing a sample of 12,578 U.S. 
mergers between 1962 and 2000, the authors found that stock acquisitions generate long-term 
negative abnormal returns for a firm. Despite this, the mean difference of buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns between successful deals and unsuccessful deals increase from 13.6% to 31.2% over the three 
years following an acquisition,55 suggesting that stock acquisitions are a result of managers timing 
the market. In contrast, Fu et al. (2013) find evidence that not all stock acquisitions are driven by 
misvaluation. Among 1,319 stock-financed acquisitions studied in their sample, one third is not 
motivated by stock overvaluation, which is neither relative to its fundamental value nor relative to 
the target valuation. Eckbo et al. (2016) documented more direct evidence contradicting the notion 
that stock acquisitions are market-driven. Investigating a sample of 4,919 merger bids between 1980 
and 2008, the authors found that bidders paying with stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions 
tend to be small firms and with low leverage, implying that the reason for bidders to pay with stocks 
is that the firm is financially constrained and limited in free cash flows. In addition, stock acquisitions 
                                                          
55 BHARs were calculated with the market-adjusted model. Their paper shows a similar trend when BHARs were 
calculated with the calendar-time portfolio model.   
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are more likely to occur in high-tech industries and when target and bidder are in geographical 
proximity, suggesting the reason for targets to accept stocks is because that they have information 
about the true position of the bidder, eliminating the concern of information asymmetry.      
 
The second concern relating to the misvaluation hypothesis is whether bidders paying with 
overvalued stocks could create value for the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that the long-
run reason for the bidders to use stocks is to create value for the firm as holding stocks in an 
overvalued market will collapse the firm’s value when the market incorporates information and 
downgrades the value accordingly. With this in mind, bidders are rational. Consistent with this 
prediction, Ang and Cheng (2006) found that the long-term performance of stock bidders and 
overvaluation are positively correlated. Analysing a sample of over 3,000 mergers between 1981 and 
2001, the authors found significantly positive abnormal returns for stock bidders in the estimation 
period of one day prior to the takeover announcement date and three years following merger 
completion. The results continue to hold compared with those drawn from the control group that 
contains similarly overvalued firms who do not undertake an acquisition. The result shows that 
overvalued bidders outperform those similarly overvalued non-acquirers.  
 
Lin et al. (2011) explain underperformance as long-run reversal of initial overvaluation rather than 
an overpayment. Their quartile analysis results of buy-and-hold abnormal return by bidder’ P/V show 
that overvalued bidders underperform their undervalued counterparts in the long run over three years 
following an acquisition. Their results are robust in the situation where the offer premium and other 
relevant variables were taken into consideration in the multivariate regression of BHARs on bidder 
P/V. The rationale of controlling for the offer premium is that bidders with high P/V are also those 
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paying high M&A offer premiums, leading to the same prediction that overpayment results in 
underperformance. In order to capture the net effect of the market correction on the firm overvaluation, 
the authors used multivariate regressions to control for the offer premium after univariate analysis. In 
addition, their data show that the average offer premium for the most overvalued bidders are 
insignificantly different from the least overvalued bidders, 56.21% and 53.64% respectively, thus 
weakening evidence that overpayment triggers underperformance in the long run.     
 
Fu et al. (2012) argued that long-term underperformance is due to overpayment. They found that 
overvalued firms tend to pay too much for acquisitions and attribute this to the weakness of the 
corporate governance structure of a firm. The authors measure post-merger performance of the firm 
with both the market-based approach as well as the accounting-based approach. Using the accounting-
based approach is based on the rationale that the initial overvaluation of the firm will be corrected 
regardless of the occurrence of an acquisition. This may not be captured by conventional market-
based approaches. The authors thus assessed the firm’s long run performance with the firm’s ROA, 
which is a proxy for firm’s operational performance rather than the market reaction, taking managerial 
effectiveness into account. Overall, both approaches indicate negative long-term synergies for the 
firms whose corporate governance structure is of inferior quality.           
 
Since the long-term benefits of an acquisition are nearly zero as predicted by the misvaluation 
model,56 leading to a question as to why target managers are willing to accept bidders’ overvalued 
stocks. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) interpreted this as target’s short-horizons. With this in mind, 
targets tend to voluntarily accept overvalued stocks to raise the liquidity of the firm or simply trade 
                                                          
56 Given the fact that value creation for the bidder, in return, damages the target in the long run. 
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them after acquisitions for a cash-out purpose. Another explanation is that this matter is attributed to 
the agency problems of the target firms where managers are offered with lucrative benefits, such as 
good pay or being retained in the top position of the bidder firm following acquisitions, leading them 
to give up control of the firm.   
 
However, the assumption of short-horizon targets has been questioned by a number of M&A studies. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest a rational target model whereby rational targets 
should not be willing to accept overvalued stocks, as they clearly know about the danger of holding 
stocks in an overvalued market. The authors suggest that both target and bidder managers are well-
informed about their own firms but they lack private information about the other firm. Such private 
information of the firm tells managers whether the other firm is undervalued or overvalued but cannot 
tell managers what drives such misvaluation. A rational target is able to assess the synergies of the 
merger and decide not to accept overvalued stocks so as to prevent the value of the firm from being 
damaged. However, the view is distorted during the periods when market-wide valuation is high. As 
it is explained by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), ‘the rational target correctly filters on 
average but underestimates the market wide effect when the market is overvalued and over estimates 
the effect when the market is undervalued.’ Thus, an overestimation of synergy positively correlates 
with valuation errors. Despite target managers being rational, they may find it hard to distinguish 
synergies from misvaluation without knowing what drives misvaluation. Their data indicate that 
stock-financed acquisitions are prevalent during high market-wide valuation periods when rational 
targets tend to make mistakes by wrongly accepting bidders’ overvalued stocks.  
 
Following this, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) suggest that rational targets tend to accept overvalued 
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stocks when valuation errors mislead their estimation on synergies. The authors find the volume of 
stock acquisitions and valuation errors are positively correlated. These authors use regression 
techniques to break the market-to-book ratio (M/B), the conventional misvaluation measure, into 
three individual components: the firm-specific misvaluation, the sector-wide misvaluation and the 
long-run value to book which captures long-run growth opportunities. Their data suggest that the 
firm-specific level and the sector-level are the most important factors driving misvaluation. More 
specifically, bidders on average have higher firm-specific errors than targets, which is on average 
60%. Misvaluation can reconcile about 15% of merger activity at the industry level. Rhodes-Kropf et 
al.’s study (2005) shows that low long-run value-to-book firms buy high long-run value-to-book firms, 
suggesting that low growth opportunities firms acquire high growth opportunities firms. Overall, 
misvaluation-driven mergers are as a result of valuation errors, contradicting to what the misvaluation 
hypothesis assumes. 
 
Likewise, Di Guili (2013) finds rational targets, suggesting that target managers care about the quality 
of mergers rather than private benefits. In this regard, stocks are associated with better investment 
opportunities. So as to distinguish the effects of misvaluation and growth opportunities, the author 
proposes a new proxy for investment opportunities of the firm and finds there is positive correlation 
between stock payment and the firm’s prospects. Following this line of literature, Vermaelen and Xu 
(2014) explained rational targets with capital structure theory. They found that rational target 
managers are likely to accept overvalued stocks as they believe bidders paying with stocks will reach 
an optimal capital structure. They proposed a prediction model regarding the method of payment, 
which predicts that the bidder pays cash when the market expects cash payment. If bidders pay cash 
when the model predicts stocks, the long-term abnormal returns will be positive based on the rationale 
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that the market under-reacts to the firm. Whilst bidders pay with stocks as the market predicted, their 
long-term abnormal returns will be negative, assuming that the market can identify the motive for 
financing an M&A is overvaluation. The prediction model explains 89% of Vermaelen and Xu’s 
M&A sample (2014). It indicates that cash can generate positive long-term abnormal returns on the 
condition that the market recommends stocks, whereas bidders should pay cash when the model 
predicts cash, indicating that target managers are rational in that they would not accept overvalued 
stocks without a reasonable explanation.    
 
The misvaluation hypothesis explains who buys whom and the medium of payment. Dong et al. (2006) 
conducted a thoroughly investigation into the relationship to these predictions. The authors analysed 
pre-takeover valuation of targets and bidders by using the firms’ market price-to-book value of equity 
(P/B), and market price-to-residual income (P/V). This latter misvaluation measure has been largely 
ignored by previous studies. Their sample consists of 3,732 U.S. acquisitions announced between 
1978 and 2000. Their study suggests that these two misvaluation measures are highly correlated but 
P/B tends to have more explanatory power over the misvaluation hypothesis than P/V on the rationale 
that managers are becoming more familiar with P/B than P/V. According to Dong et al. (2006), P 
denotes the market value of the firm while both B and V denote the firm’s fundamental value. Thus, 
the essence of these two misvaluation proxies indicates the extent to which a firm’s market value 
deviates from its fundamental value. The difference between B and V is that, the former measures the 
firm’s book value whilst the latter contains analysts’ forecasting information. Therefore, P/B is a 
proxy for the firms’ growth opportunities or managerial effectiveness, which is used to investigate 
the Q hypothesis, whilst P/V is more likely a pure proxy for misvaluation in this context given that 
the measure reflects expectations of analysts’ forecasts about the firm’s future performance. However, 
Chapter 4. Relative Reference Prices and M&A Misvaluations 
 
179 
 
it is argued that analysts’ forecasts may not accurately reflect the information about the firm’s 
prospects and managerial effectiveness. Therefore, the authors propose to include both P/B and P/V 
to investigate the misvaluation hypothesis.  
 
Dong et al.’s study (2006) focuses on the relationship between the valuations of both the bidder and 
the target and many aspects of M&As, including the method of payment, M&A offer premiums, M&A 
outcomes and a wide range of deal characteristics. The sample includes 2,922 successful and 810 
unsuccessful takeover bids announced between 1978 and 2000, and filters out those M&A deals 
whose transaction value was less than $10 millions, eliminating concerns about small deals 
confounding the result.57 Dong et al.’s data show that bidders are generally those with a higher 
valuation whereas targets are those with a lower valuation, reflected in higher P/B and P/V of bidders 
opposed to targets. Once again, a higher valuation firm is more likely be the takeover bidder than a 
lower valuation firm, which is consistent with the prediction in Shleifer and Vishny’s theoretical 
model (2003). Stock-financed takeover bids show significantly higher valuation of the bidder and the 
target than cash-financed takeover bids. Of particular note, the mean valuation differential between 
the bidder and the target are highly significant in the two misvaluation measures in the stock-financed 
acquisition subsample, whilst P/B has more explanatory power than P/V in explaining the difference 
in bidder-target valuation in the cash-financed acquisition subsample. With respect to M&A outcomes, 
the authors noted that bidders with higher P/B tend to pay targets with higher M&A offer premiums, 
which are associated with negative market reactions to the bidder and positive market reactions to the 
target.     
 
                                                          
57 The authors also winsorised P/B and P/V of the firms at 1% and 99% levels for a similar reason.  
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Their study proposes two different proxies for misvaluation and find some rather mixed results when 
relating to a wide range of takeover characteristics. The authors found that cash bidders are also 
relatively more overvalued than targets. The misvaluation effect triggers bidder managers’ incentives 
of exploring mispricing targets. As a result, rather than paying targets with stocks, bidders who are 
more overvalued would also pay cash to the undervalued targets. This argument complements stock-
market driven acquisitions, reasoning that either cash or stocks may be used when the bidders’ M&A 
motive is to dilute overvaluation. The authors also note that these proxies for misvaluation are a 
reflection of the managers’ perceptions of a firm’s valuation rather than the true position of the firms, 
explaining relative valuations from a behavioural finance perspective. Despite that, the study has 
thoroughly investigated the misvaluation hypothesis and provides empirical evidence relating to what 
the theoretical model of misvaluation had proposed, failing to provide any rationale as to why target 
managers accept overvalued stocks. It remains unclear whether target managers accept bidders’ stocks 
believing that bidders with high P/B or P/V are those with good past performance and thus are able 
to create synergies for the combined firm.             
 
With this in mind, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) proposed 
that targets accept overvalued stocks is because they are misled by valuation errors. Whilst Burch et 
al. (2012) suggest that targets prefer to hold highly valued stocks as they believe those firms are 
normally well-run and have better prospects, implying that targets can identify the sign of 
overvaluation and voluntarily accept those highly valued stocks. Their findings are consistent with 
the prediction of the Q hypothesis. By accepting those highly overvalued stocks, targets could 
liquidate their holding position.  
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Many additional studies have proposed various proxies for misvaluation, which challenge the 
conventional misvaluation measures. For example, Ben-David et al. (2015), who used short interest 
as a proxy for misvaluation, reflecting investors’ under- and over-reactions to the firm’s valuations. 
The authors found that stock bidders have higher short interests relative to targets. The use of short 
interest as a measure for misvaluation isolates the effect of growth opportunities which may lead to 
the same prediction that stocks are likely to be used as a means of payment for M&As. Ben-David et 
al.’s results are consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis. Di Guili (2013) challenges MTBV by 
arguing that it represents both the misvaluation and growth opportunities of a firm. It is generally 
believed that firms with a high MTBV may be a result of overvaluation or better investment 
opportunities. So as to distinguish the effects of misvaluation and investment opportunities, the author 
develops a new measure for investment opportunity, which is based on post-merger investment. 
Analysing a sample of 1,187 mergers announced between 1990 and 2005 and using the average ratio 
of capital expenditures over assets in the four years following the merger as a proxy for the firms’ 
investment opportunities, the author finds that the propensity for using stocks increases with the post-
merger investment ratio. His study indicates that the firm’s market value relative to its fundamental 
value is a problematic proxy for misvaluation and likely to bias the predictions of the misvaluation 
hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2. Reference point theory of M&As 
The reference point is an essential implication of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979). 
It portrays the concept that people’ s feelings about the gain and the loss are judged relative to a 
particular reference point, which is normally the current position of a subject, the status quo or the 
aspiration level, as opposed to a reference point. Reference points distinguish prospect theory from 
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the traditional expected utility theory that emphasise the final outcome of the wealth level but fails to 
account for the decision-making process.  
 
The reference point theory is rooted in Tversky and Kahneman’s anchoring and adjustment 
mechanism (1974) suggesting that people tend to rely heavily on a piece of salient but perhaps largely 
irrelevant information at an initial stage of the decision-making process and adjust the final estimates 
when new information is incorporated. This psychological phenomenon refers to the belief formation 
process. Many implications of prospect theory are largely built upon the reference point theory. There 
exists a loss-aversion tendency, given an equal-size of loss or gain, the feelings about the loss are 
more pronounced than those about the gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and there also exists a 
diminishing sensitivity that the feelings about the gain and loss are more pronounced in the scenario 
where the outcome is close rather than distant in relation to the reference point (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992).  
 
The reference point theory interprets how people make decisions under the situation where 
considerable information uncertainty exists. Baker et al. (2012) were the first to relate this theory to 
the M&A pricing decision. They noted that the use of the target 52-week high as the reference price 
lies in two proposed reasons. First, the firm’s 52-week high is frequently reported by the financial 
media, which reinforces the investors’ formation process to utility realisation. Secondly, Baker et al. 
justify the rationale behind the use of the target 52-week high from the psychological and practical 
points of views of both the target and the bidder firms.58 
 
                                                          
58 The researcher discussed the main findings of their paper in the previous Chapters.  
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The authors also document evidence of the reference point effect on the market. When assessing the 
deal outcome, the authors found that there are high offer premiums to targets who negotiate bidders 
with their 52-week highs, whilst bidders receive negative market reactions, indicating that the offer 
price driven by reference price is due to an overpayment. On the whole, Baker et al.’s study (2012) 
suggests an evident reference point phenomenon for both the individual and the institutional investors.  
 
Chira and Madura (2015) extended Baker et al.’s work (2012) by interpreting the role of reference 
point prices as the bargaining power of the firm. Chira and Madura focused on the relationship 
between takeover possibility and the reference points of the two firms involved. Similar Baker et al.’s 
work (2012), Chira and Madura measured the reference point as the deviation of the firms’ 52-week 
highest stock price from their current prices. The study assumes that the firms have greater bargaining 
power when its current price is closer to, rather than distant from, its highest stock price over the year. 
There results show that firms are likely to be takeover bidders when they have less distance between 
their current price and the highest price over the year, indicating that a bidder’s great bargaining 
power leads to a greater incentive of undertaking acquisitions. Moreover, it was found that firms are 
less attractive to unaffiliated firms when the distance between the reference price and the current price 
is large, arguing that the firm whose price deviates considerably from its 52-week high tends to resist 
the deal unless a high price is offered in compensation. And because of this, bidders will abandon the 
deal.  
 
The authors suggest that both the target and the bidder will assess the firm value with their own 
reference points. By examining the relationship between deal completion and the firms’ reference 
points, the authors argue that targets with a low stock price relative to their 52-week highs may 
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perceive themselves as undervalued, resulting in strong deal resistance. Bidders will pursue the deal 
by paying for takeover targets with stocks whose price is high relative to their 52-week highs, given 
that bidders perceive their firms to be overvalued. However, their study fails to provide any rationale 
on why bidders would look at their own reference points since they have more information about their 
firm than other investors in the market. In addition, the study argues that the deal is likely to be 
completed when the price distance between the firm’s 52-week high and the current price is small for 
both the target and the bidder, relying on the explanation that psychological barriers between the two 
firms are low.    
 
Many additional studies have indicated an important role the firm’s reference point price plays on 
investors’ trading strategies. George and Hwang (2004) used a firm’s 52-week high as the reference 
point price and found evidence of reference dependence bias in the stock market. They note that 
investors view the price that is close to its 52-week high price as good news and the price that has a 
great distance its 52-week high as bad news. The mechanism is that investors are unwilling to bid up 
a price when it is close to the 52-week high and should be reluctant to press down a price when it is 
a long way below the 52-week high. This reasoning suggests that investors have a tendency to make 
decisions based on a reference point price, which is the firm’s 52-week high. The salient evidence of 
reference dependence is also supported by the findings of Grinblatt and Kelaharju (2001) who 
investigated the Finnish stock market. They used a firm’s historical high as a reference point price 
and found that investors avoid selling (buying) stocks whose value is far below (close) to the historical 
high. Huddart et al. (2009) observed the phenomenon of abnormal sales’ volume around the 52-week 
high based on a sample of 2,000 firms over 24 years.    
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Shefrin and Statman (1985) put forward the disposition effect that investors tend to sell winner stocks 
too soon and hold loser stock too long, which is in favour of prospect theory. Barberies and Xiong 
(2009) also documented evidence of loss-aversion based on a large sample of activities by individual 
investors. These authors show investors’ greater propensity for selling stocks whose value has risen 
recently and buying those whose value has been downgraded recently. According to a survey of 
reference point theory (Olsen, 1997), it often occurs that the reference point effect is evident among 
both individual and institutional investors, which implies that reference dependence bias is human 
nature when facing uncertainty.  
 
Bidder and target managers look at the reference point of the firms because they know the market 
also has a reference-dependence bias. In this case, bidder managers can justify the motive for M&A 
offer premiums paid for the target. Targets demand offer premiums around the target 52-week high 
to avoid being blamed for selling the firm with a low valuation. Though Baker et al. (2012) showed 
that offer premiums are positively related to the target 52-week high, it is less likely for the researcher 
to know the whole reason for the bidders’ M&A motive without considerations about the bidder’s 
side. For example, bidders are overconfident as they would argue that paying for targets based on 
their 52-week highs can create synergies. It may also be the case that bidders are in a relatively weaker 
bargaining position to targets because of information asymmetry, indicating that offer premiums 
relative to the target 52-week high are due to target’s strong bargaining power. This chapter puts 
forward Baker et al.’s idea (2012) by adding the role of the bidder reference point, and explores how 
M&A activity is structured, based on the reference point of the two firms involved.    
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4.3. Hypothesis development 
Shleifer and Vishny's misvaluation hypothesis (2003) indicates that bidders have a direct incentive to 
use stocks as means of payment to finance an M&A deal when they are overvalued. It is the case that 
overvaluation is a managerial perception as noted by Dong et al. (2006). The market has a tendency 
to assess the firm value based on the reference point price, as predicted by reference point theory of 
M&A (Baker et al., 2012). Managers whose aim is to time the market will also consider this and 
eliminate such overvaluation concerns through M&As. Bidders are likely to be those with a stable 
performance relative to targets, drawing its current price closer to the 52-week high, rather than the 
case of the target. This gives rise three possible situations when the firm’s value has recently moved 
toward to its 52-week high. If bidders are fairly estimated, nearness to the 52-week high price 
indicates bidder’s strong bargaining power. The market believes that the firm is strong in making 
profits for the combined firm, and as a result, bidders would pay fewer offer premiums. The second 
scenario is that bidders are possibly undervalued even though there is nearness to the 52-week high 
price given that the firm’s growth opportunities may be underestimated. The arrival of the information 
at a later stage will push the firm’s price to a new 52-week high. If so, bidders would possibly pay 
for targets with cash rather than undervalued stocks. The third scenario is that bidders are overvalued 
with nearness to the 52-week high price. If it is the case, bidders are likely to pay for a target with 
stocks, aiming at diluting overvaluation and creating firm value in the long run. Furthermore, 
eliminating overvaluation requires additional costs, which result in a high offer price in excess of the 
target’s current value.    
 
The RRP eliminates any of these concerns on the bidders’ value, as it reflects the extent to which the 
bidder is relatively more overvalued than the target from the market perspective. This proxy 
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investigates the valuation at the market level rather than at the firm level, which is the misperception 
of the firm’s valuation created by those investors lacking private information about the firm. If 
managers can time the market, M&As are a valuation game. It should be suggested that bidders should 
dilute their valuations as long as they are relatively more overvalued than the target. One important 
sign of this overvaluation is that bidders choose stocks as a means of payment for finance M&As, 
since holding stocks in an overvalued market will destroy the wealth of long-term shareholders. 
Therefore, the probability of using stocks for payment purposes increases in line with movements in 
the RRP leading to our first testable hypothesis of 
 
H1: There is a positive correlation between the RRP and the likelihood of using stocks as a means of 
payment in M&As. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicted that bidders’ overvaluation will be diluted through acquiring an 
undervalued (or less overvalued) firm. Dong et al. (2006) proposed P/B and P/V as proxies for 
misvaluation, which is the firm’s market value relative to its fundamental value. Dong et al.’s findings 
imply that diluting overvaluation remains a priority objective for bidder managers regardless of the 
method of payment used for finance M&As. It might be the case that cash bidders are also overvalued, 
in that overvaluation drives acquisitions. According to this argument, bidders make a takeover bid 
with cash rather than not bidding at all. Thus, bidders can profit from acquisitions by using stocks 
when they are relatively more overvalued and using cash when targets are undervalued. This 
reasoning implies that M&As result from bidder managers timing the market.  
 
Relative bidder-target valuations were measured with RRP, capturing the market perception of a 
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firm’s valuation and also giving consideration of the valuation of the two firms involved. Since both 
target and bidder managers will assess their firms’ value according to the reference point (Chira and 
Madura, 2015), they can identify the signs of relative valuations. Thus, bidders would pay offer 
premiums in exchange for the control of the target firm. Targets would demand high offer premiums 
based on this relative valuation, as they can also identify any misvaluation reflected in the RRP. They 
would resist the deal unless high offer premiums were offered in compensation. Based on the above 
argument, it was tested that 
 
H2: M&A offer premiums correlates positively with the RRP. 
 
Finally, bidders with a relatively smaller changes related to the firm’s 52-week high (with a price that 
is close to its 52-week high) are expected to have a stronger bargaining position, leading to low offer 
premiums being paid to the target. Thus, a high offer premium would offer shareholders a 
straightforward sense that there is an overpayment, thus reacting negatively to the bid announcement. 
On the other hand, this researcher argues that M&As serve as a value enhancement opportunity for 
the target firm as shareholders would expect that targets with a relatively higher reference point would 
have a higher probability of profiting through acquisitions. Therefore, our last testable hypothesis is 
 
H3: Bidder (Target) short-term performance correlates negatively (positively) with the RRP. 
 
4.4. Data and methodology 
4.4.1. Data  
The initial sample covers 36,506 U.S. domestic public acquisitions announced between January 1, 
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1985, and December 31, 2014, as provided by Thomson One. Stock price was collected from CRSP, 
and a series of standard accounting variables were collected from COMPUSTAT. Accounting 
variables were required to be available for the fiscal year end prior to the announcement date are 
required. Public acquisitions refer to the two firms involved being publicly traded U.S. firms (listed 
on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ).59 Once deals that were classified as recapitalizations, repurchases, 
self-tender offers and rumors according to Thomson One were excluded, it was left with 11,615 
observations.60 The offer premium is not a missing value, which further reduces the number of 
observations to 5,450. The stock price for the calculation of the bidder and the target 3-day CARs 
were required to be available, which left with 4,630 observations. The payment method information 
to be available in Thomson One, which left the chapter with 4,290 observations. It yielded 2,156 
observations after excluding all bidder variables with a missing value, and has a final sample of 1,878 
observations after excluding all target variables with a missing value.61 
 
The RRP effect on the probability of using stocks as a means of payment for acquisitions was analysed 
by controlling for a series of deal, bidder and target characteristics, which are standard control 
variables highlighted in M&A literature. Bidder size is expected to be negatively related to the stock-
financed acquisition. Faccio and Masulis (2005) suggest that larger bidders have higher credit 
facilities, which reduces the probability for using stocks. The firm’s growth opportunities were 
measured with MTBV. Higher MTBV bidders tend to use more stocks in acquisitions, in that they 
                                                          
59 Firms should have an available stock price to calculate the 52-week high.  
60 By doing these, acquisitions in which the bidder and the target is the same firm were eliminated, on the rationale that 
the difference between the target and the bidder reference points cannot be distinguished (e.g. self-tender offers), and 
acquisitions in which the target actively searches for the bidder were also excluded, since those deals violate the reference 
point effect.  
61 All variables that have a missing value and were used in the regressions were excluded, following a summary of the 
acquisition sample and variables. 
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reserve cash to fund new investment projects (Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006). The 
firm’s profitability was measured with the return-on-asset ratio (ROA). It should be suggested that 
firms with higher profitability are more likely to use retained earnings held in cash rather than stocks 
as it reduces costs of financing. Target characteristics were also accounted for, since stocks are more 
likely to be used to mitigate the target risk (Hansen, 1987). In this respect, the propensity for using 
stocks is greater when targets’ risks increase, such as large size, with a high MTBV and a low ROA.    
 
Following Officer (2004), information asymmetry is measured by calculating the standard deviation 
of returns. Hansen (1987) suggests that stocks are more likely to be used when level of information 
uncertainty increases. Leverage is defined as debt-to-equity ratio (D/E). Vermaelen and Xu (2014) 
suggest that over-levered bidders who justify stock financing in terms of moving to an optimal capital 
structure lead to an increase of overvalued stocks for acquisitions. Whereas targets with high leverage 
should be reluctant to receive such stocks. Liquidity is defined as cash flow-to-equity ratio (CF/E). 
Higher liquidity firms are more likely to be less financially constrained firms, which result in the 
method of payment for acquisitions is cash rather than stocks. Inclusions of capital structure related 
variables in the regressions would allow us to disentangle the effects of firm’s capital structure 
decision and misvaluation on stock-financed acquisitions.    
 
In a further analysis, the RRP effect on the offer premium was analysed. Different categories of 
variables were controlled in line with the work of Eckbo (2009). Specifically, firm size was measured 
with logarithm of market valuation (MV). According to the hubris management hypothesis (Roll, 
1986), larger bidders tend to pay generously for smaller targets. The firm’s profitability was measured 
with ROA. Agency theory suggests that poor-performing bidders tend to dissipate firms’ resources 
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and overpay for the target, whereas well-performing firms are attractive to bidders (Schwert, 2000). 
The firm’s growth opportunities were measured with MTBV. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest the 
extrapolation hypothesis that glamour bidders are less cautionary than value bidders about the target 
valuation, leading to higher offer premiums. Harford (1999) suggests that the target MTBV links with 
the managerial takeover motive since bidders are more aggressive in exploring synergies from the 
lower MTBV target. Stock volatility were calculated with standard deviation of returns over 335 
calendar days ending 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. All regressions include year 
and industry effect. 
 
The M&A sample was matched to firms’ characteristics collected from COMPUSTAT, and to stock 
price information collected from CRSP. By doing this, all relevant information was presented in one 
data file for the purpose of conducting analyses. MV is defined as the product of market price and 
outstanding shares (CRSP: SHROUT*PRC). “Relative Size” is defined as the deal value divided by 
bidder MV. ROA is return-on-asset ratio, defined as net income (Compustat: NI) divided by total asset 
(Compustat: AT). MTBV is market-to-book value, defined as the market value of equity to the book 
value of equity, where book value of equity is total shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ) plus 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat: TXDITC) minus the preferred stock redemption 
value (Compustat: PSTKRV). Capital structure related variables were also included in the regressions 
of the probability for using stocks on RRP. Leverage was measured by debt-to-equity ratio, defined 
as total long-term debt (Compustat: DITT) divided by the book value of equity. CF/E is cash flow-
to-equity ratio, defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IBC) plus depreciation and 
amortization (Compustat: DPC) minus cash dividends (Compustat: DV).   
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4.4.2. Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 reports a summary of the acquisition sample. Stock-financed acquisitions are those refers 
to acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks. Cash-financed acquisitions are those refers to 
acquisitions that are 100% financed by cash. “Mix” refers to acquisitions that are neither all stock-
financed nor all cash-financed acquisitions. “Completed” refers to completed deals in the sample 
period investigated in our chapter. “Tender” denotes tender offers, referring to deals that are proposed 
directly to shareholders. This opposes to mergers, which made through negotiation of the 
management teams of the two firms involved. “Hostile” denotes to hostile bids, portraying deal 
attitude. “Diversification” refers to diversified deals in which the primary two Standard Industry 
Classification codes are different between bidders and targets.  
 
The average transaction value for 1,878 M&A deals in the sample is 1.54 billion US dollars. Of 1,878 
acquisitions, 608 all stock-financed acquisitions, 726 all cash-financed acquisitions and 539 mixed 
acquisitions.62 There were 702 diversifying acquisitions, as opposed to 1,176 relatedness deals, and 
1,597 successful acquisitions compared with 277 unsuccessful deals.63 There were a small proportion 
of tender offers and hostile acquisitions, 380 and 134 respectively.  
 
Table 4.2 reports summary statistics for variables. Panel A presents the dependent variables used in 
OLS regressions, including offer premiums, the bidder and the target 3-day CARs calculated using 
the market model. The mean value for offer premiums is 31%. It is suggested that bidders have to pay 
on average over 30% in excess of the target’s market price to gain the firm control. The mean value 
                                                          
62 The method of payment information for five acquisitions is defined as “Others” in Thomson One. 
63 There were 1,874 deals with information about deal status based on Thomson One.  
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for bidder CARs is lower than target CARs, 22.2% over -1.1%. Panel B presents the main variables 
of interests. The mean value for the bidder reference point is lower than the target reference point, 
29.4% to 41.2%, which suggests that bidders on average are relatively more overvalued. The mean 
value for RRP is 11.8%. Panel C presents all control variables. Bidders are on average larger than 
targets, 7.50 as opposed to 5.21. Bidders have better investment opportunities than targets, 3.99 
compared to 2.69. The profitability for bidders is higher than for targets, 2.9% over -4.9%, reflected 
in ROA. Overall, firms with larger size, higher profit-generating ability and better investment are 
likely the takeover bidders whereas those with smaller size, lower profitability, and lack of investment 
opportunities are likely the takeover targets. The summary statistics are generally consistent with 
prior M&A literature (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004).  
 
4.4.3. Methodology 
4.4.3.1. Relative reference point (RRP) and offer premiums 
Reference point (RP) refers to what extent the current price deviates from its 52-week highest price. 
The 52-week highest price is a highly relevant piece of price information that shapes investors’ minds 
to the firm’s prospects. Lacking information and time availability to process the deal information, the 
market would naturally borrow this to compare with the current price. Hence, the firm’s 52-week 
highest price is the market reflection of the firm’s best performance. According to George and Hwang 
(2004), the 52-week highest price is the outcome of a series of good news that occurred in the past 
that drives the firm’s market value beyond its fundamental value. Thus, the 52-week high is largely 
related to the market’s perception of the firm’s valuation. A lower reference point would indicate that 
the firm is still in the momentum of the “good news” effect, leading firms to be more overvalued. In 
contrast, a higher reference point indicates that the good news effect is less relevant, leading firms to 
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be less overvalued. Therefore, a target reference point (TRP), larger relative to the bidder reference 
point (BRP), sending a signal of market-wide perception regarding the target firm being less 
overvalued than the bidder firm. Furthermore, the extent to which the bidder is more overvalued than 
the target is measured with the relative reference point (RRP). Therefore, the market misperception 
of firm’s valuation tends to reduce when a lower reference point firm mergers with a relatively higher 
reference point firm. The data also show that TRP is on average larger than BRP.64 Formulas for RP, 
RRP and offer premiums were illustrated as follows: 
 
, 30 , 30log(52 ) log( )i i t i tRP WeekHigh StockPrice                                                                          (4.1) 
 
i i iRRP TRP BRP                                                                                                                                 (4.2) 
 
   , , , 30log logi t i t i tOfferPremiums OfferPrice TStockPrice                                                         (4.3) 
 
where 
iRP  denotes the reference point of each firm i. The bidder (target) reference point is defined as 
the logarithmic term difference between the bidder’s (target’s) highest stock price over 335 calendar 
days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and bidder’s (target’s) stock price 30 days prior 
to the announcement date.65 
iRRP  denotes relative reference point which is defined as the target 
reference point (
iTRP ) and the bidder reference point ( iBRP ). Offer premiums were calculated as the 
                                                          
64 The difference between the target reference point and the bidder reference were used, attempting to obtain a positive 
value, making the coefficients easier to interpret. According to the prediction, a less overvalued target should have a 
higher reference point whereas a more overvalued bidder should have a lower reference point. The descriptive statistics 
also show that, on average, the target reference point is larger than the bidder reference point: 0.412 and 0.294. 
65 Using the firm’s stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date tends to mitigate the market reactions released due 
to information leakage.  
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logarithmic term difference between the offer price ( ,i tOfferPrice ) and target stock price 30 days prior 
to the announcement date ( , 30i tTStockPrice  ).  
 
As this chapter examines the effect of a relative valuation between the two firms involved on an 
M&As transaction but not the extent to which the firm’s market value deviates from its true value, 
the use of the RRP allows the researcher to establish a bilateral valuation framework where it is the 
valuation deviation of the two firms influences the market perception. The market-wide valuation 
would potentially drive the firm’s market value away from its fundamental value (Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan, 2004). By doing so, it can account for the influence of market swings, as the RRP is a 
relative valuation measure allowing the researcher to observe a new equilibrium of the firms’ 
valuation.   
 
4.4.3.2. Logistic regressions       
Logistic model refers to that dependent variable is categorical. The dependent variable of binominal 
logistic model takes two values. This model was employed to study whether acquisitions are purely 
financed by stocks or other means of finance, taking value of 1 and 0 respectively. While the 
dependent variable of multinomial logistic model takes more than two values. The model was 
employed to study the magnitude change in the RRP causes the likelihood of the acquisitions are 
financed by stocks rather than cash or the mix payment. Both binomial and multinomial logistic 
models were employed in this chapter. Binominal logistic regression was used to examine the RRP 
effect on the probability of using stocks. The logistic coefficients were transferred into marginal effect 
(ME) at sample means, which provide consistent interpretation of OLS estimates. In addition, 
multinomial logistic regression was used to examine the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks 
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rather than other means of payment as a robustness check. The model was specified as follows: 
 
, 1 , ,
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( ) ( )
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where Pl  represents the possibility function, the main variable of interest to be investigated is 
iRRP . 
iX  denotes control variables in relation to the payment choices for M&A deals. (4.4) and (4.5) 
combined yield the behavior of the logistic function, as follows:  
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Pl RRP X   

   = ,( )i tP Stock  ,( )i tQ Stock                                          (4.6) 
 
The function represents the derivative in respect of the ,i tRRP .  
 
4.4.3.3. Classification of high-, neutral- and low-valuation markets 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest stock-financed acquisitions are positively correlated 
with market-wide valuation. Following Bouwman et al.'s approach (2009), market valuation periods 
were classified using the price-earnings (P/E) ratio of the market index (S&P 500) and monthly data.  
Firstly, the market P/E ratio was de-trended by removing the best straight line fit (OLS) from the P/E 
of the month in question and the five preceding years. Secondly, each calendar month was classified 
into high- (low-) market valuation groups if the de-trended market P/E ratio of that month was above 
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(below) the five-year average. Then, the months were ranked according to the de-trended market P/E 
ratio. Months in the top 25% of the above average group were classified as high-market valuation 
months, months in the bottom 25% of the below average group were classified as low-market 
valuation months, the remaining months being classified as neutral-market valuation months. Thus, 
half of the months were classified as neutral-market valuation and the other half contains months of 
both high- and low-market valuation. The idea of de-trending market valuation is to remove the 
upwards trend because the most recent acquisitions generally have a higher market valuation than the 
past due to market inflation. 
 
4.4.3.4. Short-term method 
Following Eckbo et al.'s market model (2016), firms’ announcement returns were calculated as 
follows: 
 
, 1 , ,i t m t i tR R                                                                                                                                   (4.7) 
 
where ,i tR  denotes holding period returns (CRSP: RET) for firm i in the period t, ,m tR  denotes value-
weighted market returns including dividends (CRSP: VWRETD), ,i t  denotes the error term. We 
estimate market model parameters over the window from 261 to 28 trading days prior to the 
announcement date [-261, -28], and use a 3-day event window [-1, 1].   
 
4.4.3.5. Long-term method 
4.4.3.5.1. Market-adjusted model 
Following Loughran and Vijh (1997), the firm’s long-term performance was calculated with the 
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market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). And 36-month BHARs were presented 
with the following equation: 
 
, , ,
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
T T
i t i t index t
t t
BHAR R R
 
                                                                                                     (4.8) 
 
where, ,i tR  is the arithmetic returns for firm i on day and ,index tR  is the arithmetic return for the market 
index on day t.  
 
4.4.3.5.2. Size-adjusted model 
Fama (1998) claims that the use of different long-term methodological approaches can generate 
different results. He suggests the efficient market hypothesis that financial anomalies are chance 
results due to the market misinterpretation of the information, such as under or over-reactions. They 
are largely contributed to the bad-model problems. Fama (1998) suggests that the long-term return 
anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable change in a way they measured. In the light of this, the 
size-adjusted model was employed to assess bidders’ long-term abnormal returns. Lyon et al. (1999) 
suggest that the use of this methodological approach can yield well-specific test statistics as it 
alleviates the new listing and rebalancing biases. Following Lyon et al’s work (1999), BHARs were 
measured by constructing reference portfolios based on all firms listed in NYSE. Specifically, size-
adjusted ARs were calculated as follows:  
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where ptR  relates to reference portfolio return and calculated as follows: 
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where ,j tR  relates to simple return on the firm j at time t, and n denotes to the number of firms.  
 
4.4.3.5.3. Bootstrapped t-statistics  
Fama (1998) challenges the statistics for the univariate test of BHARs under conventional 
methodological approaches. He argues positive-skewness problems that may not yield well-specified 
t-statistics. In the light of this, a bootstrapped t-statistic and the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test were used to estimate the differentials for BHAR ranks. The skewness-adjusted t-test is presented 
as follows: 
 
21 1
3 6
T N S S
N
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                               (4.11) 
 
where  
 
1, 2( )
BHAR
BHAR T T
S

                                                                                                                                (4.12) 
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Chapter 4. Relative Reference Prices and M&A Misvaluations 
 
200 
 
   1, 2
1, 2
3
( )( )
2
3
n
T Ti T T
i
BHAR
BHAR BHAR
N



 
 


                                                                                                                         (4.13) 
 
where 
BHAR  relates to the standard deviation of BHAR by conventional models. 
  
4.4.3.6. Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis is employed to examine the relevant factors explaining the market reaction. 
According to Draper and Paudyal (2008), multivariate analysis is superior in analyzing the causation 
relationship between the market reaction and related variables. The multivariate framework is 
presented as follows:  
 
( 1, 1)
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CAR X   

                                                                                                                 (4.14)    
               
where iX   denotes variables related to market reactions. The main variable of interest to be 
investigated is RRP, which is the difference between the target and bidder reference points. The 
multivariate framework controls for a series of deal and firm characteristics that have significant 
impacts on market reactions in standard M&A literature (Alexandridis et al., 2010; Asquith et al., 
1983). 
 
4.5. Empirical results 
In this section, empirical results are reported and discussions being provided in relation to the RRP 
effect on the method of payment, offer premiums and bidder performance in the short and long runs. 
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According to misvaluation hypothesis, overvalued bidders tend to time the market by paying 
significantly high offer premiums to target shareholders and utilising their overvalued stocks. Despite 
wealth being destroyed in the short run, the hypothesis predicts that rational bidders expecting to 
create firm value in the long run. Following these predictions, logistic regressions of stock-financed 
acquisition on the RRP were first conducted. Second, how offer premiums change according to RRP 
is investigated. Our third main regressions examined the role of offer premiums plays on firms’ 
announcement returns. Specifically, the 2SLS technique is used to examine how announcement 
returns of a firm change according to the RRP driven offer premiums. Finally, the post-merger period 
performance of stock bidders is examined with univariate analysis by RRP ranking.   
          
4.5.1. The RRP effect on the probability of using stocks  
Table 4.3 reports a positive relationship between the RRP and the likelihood of using stocks for 
financing M&As. The sign and significance level of the RRP do not change significantly after 
information asymmetry has been included, as well as capital structure related variables of both the 
bidder and the target.66 Specification (4) of Table 4.3 shows the main results, a one unit increase in 
the RRP lead to about 10.4 percentage points increase of stock payments (p = 0.001), as interpreted 
by marginal effect. In addition, an increase of MTBV results in an increase in the likelihood of the 
use of stocks, suggesting that bidders tend to pay with stocks when they have better investment 
opportunities on the reasoning that cash is likely to be retained for future investment. This is 
consistent with Dong et al.’s view (2006) and that of Di Guili (2013). The results obtained show that 
bidders who are small, with lower profitability and high debt are likely to pay with stocks, as they are 
generally financially constrained which limits their cash borrowing. This is consistent with Eckbo et 
                                                          
66 Our results do not change significantly after considering the firm-fixed effect.  
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al.'s findings (2016).  
 
The main results suggest that the relatively more overvalued bidders are likely to pay with stocks, 
which is consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis and also reconciles the predictions of the 
reference point theory of M&As. Bidders whose price is close to their 52-week high would give 
targets a chance of selling out overvalued shares for profits following acquisitions, which is consistent 
with Burch et al.’s view (2012) that targets tend to accept overvalued stocks because that bidders can 
generate profits in the future. Alternatively, targets would demand more stocks from bidders when 
targets can identify overvaluation, which is in line with Vijh and Yang’s view (2014). When the 
market news has driven the target firm’s current value away from its fundamentals, bidders have the 
incentive to exploit the target price discounts. With the reference-dependence bias, bidders also assess 
the M&A valuation by focusing on the RRP, arguing that if a target’s price falls greatly below its 52-
week high than that of their firms, would offer bidders greater potential for overvaluation dilution.67  
 
Table 4.4 reports the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks under different market conditions. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) suggest that stock-financed acquisitions are positively 
correlated with high market-wide valuation. This is because that the overestimation of synergies 
increases with valuation errors. Consistent with this view, it is found that the RRP effect is more 
pronounced when market valuation errors are sizable. As explained by the marginal effect in Table 
4.4, for every one unit increase in the RRP would lead to an increase of about 15.3 percentage points 
                                                          
67 It can be argued that when the target current price is significantly lower than its 52-week high, the target may experience 
risks of bankruptcy. It is believed that bidders would be cautious about this and may not focus on the target 52-week high. 
However, these individual cases were not considered in this thesis, as there is only limited number of deals in this M&A 
sample.  
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when the market-wide valuation is high and an increase of about 10.9 percentage points when the 
market-wide valuation is neutral, whereas the RRP effect on market condition is insignificant in the 
subsample of low market-wide valuation.  
  
4.5.2. The RRP effect on the offer premium 
The view that investors’ perception is captured by the reference point effect has been examined. It 
remains interesting to explore the RRP effect on offer premiums. Baker et al. (2012) show that the 
market would look at the firm’s reference point and may perceive that an offer price is a result of 
bidder’s overconfidence, given limited information and limited time in which to process the deal. It 
is less likely that the reference point effect plays a similar role for the bidders who have more 
information about the firm and seems less likely to justify a firm’s valuation according to a single 
number.   
 
The first four specifications of Table 4.5 use different categories of control variables.68 The sign and 
significance level of the RRP do not change significantly compared with what is reported in the 
specification (5), which is the main specification. The RRP is positive and significant at the 1% level 
(coefficient 0.089, t = 4.501), showing that a 10% increase in the RRP is associated with an 
approximately 0.9% increase in offer premiums. The signs and significance levels of the control 
variables are generally consistent with prior M&A studies (Moeller et al., 2004; Alexandridis et al., 
2013). The results obtained by the author suggest that the relatively more overvalued bidders overpay 
                                                          
68 Specification (1) reports the relationship between offer premiums and the reference point, specification (2) controlled 
for deal characteristics, specification (3) controlled for deal and bidder characteristics, specification (4) controlled for deal 
and target characteristics, specification (5) controlled for all variables. All specifications accounted for year and industry 
dummies. 
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for the target according to the RRP, which is consistent with the reference point theory of M&A. The 
joint bidder and target reference point effect has an impact on target pricing. It can be interpreted as 
follows: bidders who risk being perceived as overvalued have to pay for targets according to the target 
reference point to obtain the deal before revising market perceptions, since lower than the target 
reference point would decrease the probability of deal success (Baker et al., 2012). Moreover, when 
the bidder’s price is close to the 52-week high, managers may find it hard to justify, and will suffer 
significant losses in the long run either because of overvaluation to be corrected in the market (Jensen, 
2005) or their stocks are to be aggressively sold at around the high market value of the firm (Barberis 
and Xiong, 2009). Hence, bidders would pay heavily to revise the market’s misperception. On the 
other hand, targets also demand offer premiums based on the bidder reference point, as a lower bidder 
reference point might lead targets to believe that bidders are able to afford a higher offer premium.  
 
Given that acquisitions were largely driven by operating synergies and agency problems before 1990, 
and by misvaluation after 1990 (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Dong et al., 2006), time-distribution tests 
whose results are reported in Table 4.6 were carried out. The sample period in this chapter divides 
into three based on M&A merger waves. Before 1990, 1990 to 2000 and post 2000. The sample period 
covers the high valuation trends when investors’ perception to firms’ misvaluation is high, such as 
the stock market bubble between 2000 and 2002, and the housing bubble and credit crisis between 
2007 and 2009. It should also be suggested that the misvaluation hypothesis is more likely to explain 
acquisitions after 1990 than before 1990 when the primary M&A motive is synergies. The results 
yield similar results to our predictions. By extending the sample period of Dong et al. (2006), it was 
found that RRP plays an important role during large valuation trends. The sample period divides into 
two: from 2001 to 2007 and 2008 to 2014, in order to investigate how RRP explains the offer 
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premiums before and after 2008 financial crisis, as reported in Table 4.7. The results obtained indicate 
that for every 10% increase in the RRP an increase of 0.94% in the period of 2001 and 2007 would 
occur, this figure more than double during the period of 2008 to 2014. Misvaluation tends to be larger 
after financial crisis. Once again, the results the research obtained show that the relative overvaluation 
drives M&A overpayment. Unlike Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), who found a positive 
correlation between stock-financed acquisitions and merger waves and argue that rational targets 
make mistakes by accepting overvalued stocks during high valuation periods, up-to-date evidence is 
provided here suggesting that premiums increase with valuation errors. This also rationalises the 
bidder’s motive for overpayment, as high offer premiums area form of compensation for the target’s 
willingness to accept overvalued stocks.      
 
However, it is important to be aware of the fact that not all acquisitions involve a bidder that is 
relatively more overvalued than the target, as reflected in the RRP. The proxy is used to investigate 
whether the primary M&A motive is overvaluation from the market perspective. Bidders are 
relatively more overvalued if their current price shows smaller changes relative to the reference point 
price as opposed to those of the targets (i.e. RRP>0), and they are relatively undervalued if the 
changes are larger relative to the reference point price compared with those changes of targets (i.e. 
RRP<0). If the RRP is a suitable proxy for misvaluation, it should accommodate the predictions of 
the misvaluation hypothesis. Based on this, higher RRP acquisitions associated with higher offer 
premiums and target announcement returns, and lower bidder announcement returns than lower RRP 
acquisitions, should be expected.  
 
The sample was divided into two subsamples according to the RRP. First, the univariate analysis 
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Results of Table 4.8 are presented. The results show a majority of deals are RRP driven: 1,155 as 
opposed to 723. Panel A indicates that acquisitions are carried with significantly larger offer 
premiums when bidders are relatively more overvalued than the opposite case, the mean difference 
for the offer premium is 5% and at the 1% significance level. Our results suggest overvalued bidders 
are likely to pay with high offer premiums for the undervalued or less overvalued targets. Managerial 
priority in takeovers is to dilute overvaluation. Because of this, they believe the deal may not be 
accepted until high offer premiums paid to targets who can also identify bidders’ motive through RRP. 
In Panel B, both the two subsamples show significantly negative bidder announcement returns. The 
relatively more overvalued bidders perform significantly worse than the relatively more undervalued 
bidders. With respect to target announcement returns, both relatively more undervalued and more 
overvalued targets receive high market reactions, which is significantly different from 0. In particular, 
the mean difference for target announcement returns is about 5%, suggesting that targets involved in 
high RRP acquisitions can demand high offer premiums based on RRP, which is translated into higher 
announcement returns.  
 
Panel D of this table reports univariate analysis results for the offer premium by the method of 
payment in the two RRP subgroups. The results obtained are consistent with the prediction of the 
misvaluation hypothesis that overvalued stocks are used as cheap currency. Specifically, all cash-
financed acquisitions carry higher offer premiums when bidders are relatively more overvalued than 
relatively more undervalued bidders, as the result shows a mean difference of 8.5%, which is at 1% 
significance level. Moreover, all stock-financed acquisitions carry lower offer premiums than all 
cash-financed acquisitions when bidders are relatively more overvalued. Combined, relatively more 
overvalued bidders tend to avoid using cash, as it will increase bidders’ takeover costs. Our results 
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indicate that the method of payment indicates clear sign that managers time the market.    
 
Following univariate analyses, multivariate analyses of the offer premium on RRP in two different 
RRP subsamples were conducted, as reported in Table 4.9. Specification (1) shows the offer premium 
increases 1.64% for every 10% increase of RRP when the bidders are relatively more overvalued. 
The results are not significant in the comparable analysis. Our results show bidders to be perceived 
as relatively more overvalued are more likely to pay for targets with high offer premiums for the 
purpose of revising the market misperception. Our results also show that larger bidders generously 
pay for smaller targets, which is consistent with the findings of Moller et al. (2004).  
 
4.5.3. Do bidders who focus on the RRP overpay for the target? 
The RRP was used as an instrument variable of the offer premium when examining the role of 
overpayment. Baker et al. (2012) suggest the offer premium is not a clean measure since it can 
represent both overpayment and synergies. 2SLS enables the investigation of the chain responses of 
the RRP effect on the offer premium, and the offer premium effect on firm’s announcement returns. 
If the RRP plays a role in overpayment, it should be expected that the offer premium using 2SLS 
estimates should yield more negative (positive) bidder (target) announcement returns compared with 
those using OLS estimates. 
 
In Table 4.10, the offer premium with 2SLS estimates generates more negative (positive) bidder 
(target) CARs compared with that with OLS estimates, shown in specifications (1) and (2), and (3) 
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and (4) respectively.69 The results are consistent with Baker et al. (2012) who studied the reference 
point effect on M&A outcomes in a sample of M&As between 1984 and 2007. The results are also in 
line with the reference point theory of M&As. The market would presumably believe that the chance 
of price rebounds tends to increase when the bidder’s current stock price is close to the 52-week high. 
During the time when a bid is announced, the market reacts negatively to it as this may indicate that 
bidders are unable to deliver real support to the firm’s performance and they are likely to undertake 
bad acquisitions to maintain the overvaluation (Jensen, 2005).  
 
4.5.4. Do all stock-financed acquisitions driven by the RRP protect the wealth of long-term 
shareholders?  
Thus far, the proposition that relatively more overvalued bidders are more likely to use stocks as a 
means of payment and tend to pay significantly higher offer premiums using the new misvaluation 
measure of the RRP has been examined. Now the issue of whether or not bidders focusing on RRP 
protect long-term shareholders’ interest will be investigated. According to the misvaluation 
hypothesis, bidders who dilute overvaluation with stocks attempt to protect the wealth of long-term 
shareholders. Thus, it should be reasonable to expect that bidders making an offer price based on the 
RRP. In Panel A of Table 4.11, the sample was limited to acquisitions that are 100% financed by 
stocks only and the sample was ranked into four quartiles according to the RRP, each presenting 152 
observations.70 The aim was to examine whether overpayment leads to underperformance. By doing 
so, the offer premiums and long-term performance under the market-adjusted model for each 
correspondent quartile were estimated. The fourth quartile (i.e. the highest quartile) includes 
                                                          
69 The Hausman test and F-test results show that coefficients generated by 2SLS regression are more consistent with those 
generated by OLS regression, as reported at the end of Table 4.10.  
70 Of the 608 all stock-financed acquisitions, 402 fall into the group in which bidders are relatively more overvalued.  
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acquisitions involving relatively more overvalued bidders whereas the other quartiles include 
acquisitions involving relatively less overvalued or more undervalued bidders.  
 
It was also found that stock-financed acquisitions generate negative long-term returns, which are 
consistent with the M&A literature (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). Bidders in 
the highest quartile pay the highest offer premiums compared with those of other quartiles. In spite 
of this, the mean difference of offer premiums between the relative more overvalued bidders and 
undervalued bidders is 9.9% at 1% significance level and the mean difference for long-term abnormal 
returns of stock bidders is 18.7% at 10% significance level, indicating that relatively more overvalued 
bidders outperform their undervalued counterparts. Combined, this researcher’s results suggest that 
bidders paying high offer premiums according to the RRP are able to protect the wealth of long-term 
shareholders. These results are consistent with Ang and Cheng (2006) who found that the long-term 
performance of stock bidders and overvaluation are positively related. However, the researcher’s 
findings contradict to those of Lin et al. (2011). Their paper classified bidder valuation by the ratio 
of price-to-fundamental value (P/V) with higher P/V indicating a more overvalued bidder, and found 
that bidders who have the highest P/V generate a significant negative market performance for short 
term and long term within three years following M&As as compared with those bidders in the other 
P/V quartiles.    
 
For the purpose of robustness checks, the long-term performance of stock bidders with the size-
adjusted model was also examined, and stock bidders were divided into three ranks according to the 
RRP, as shown in Panel B of the table. This researcher’s results show that the relatively more 
overvalued bidders tend to pay 36% offer premiums for targets, which is significantly 6.6% higher 
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than those paid by relatively more undervalued bidders. It is also evident that the long-term 
performance of those paying significantly higher offer premiums is better. The results are quite similar 
to those presented in Panel A of the table.    
 
4.6. Robustness checks 
4.6.1. Endogeneity issues 
OLS can be subject to endogeneity issues arising from omitted variable biases in this chapter, as the 
RRP maybe correlated with firms’ mismanagement or mispricing which cannot be observed or the 
possibility that the market perception is likely the be an accurate reflection of the firm’s valuation. If 
the market could accurately estimate the value of the firm, the managers should have no chance to 
time the market by means of the RRP. However, this tends to be unrealistic as the misvaluation 
hypothesis proposes. In this case, in this paper it is suggested that the market’s 52-week high and the 
bidder’s and target’s 65-week high can be used as instrumental variables given that they are indirectly 
related to offer premiums but can affect offer premiums through the RRP. The market’s 52-week high 
is an ideal instrumental variable as it is uncorrelated with a firm’s mismanagement. It is suggested 
that the bidder’s and the target’s 65-week highs are used as instrumental variables in line with the 
extrapolation hypothesis that indicates that market perception is influenced by firms’ past 
performance. Using a longer horizon is of less relevance in terms of the market perception of a firm’s 
valuation. A 2SLS estimator was therefore performed, with the market 52-week high and the bidder 
and the target 65-week high as instrumental variables. 
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According to the results obtained, shown in Table 4.12, the OLS is preferred over the 2SLS.71 This is 
because the market 52-week high reflects the market-wide valuation instead of the firm-specific 
valuation which is believed to be an important source of valuation error (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). 
The results indicate that the OLS is likely to dominate the 2SLS. In addition to this, a correlation 
matrix was performed, as reported in Table 4.13. The obtained results show little evidence of 
econometric problems, such as multicollinearity issues. 
 
4.6.2. The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks 
Results of a series of robustness checks examining the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks 
are reported in Table 4.14. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicted that bidders use stocks when they 
are relatively more overvalued. The M&A sample in this chapter was divided into two sub-groups: 
the relatively more overvalued bidders (i.e. RRP>0), and the relatively more undervalued bidders (i.e. 
RRP<0).72 The results obtained suggest that the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks is solely 
driven by the relatively more overvalued bidders. It was found that, when the bidders are relatively 
more overvalued, every one unit increases in the RRP increases the propensity for using stocks for 
acquisitions by 16.4 percentage points, whereas there is little evidence that the relatively more 
undervalued bidders use stocks for acquisitions. Table 4.15 reports that the probability of using stocks 
rather than other means of payment is also large when the RRP increases. As seen, stocks are more 
likely to be used as a means of payment for acquisitions compared with the method of payment as 
                                                          
71 Specifically, the Hausman test shows a p-value of 0.6414, indicating there are no endogeneity issues in the regression. 
Moreover, the test of over-identifying restrictions further rejects the null hypothesis that there is no relation between the 
instruments and the error term (p = 0.0000).   
72 1,742 observations in regressions were recorded. Of these observations, 1,103 fall into the group in which bidders are 
relatively more overvalued and 639 fall into the group in which bidders are relatively more undervalued. 50 observations 
were dropped due to multicollinearity problems in the industries. 
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cash and a mixture of stocks and cash respectively. 73 The results of additional controls are consistent 
with the main results of this chapter presented in Table 4.3. 
 
4.6.3. The effect of the RRP on the offer premium 
This section reports the results of subsample robustness tests relating to the RRP effect on the offer 
premium. The sample was divided into subsamples according to the method of payment, deal type, 
deal choice and deal status in Table 4.16 to 4.19 respectively, and control variables are the same as 
those in Table 4.5. Table 4.16 reports a positive relationship between the RRP and the offer premiums 
by different methods of payment subsamples. The offer premium is larger when paying with cash 
than stocks, which is consistent with the univariate analysis results presented in Panel D of Table 4.8. 
It is worth noting that in stock-financed subsample, bidders tend to pay generously for those with a 
higher ROA, implying that bidders tend to select firms with strong profit-generating ability, likely to 
create value for the combined firm. The results obtained show that bidders are likely to pay with large 
offer premiums regardless of the method of payment choices. Table 4.17 reports that an increase in 
the distance of the RRP increases the offer premium regardless of deal types. Signs and significance 
levels for additional controls are quite similar between the two subsamples. In Table 4.18, the offer 
premium for merger subsamples is larger than for tender offers. It can be argued that a negotiation 
process between the two firms involved may incorporate more private information about the firms, 
leading the RRP to be well interpreted. In that case, bidders can more easily justify their M&A motives 
as well as the target value with target managers rather than shareholders, thus resulting in lower offer 
premiums. The sample used also includes a small proportion of unsuccessful deals as opposed to 
                                                          
73 Our results continue to hold by replacing the binary variable with a continuous variable. This allows us to observe how 
the RRP affects the proportion of stocks used in the payment structure. We omitted this table for the sake of brevity.  
Chapter 4. Relative Reference Prices and M&A Misvaluations 
 
213 
 
successful deals. In Table 4.19, the RRP effect is strong for both subsamples.74 On the whole, the 
results indicate that the RRP have a strong effect on offer premiums.  
 
4.6.4. Do bidders who focus on RRP overpay for the target? Testing with the market-adjusted model 
So as to avoid measurement error due to the model employed for the firms’ announcement returns in 
analysing the role of the RRP played M&As, the market-adjusted model was used to calculate the 
firms’ announcement returns, as reported in Table 4.20. These results are consistent with those in the 
market model. Specification (1) reported that bidders’ CARs decrease by 1.4% for a one percent 
increase in the offer premium, which is slightly higher than those predicted by the market model (-
1.8%). On the other hand, specification (3) indicated that targets’ CARs increase by 46.9% for every 
one percent increase in the offer premium, which is as the same as that predicted by the market model. 
A 2SLS estimator was also conducted using the RRP as an instrumental variable of the offer premium 
in the regression of CARs on the offer premium, with a similar reason has been explained in the main 
regression analysis. Including the RRP effect in the 2SLS, the results show a more positive bidder 
CARs and more negative target CARs as compared with those under OLS. Once again, paying 
according to the RRP impresses the investors’ minds that the deal is overpaid.         
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the misvaluation hypothesis using the reference point theory of M&As. 
A bilateral valuation framework with RRP has been built, and results are consistent with what the 
misvaluation hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) predicts. 
                                                          
74 This was used as a robustness test rather than to interpret the RRP effect as the reason for deal completion, as what 
determines a deal completion is complex.    
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The target and the bidder reference points have been added into the M&A platform and have found 
that the propensity for paying for acquisitions with stocks is greater when the RRP increases, this 
trend being more pronounced when the market misperception of a firm’s valuation is high. The results 
obtained are consistent with those of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Moreover, the offer premium 
increases with RRP, leading to more negative bidder (positive target) announcement returns. The 
results indicate that RRP plays an overpayment role. In a quartile analysis for a sample of all stock-
financed acquisitions, it can be found that the relatively more overvalued bidders who pay highest 
offer premiums compared with those in other quartiles generate less negative long-term abnormal 
returns, suggesting that bidders time the market while focusing on the RRP.  
 
Several contributions have been made to behavioural finance and M&A literature. First, a simply way 
of structuring M&A through the RRP was built, which reflects the most current market reactions to a 
firm’s valuations. This valuation measure is straightforward in terms of observing the difference 
between bidder and target overvaluation. The market tends to react to bidders’ announcements 
negatively, as there is a high offer premium paid according to the RRP. Secondly, it has been found 
that the RRP directs the method of payment choices, as a relatively more overvalued bidder tends to 
reduce offer premiums when financing an acquisition with stocks rather than with cash. Thirdly, it 
has also been revealed that bidders who have more information about the firm are also subject to the 
reference point effect. However, this does not mean that bidders are irrational, rather, the findings 
show that higher offer premiums according to the RRP would mitigate negative market reactions in 
the long term, suggesting that focusing on the RRP is a bidder’s way of thinking weighed towards the 
interests of the long-term shareholders. Overall, the results of this chapter suggest that managers are 
able to time the market through the RRP, which is consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for M&A sample  
This table reports summary statistics for 1,878 U.S. domestic public deals announced between 1985 and 2014. The number 
N denotes the number of deals per year. The third and fourth columns present the mean and median of deal value. The 
fifth to seventh columns present the method of payment. Here “Stock” (“Cash”) refers to all-stock (all-cash) acquisitions. 
“Mix” refers to acquisitions that are neither all stock-financed nor all cash-financed acquisitions. “Completed” refers to 
completed deals (i.e. successful deals), of which there are 1,874 with information relating to deal status. “Tender” refers 
to tender offers. “Hostile” refers to hostile bids. “Diversified” refers to diversified deals in which the primary two Standard 
Industry Classification codes are different between bidders and targets.  
Year N Deal Value ($mils) Payment Method Completed Tender Hostile Diversified 
    Mean Median Cash Stock Mix Y N Y N Y N Y N 
1985 5 243.86  53.00  3 1 1 3 2 - 5 1 4 2 3 
1986 21 129.04  41.70  18 1 2 18 3 7 14 1 20 15 6 
1987 34 254.60  47.25  18 6 8 30 3 6 28 5 29 17 17 
1988 30 381.53  68.92  15 8 7 24 6 11 19 6 24 16 14 
1989 24 114.04  30.49  11 10 3 17 6 4 20 1 23 18 6 
1990 23 579.03  29.38  12 7 4 18 5 5 18 3 20 10 13 
1991 23 172.38  26.82  7 14 1 19 3 3 20 - 23 14 9 
1992 21 155.46  51.44  6 13 2 17 4 1 20 2 19 12 9 
1993 45 519.07  114.00  14 18 12 33 12 7 38 5 40 20 25 
1994 61 222.95  74.12  23 30 8 46 14 9 52 7 54 18 43 
1995 98 538.98  74.91  27 53 18 84 14 14 84 6 92 38 60 
1996 95 684.53  138.25  31 40 24 80 15 18 77 9 86 36 59 
1997 130 645.10  232.11  19 62 49 113 17 19 111 3 127 46 84 
1998 138 1208.89  140.12  36 54 47 126 12 27 111 3 135 47 91 
1999 164 1513.65  305.42  61 58 45 134 30 41 123 14 150 68 96 
2000 136 2286.88  378.34  35 68 33 119 17 32 104 8 128 49 87 
2001 109 1115.01  146.89  33 40 36 94 15 27 82 4 105 38 71 
2002 49 1784.72  268.90  20 14 15 44 5 16 33 4 45 18 31 
2003 71 807.01  130.82  27 18 26 65 6 19 52 5 66 19 52 
2004 66 2859.54  479.02  25 16 25 60 6 6 60 3 63 22 44 
2005 66 2874.25  500.75  29 13 24 60 6 7 59 5 61 24 42 
2006 75 1838.00  563.07  40 12 23 65 10 6 69 4 71 29 46 
2007 60 1478.29  792.51  39 6 15 53 7 12 48 2 58 18 42 
2008 57 2208.95  234.26  35 6 16 40 17 14 43 10 47 17 40 
2009 44 3498.35  496.88  17 8 19 41 3 16 28 - 44 18 26 
2010 56 1884.97  572.72  33 9 14 47 9 16 40 5 51 15 41 
2011 41 2691.37  611.62  16 8 17 28 13 8 33 9 32 13 28 
2012 38 1385.71  622.51  26 1 11 37 1 10 28 - 38 17 21 
2013 44 1997.05  1139.09  28 5 11 39 5 9 35 3 41 12 32 
2014 54 6908.66  1662.39  22 9 23 43 11 10 44 6 48 16 38 
Total 1878 1540.29  227.49  726 608 539 1597 277 380 1498 134 1744 702 1176 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for variables 
This table reports the number, mean, median and standard deviation of variables used in the regressions. Panel A presents the main 
dependent variables. Firms’ 3-day CARs are calculated with the market model, with parameters estimated between 261 and 28 trading 
days prior to the announcement date. Offer premiums are defined as the logarithmic term difference between offer price and target 
stock price 30 calendar days prior to the announcement date. Panel B presents the main variables of interest. The reference point is 
defined as the logarithmic term difference between a firm’s highest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date and the price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. RRP is defined as the difference between the target 
and the bidder reference point. Panel C presents control variables. Deal characteristics are noted as Table 1. “Relative Size” is defined 
as the deal value divided by bidder MV, where bidder MV is defined as the product of market price and outstanding shares (CRSP: 
SHROUT*PRC). ROA is return-on-asset ratio, defined as net income (Compustat: NI) divided by total asset (Compustat:AT). MTBV 
is market-to-book value, defined as the market value of equity to the book value of equity, where book value of equity is total 
shareholders’ equity (Compustat: SEQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat: TXDITC) minus the preferred stock 
redemption value (Compustat: PSTKRV). Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns over the 335 calendar days ending 30 
days prior to the announcement date. CF/E is cash flow-to-equity ratio, defined as income before extraordinary items (Compustat: IBC) 
plus depreciation and amortization (Compustat: DPC) minus cash dividends (Compustat: DV), and leverage is measured by debt-to-
equity ratio, defined as total long-term debt (Compustat: DITT) divided by the book value of equity. All accounting variables were in 
the fiscal year end before the announcement date, and continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Main Dependent Variables 
Offer Premiums 1878 0.310  0.292  0.282  
Bidder 3-day CARs 1878 -0.011  -0.007  0.073  
Target 3-day CARs 1878 0.222  0.176  0.240  
Panel B: Main Variables of Interest 
Bidder Reference Point 1878 0.294  0.157  0.351  
Target Reference Point 1878 0.412  0.255  0.455  
RRP 1878 0.118  0.055  0.420  
Panel C: Other Variables: deal, bidder, and target characteristics 
Cash 1878 0.387  - 0.487  
Stock 1878 0.324  - 0.468  
Hostile 1878 0.071  - 0.257  
Tender 1878 0.202  - 0.402  
Diversification 1878 0.374  - 0.484  
Relative Size 1878 0.401  0.191  0.555  
Bidder lnMV 1878 7.500  7.443  2.159  
Bidder MTBV 1878 3.991  2.632  6.269  
Bidder ROA 1878 0.026  0.047  0.138  
Bidder Volatility 1878 0.029  0.025  0.017  
Bidder Leverage 1872 0.661  0.330  1.194  
Bidder CF/E 1804 0.161  0.180  0.316  
Target lnMV 1878 5.212  5.133  1.839  
Target MTBV 1878 2.691  1.797  4.300  
Target ROA 1878 -0.049  0.024  0.241  
Target Volatility 1878 0.041  0.035  0.022  
Target Leverage 1870 0.619  0.140  1.621  
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Table 4.3: The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks 
This table reports binomial logistic regression for all-stock acquisitions on RRP. Dependent variable is “Stock”, which is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if acquisitions are 100% 
financed with stocks, 0 otherwise. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported alongside marginal effects. We transfer coefficients into marginal effect (ME), evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Stock Coef. p-value ME   Coef. p-value ME   Coef. p-value ME   Coef. p-value ME 
RRP 0.567*** (0.000) 0.103   0.605*** (0.000) 0.110   0.531*** (0.001) 0.097   0.570*** (0.001) 0.104  
Hostile -0.777** (0.014) -0.141   -0.742** (0.019) -0.135   -0.721** (0.022) -0.132   -0.670** (0.033) -0.123  
Tender -2.441*** (0.000) -0.443   -2.402*** (0.000) -0.436   -2.563*** (0.000) -0.468   -2.502*** (0.000) -0.458  
Diversification 0.146 (0.266) 0.027   0.124 (0.349) 0.023   0.146 (0.280) 0.027   0.120 (0.378) 0.022  
RelativeSize -0.611*** (0.000) -0.111   -0.662*** (0.000) -0.120   -0.561*** (0.000) -0.102   -0.606*** (0.000) -0.111  
Bidder lnMV -0.379*** (0.000) -0.069   -0.290*** (0.000) -0.053   -0.402*** (0.000) -0.073   -0.314*** (0.000) -0.057  
Bidder MTBV 0.048*** (0.000) 0.009   0.036*** (0.001) 0.007   0.060*** (0.000) 0.011   0.048*** (0.000) 0.009  
Bidder ROA -2.063*** (0.000) -0.375   -0.914* (0.088) -0.166   -2.464*** (0.000) -0.450   -1.407** (0.030) -0.257  
Target lnMV 0.315*** (0.000) 0.057   0.350*** (0.000) 0.063   0.348*** (0.000) 0.064   0.375*** (0.000) 0.069  
Target MTBV 0.051*** (0.001) 0.009   0.041*** (0.006) 0.008   0.063*** (0.000) 0.012   0.055*** (0.001) 0.010  
Target ROA 0.087 (0.762) 0.016   0.371 (0.231) 0.067   0.009 (0.977) 0.002   0.218 (0.492) 0.040  
Target Volatility     5.118 (0.253) 0.928       3.773 (0.423) 0.690  
Bidder Volatility     32.029*** (0.000) 5.809       30.994*** (0.000) 5.670  
Bidder Leverage         -0.232*** (0.001) -0.042   -0.211*** (0.002) -0.039  
Target Leverage         -0.126*** (0.003) -0.023   -0.121*** (0.005) -0.022  
Bidder CF/E         0.213 (0.403) 0.039   0.233 (0.386) 0.043  
Year  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Constant 0.324 (0.577)   -1.480** (0.032)   0.592 (0.360)   -1.130 (0.132)  
N 1878    1878    1792    1792            
Pseudo R2 0.272       0.287       0.291       0.303             
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Table 4.4: The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks under different market-wide valuations 
This table reports binomial logistic regression for all-stock acquisitions on RRP by different market conditions. Dependent variable is “Stock”, which is a binary variable, taking value 
of 1 if acquisitions are financed with 100% stocks, 0 otherwise. High Market is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if takeover months in the top 25% above past 5-year average de-
trended P/E of the market index (S&P 500) or market valuation is high, 0 otherwise. Specifications (1)-(3) report the results when market-wide valuation is high, low and neutral 
respectively. Due to the availability of the P/E of the market index, we were able to determine 1733 observations with valid market-wide valuation data, 666 for high valuation periods, 
434 for low valuation periods, and 633 for neutral valuation periods. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported alongside marginal effects. We transfer coefficients into marginal effect (ME), evaluated at the sample 
means of the independent variables. 
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Table 4.4. (continued)  
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Stock High  Low  Neutral 
  Coef. p-value ME   Coef. p-value ME   Coef. p-value ME 
RRP 0.758*** (0.002) 0.153 
 1.021 (0.113) 0.059 
 0.510* (0.057) 0.109 
Hostile -0.317 (0.462) -0.064 
 -1.043 (0.199) -0.060 
 -0.723 (0.332) -0.155 
Tender -2.339*** (0.000) -0.473 
 -1.195** (0.042) -0.069 
 -4.251*** (0.000) -0.910 
Diversification 0.797*** (0.001) 0.161 
 -0.165 (0.676) -0.010 
 -0.060 (0.792) -0.013 
RelativeSize -0.968*** (0.000) -0.196 
 -0.847 (0.121) -0.049 
 -0.307 (0.238) -0.066 
Bidder lnMV -0.377*** (0.000) -0.076 
 -0.809*** (0.000) -0.047 
 -0.141 (0.162) -0.030 
Bidder MTBV 0.052*** (0.002) 0.011 
 0.060 (0.181) 0.003 
 0.038 (0.109) 0.008 
Bidder ROA -2.376*** (0.009) -0.481 
 -1.664 (0.453) -0.096 
 -2.797* (0.071) -0.599 
Target lnMV 0.600*** (0.000) 0.121 
 0.696** (0.014) 0.040 
 0.170 (0.161) 0.036 
Target MTBV 0.062** (0.016) 0.013 
 -0.004 (0.936) 0.000 
 0.063** (0.049) 0.014 
Target ROA -0.154 (0.764) -0.031 
 0.069 (0.938) 0.004 
 0.699 (0.219) 0.150 
Target Volatility 8.929 (0.254) 1.808 
 -1.335 (0.952) -0.077 
 -1.354 (0.866) -0.290 
Bidder Volatility 15.449 (0.144) 3.127 
 35.750 (0.140) 2.068 
 51.081*** (0.000) 10.936 
Bidder Leverage -0.306*** (0.002) -0.062 
 -0.219 (0.304) -0.013 
 -0.169 (0.150) -0.036 
Target Leverage -0.129* (0.090) -0.026 
 -0.089 (0.350) -0.005 
 -0.203** (0.013) -0.043 
Bidder CF/E 0.096 (0.791) 0.019 
 -0.634 (0.359) -0.037 
 2.044*** (0.001) 0.438 
Year  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Industry Yes    Yes    Yes   
Constant -2.916** (0.033)   -0.057 (0.974)   0.044 (0.976)  
N 666    434    633            
Pseudo R2 0.345      0.268      0.333    
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Table 4.5: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums 
This table reports the ordinary least square (OLS) regression results for offer premiums on the RRP, controlling for a series of deal and firm characteristics. Specification (1) reports 
the relationship between offer premiums and the reference point effect, specification (2) controls for deal characteristics, specification (3) controls for deal and bidder characteristics, 
specification (4) controls for deal and target characteristics, specification (5) controls for all variables. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively, is reported alongside coefficients. 
Offer Premiums (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.101*** (5.099)  0.105*** (5.311)  0.110*** (5.575)  0.098*** (4.846)  0.089*** (4.501) 
Hostile    0.008 (0.367)  0.002 (0.105)  0.015 (0.698)  0.032 (1.563) 
Tender    0.075*** (4.744)  0.074*** (4.695)  0.080*** (5.098)  0.075*** (5.006) 
Diversification    0.006 (0.433)  0.004 (0.284)  0.005 (0.369)  -0.017 (-1.256) 
Stock    -0.024 (-1.336)  -0.019 (-0.991)  -0.026 (-1.392)  -0.003 (-0.184) 
Cash    -0.009 (-0.565)  -0.004 (-0.227)  -0.019 (-1.123)  -0.031* (-1.917) 
RelativeSize       0.020 (1.537)  0.021* (1.744)  0.116*** (7.263) 
Bidder ROA       0.090 (1.262)     0.019 (0.269) 
Bidder MTBV       -0.000 (-0.222)     -0.000 (-0.010) 
Bidder lnMV       0.006 (1.506)     0.056*** (9.627) 
Bidder Volatility       0.570 (0.819)     0.768 (1.047) 
Target ROA          0.119*** (2.810)  0.141*** (3.347) 
Target MTBV          -0.001 (-0.806)  -0.001 (-0.878) 
Target lnMV          -0.030*** (-6.512)  -0.078*** (-11.703) 
Target Volatility          -0.035 (-0.065)  -0.315 (-0.537) 
Constant 0.212*** (3.291)  0.182*** (2.744)  0.116 (1.535)  0.334*** (4.388)  0.150* (1.896) 
Year  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 1878   1878   1878   1878   1878           
adj. R2 0.077     0.088     0.089     0.116     0.169           
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Table 4.6: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums over time 
This table reports the OLS regression results for offer premiums on the RRP by time periods. We divided our sample into 
different time periods. Specification (1)-(3) report results before 1990, 1990 to 2000, and after 2000 respectively. Variable 
definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively, is reported alongside coefficients. 
 (1)   (2)   (3) 
Offer Premiums 1985-1989   1990-2000   2001-2014 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP -0.058 (-0.773)  0.062** (2.392)  0.125*** (3.858) 
Hostile -0.049 (-0.463)  0.044 (1.476)  0.031 (1.038) 
Tender 0.191*** (2.750)  0.109*** (4.668)  0.048** (2.152) 
Diversification -0.021 (-0.395)  -0.003 (-0.149)  -0.024 (-1.255) 
Stock 0.078 (0.931)  -0.002 (-0.076)  -0.039 (-1.353) 
Cash 0.037 (0.564)  -0.084*** (-3.258)  0.006 (0.268) 
RelativeSize 0.064 (1.413)  0.133*** (5.774)  0.092*** (3.355) 
Bidder ROA 0.623** (2.306)  -0.010 (-0.104)  -0.005 (-0.044) 
Bidder MTBV 0.001 (0.273)  -0.001 (-0.432)  0.001 (0.848) 
Bidder lnMV 0.028 (1.544)  0.058*** (6.615)  0.049*** (5.472) 
Bidder Volatility -4.431 (-1.110)  0.534 (0.535)  0.733 (0.611) 
Target ROA 0.157 (0.911)  0.188*** (2.996)  0.121** (1.979) 
Target MTBV -0.004 (-0.378)  -0.000 (-0.040)  -0.003 (-1.577) 
Target lnMV -0.032 (-1.508)  -0.079*** (-7.832)  -0.074*** (-7.090) 
Target Volatility 1.856 (0.774)  -0.330 (-0.415)  0.093 (0.098) 
Constant -0.413** (-2.600)  0.087 (0.860)  0.301*** (3.104) 
Year  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 114   934   830           
adj. R2 0.190     0.176     0.184           
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Table 4.7: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums by valuation periods 
This table reports the OLS regression results for offer premiums on the RRP before and after the 2008 financial crisis. The sample was divided into two subsamples: between 2000 and 
2007 and between 2008 and 2014, i.e. financial crisis period, presented in specification (4) and (5) respectively. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively, is reported alongside coefficients. 
  (1)   (2) 
Offer Premiums 2001-2007  2008-2014 
  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.094** (2.293)  0.192*** (3.655) 
Hostile 0.089** (2.245)  -0.003 (-0.073) 
Tender 0.017 (0.539)  0.080** (2.514) 
Diversification -0.046* (-1.772)  0.010 (0.306) 
Stock -0.005 (-0.142)  -0.081* (-1.854) 
Cash 0.023 (0.784)  0.004 (0.138) 
RelativeSize 0.069* (1.892)  0.121*** (2.981) 
Bidder ROA -0.083 (-0.694)  0.300 (1.273) 
Bidder MTBV 0.001 (0.462)  0.003 (1.059) 
Bidder lnMV 0.037*** (3.633)  0.059*** (3.631) 
Bidder Volatility 0.424 (0.279)  0.799 (0.375) 
Target ROA 0.151** (2.176)  0.011 (0.097) 
Target MTBV 0.001 (0.238)  -0.006** (-2.322) 
Target lnMV -0.067*** (-5.149)  -0.076*** (-4.427) 
Target Volatility -0.192 (-0.140)  -0.026 (-0.024) 
Constant 0.285** (2.369)  0.102 (0.685) 
Year  Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes   Yes  
N 496   334  
adj. R2 0.190   0.375  
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Table 4.8: Univariate analysis by different RRP groups 
This table reports univariate analysis results for the offer premium, the bidder and the target’s CAR3 calculated with market model. We divide our sample into those RRP less than 0, 
which is the bidder is relatively more undervalued than the target and those RRP larger than 0, which is the bidder is relatively more overvalued than the target. Panel A reports the 
univariate analysis results for the offer premium. Panel B reports the univariate analysis results for the bidder CAR3. Panel C reports the univariate analysis results for the target CAR3. 
Panel D reports univariate analysis for the offer premium by the method of payment. Here “Cash” represents that acquisitions are 100% financed with cash. “Stock” represents 
acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks. Specifications (3) and (4) report offer premiums of 100% cash-financed acquisitions at RRP>0 and RRP<0 groups. Specifications (3) 
and (4) report offer premiums of 100% stock-financed acquisitions at RRP>0 and RRP<0 groups. The mean value, t-statistics, and the number of observations for the offer premium, 
the bidder and the target 3-day abnormal returns around the announcement date are reported in each Panel. The mean difference of t-tests is reported at the end of each Panel. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A: Univariate analysis for the offer premium 
 Offer Premiums t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 0.279*** (30.20) 723 
(2) RRP>0 0.329*** (37.26) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  0.050***  (-3.79)   
Panel B: Univariate analysis for the bidder CAR3 
 Bidder CAR3mm t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 -0.006** (-2.27) 723 
(2) RRP>0 -0.014*** (-6.37) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  -0.008** (-.2.28)   
Panel C: Univariate analysis for the target CAR3 
 Target CAR3mm t-stat. N 
(1) RRP<0 0.191*** (23.81) 723 
(2) RRP>0 0.240*** (32.34) 1,155 
Mean difference (2)-(1)  0.049*** (4.33)   
Panel D: Univariate analysis for the offer premium by the method of payment at different RRP subgroups 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   Mean difference 
 RRP>0 RRP<0   RRP>0 RRP<0  (1)-(2) (3)-(4)   (1)-(3) (2)-(4) 
 Cash  Stock       
Offer Premiums (%) 35.25*** 26.75***  31.33*** 29.22***  8.50*** 2.11  3.92* -2.47 
t-stat (25.18) (20.90)  (19.07) (14.51)  (4.24) (0.80)  (1.88) (-1.08) 
N 435 291   402 206   724 608   837 497 
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Table 4.9: OLS regressions of offer premiums on the RRP: By RRP subsamples 
This table reports OLS regression results for the offer premium on RRP. We divide the sample according to the RRP. 
Column (1) presents the results for the offer premium on RRP when the bidder is relatively more overvalued than the 
target, column (2) presents the results for the offer premium on RRP when the bidder is relatively undervalued than the 
target. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively, is reported alongside coefficients. 
  (1)   (2) 
Offer Premiums  RRP>0  RRP<0 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.164*** (4.766)   -0.005 (-0.112) 
Hostile 0.003 (0.105)  0.063** (1.968) 
Tender 0.090*** (4.317)  0.055*** (2.724) 
Diversification 0.009 (0.483)  -0.058*** (-2.923) 
Stock -0.004 (-0.170)  0.004 (0.159) 
Cash -0.024 (-1.080)  -0.036 (-1.548) 
RelativeSize 0.128*** (5.132)  0.104*** (5.109) 
Bidder ROA -0.050 (-0.577)  0.103 (0.881) 
Bidder MTBV 0.002 (1.258)  -0.002 (-1.129) 
Bidder lnMV 0.051*** (6.456)  0.059*** (6.943) 
Bidder Volatility -0.763 (-0.750)  2.070* (1.875) 
Target ROA 0.168*** (3.439)  0.115 (1.467) 
Target MTBV -0.002 (-0.900)  0.000 (0.119) 
Target lnMV -0.079*** (-8.750)  -0.073*** (-7.066) 
Target Volatility -0.390 (-0.535)  -0.756 (-0.736) 
Constant 0.060 (0.574)  0.012 (0.078) 
Year Yes   Yes  
Industry  Yes     Yes   
N 1155     723           
R2 0.220     0.214           
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Table 4.10: Do bidder focusing on the RRP overpay for the target? 
This table reports the OLS regression and 2SLS regression results for both bidder and target 3-day CARs on offer 
premiums. The dependent variable for specifications (1) and (2) is the bidder CAR3 and for specifications (3) and (4) is 
the target CAR3, where CAR3 is calculated with the market model. The parameters are estimated in the window [-261,-
28]. Specifications (2) and (4) reports the results of 2SLS regression using the RRP as an instrument variable of offer 
premiums. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively. The results of the Hausman 
test and F-test were reported at the lower part of the table. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)    
 Bidder CAR3   Target CAR3 
  OLS IV   OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.018*** -0.090***  0.469*** 0.765*** 
 (-2.807) (-2.626)  (20.499) (6.597)    
Hostile -0.002 -0.002  -0.000 -0.003    
 (-0.324) (-0.317)  (-0.028) (-0.153)    
Tender 0.009** 0.017***  0.041*** 0.010    
 (2.376) (2.888)  (3.102) (0.533)    
Diversification 0.003 0.003  0.004 0.004    
 (0.805) (0.867)  (0.375) (0.373)    
Stock -0.011** -0.010**  -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 (-2.326) (-2.155)  (-3.952) (-3.512)    
Cash 0.021*** 0.021***  0.031*** 0.037*** 
 (5.245) (4.555)  (2.615) (2.857)    
RelativeSize -0.005 -0.005  -0.050*** -0.052*** 
 (-1.116) (-1.311)  (-6.136) (-5.505)    
Bidder lnMV -0.003*** -0.003***                   
 (-3.916) (-3.230)                   
Bidder MTBV -0.000 -0.000                   
 (-0.972) (-0.901)                   
Bidder ROA 0.041** 0.040***                   
 (2.186) (2.998)                   
Target lnMV    -0.002 0.006    
    (-0.866) (1.447)    
Target MTBV    -0.002** -0.002    
    (-2.228) (-1.640)    
Target ROA    -0.012 -0.017    
    (-0.469) (-0.800)    
Constant 0.015* 0.032***  0.106*** -0.027    
 (1.843) (2.706)  (5.578) (-0.483)    
N 1878 1878  1878 1878    
adj. R2 0.060 .  0.374 . 
Hausman test  X2=4.8934 (p=0.0271)        X2=7.9056 (p=0.0050) 
F-test X2=60.2985 (p=0.0000)      X2=42.9958 (p=0.0000) 
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Table 4.11: Do all stock-financed acquisitions driven by the RRP protect the wealth of long-term shareholders? 
Panel A of this table reports the univariate analysis results of both the offer premium and the firms’ 36-month market-
adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR36ma) by RRP quartiles. The sample only consists of 100% stock-
financed acquisitions. Each quartile is assigned a rank from 1 to 4. Rank 1 represents bidders that are relatively more 
undervalued than their targets (i.e. RRP<0), and rank 4 represents bidders that are relatively more overvalued than their 
targets (i.e. RRP>0). Panel B of this table reports the univariate analysis results of both the offer premium and the firms’ 
36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR36sa) by the RRP. We divided the RRP into three levels, 
the bottom one third or rank 1 refers to bidders are relatively more undervalued, while the top one third or rank 3 refers 
to bidders are relatively more overvalued, the middle accounts for the remaining observations. We reported mean value, 
t-statistics and the number of the offer premium at each rank. BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa are winsorised at the 1% and 
99% level. We performed bootstrap estimation of sampling distribution of BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa at 1000 
replications, and report mean value, p-value and the number of BHAR36ma and BHAR36sa of each rank. The mean 
difference of t-tests is reported at the end of the table. T-statistics (or p-value) are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A: Market-adjusted BHARs by RRP quartiles 
All stock-financed acquisitions Offer Premiums t-stat. N BHAR36ma p-value N 
1 (RRP<0) 0.296*** (12.12) 152 -0.348*** (0.000) 137 
2 0.251*** (11.74) 152 -0.221** (0.017) 144 
3 0.283*** (12.02) 152 -0.198** (0.025) 145 
4 (RRP>0) 0.395*** (13.86) 152 -0.161* (0.093) 147 
Mean difference 4-1  0.099*** (2.63)  0.187* (0.079)  
Panel B: Size-adjusted BHARs by RRP        
All stock-financed acquisitions Offer Premiums t-stat. N BHAR36sa p-value N 
1 0.294*** (14.53) 201 -0.400*** (0.003) 158 
2 0.262*** (13.04) 201 -0.206** (0.040) 180 
3 (RRP>0) 0.360*** (15.29) 206 -0.253*** (0.001) 174 
Mean difference 3-1  0.066** (2.11)   0.147* (0.073)   
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Table 4.12: Endogeneity issues 
This table reports the RRP effect on the offer premium by controlling for endogeneity issues. Results from an OLS 
regression and a 2SLS regression are presented in this table. The RRP is treated as an endogenous variable, and the market 
52 week high, with the bidder and the target 65 week-high treated as instrumental variables. We first obtain the fitted 
value from the regression of the RRP on the instrument variables and then replace the RRP with the fitted value. Results 
are reported in the “IV” Column. The market 52-week high is defined as the logarithmic term difference between the 
highest total market value (CRSP: TOTVAL) over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date 
and the total market value 30 days prior to the announcement date. The bidder (the target) 65 week-high is 427 calendar 
days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the stock price 30 days prior to the announcement date. Variable 
definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * respectively, is reported alongside coefficients. The results of the 
Hausman test and the over-identifying restrictions test are reported in the lower part of the table.   
Offer Premiums OLS   IV 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.089*** (4.501)  0.085*** (4.853) 
Hostile 0.032 (1.563)  0.032 (1.312) 
Tender 0.075*** (5.006)  0.075*** (4.518) 
Diversification -0.017 (-1.256)  -0.017 (-1.280) 
Stock -0.003 (-0.184)  -0.003 (-0.179) 
Cash -0.031* (-1.917)  -0.031* (-1.856) 
RelativeSize 0.116*** (7.263)  0.116*** (7.719) 
Bidder ROA 0.019 (0.269)  0.018 (0.337) 
Bidder MTBV -0.000 (-0.010)  -0.000 (-0.005) 
Bidder lnMV 0.056*** (9.627)  0.056*** (10.282) 
Bidder Volatility 0.768 (1.047)  0.744 (1.110) 
Target ROA 0.141*** (3.347)  0.140*** (4.545) 
Target MTBV -0.001 (-0.878)  -0.001 (-0.883) 
Target lnMV -0.078*** (-11.703)  -0.078*** (-12.472) 
Target Volatility -0.315 (-0.537)  -0.291 (-0.624) 
N 1878   1878  
adj. R2 0.169     0.169   
Hausman test 0.2170 (p=0.6414)    
Over-identifying restrictions 
(Sargan test) 
26.8164 (p=0.0000)       
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Table 4.13: Variables correlation matrix 
This table reports pairwise Pearson correlation of the variables used in the regression of offer premiums on the RRP. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.RRP 1.0000               
2.Hostile -0.0450 1.0000              
3.Tender -0.0199 0.1333 1.0000             
4.Diversification -0.0072 -0.0175 0.0245 1.0000            
5.Stock 0.0957 -0.1122 -0.2918 -0.0289 1.0000           
6.Cash -0.0355 0.0518 0.3323 0.1144 -0.5493 1.0000          
7.RelativeSize -0.0939 0.2082 -0.0710 -0.1175 0.0101 -0.2716 1.0000         
8.Bidder ROA -0.0898 0.0096 0.0884 0.0969 -0.1875 0.1732 -0.1187 1.0000        
9.Bidder MTBV 0.0092 -0.0661 -0.0459 -0.0099 0.1511 -0.0770 -0.0789 0.1448 1.0000       
10.Bidder lnMV -0.0465 -0.0500 0.0938 0.0764 -0.1840 0.1811 -0.3759 0.3133 0.2044 1.0000      
11.Bidder Volatility 0.0667 -0.0353 -0.0688 -0.0681 0.3333 -0.2574 0.1446 -0.4836 0.1110 -0.4176 1.0000     
12.Target ROA -0.2785 0.0618 0.0088 0.0286 -0.0651 0.0106 0.1003 0.2997 -0.0042 0.0912 -0.2870 1.0000    
13.Target MTBV -0.1282 -0.0369 -0.0187 0.0093 0.1246 -0.0714 -0.0517 0.0379 0.1840 0.1591 0.0662 0.0426 1.0000   
14.Target lnMV -0.2091 0.1085 -0.0051 -0.0844 -0.0961 -0.0757 0.1873 0.1755 0.1153 0.6213 -0.3167 0.3045 0.1913 1.0000  
15.Target Volatility 0.3084 -0.1088 -0.0072 0.0382 0.2321 -0.0760 -0.1515 -0.2704 0.0929 -0.2373 0.6290 -0.4696 0.0385 -0.5106 1.0000 
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Table 4.14: Robustness check: the RRP effect on the probability of using stocks 
This table reports logistic regression results of the probability of using stocks on RRP effect. Dependent variable 
is “Stock”, which is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if acquisitions are 100% financed with stocks, 0 
otherwise. Column (1) reports regression results for all-stock financed acquisitions on the RRP for the acquisition 
sample that the bidder is relatively more overvalued than the target or RRP>0, column (2) reports regression 
results for all-stock financed acquisitions on RRP for the acquisition sample that the bidder is relatively more 
undervalued than the target or RRP<0. We control all other variables the same with Table 4.3. There are 50 
observations missing due to multicollinearity problem with the year, so that we are left with 1,742 observations, 
1,103 for RRP>0 group, and 639 for RRP<0 group. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. P-value 
is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively, is reported alongside marginal effects. We transfer coefficients into marginal effect (ME), evaluated 
at the sample means of the independent variables. 
Binomial Logistic Regression 
Stock 
(1)   (2) 
RRP>0  RRP<0 
Coef. p-value ME  Coef. p-value ME 
RRP 0.831*** (0.003) 0.164  -0.232 (0.611) -0.035 
Hostile -0.471 (0.235) -0.093  -1.544** (0.019) -0.233 
Tender -2.291*** (0.000) -0.453  -3.799*** (0.000) -0.573 
Diversification 0.204 (0.237) 0.040  -0.082 (0.752) -0.012 
RelativeSize -0.991*** (0.000) -0.196  0.006 (0.982) 0.001 
Bidder lnMV -0.431*** (0.000) -0.085  -0.103 (0.319) -0.016 
Bidder MTBV 0.036** (0.031) 0.007  0.074*** (0.000) 0.011 
Bidder ROA -0.879 (0.273) -0.174  -2.627** (0.026) -0.396 
Target lnMV 0.497*** (0.000) 0.098  0.169 (0.162) 0.025 
Target MTBV 0.039* (0.090) 0.008  0.087*** (0.003) 0.013 
Target ROA 0.144 (0.704) 0.029  -0.192 (0.803) -0.029 
Target Volatility -3.052 (0.606) -0.604  14.092 (0.142) 2.124 
Bidder Volatility 33.483*** (0.000) 6.621  36.743*** (0.002) 5.538 
Bidder Leverage -0.144 (0.124) -0.028  -0.276*** (0.007) -0.042 
Target Leverage -0.151** (0.016) -0.030  -0.099 (0.175) -0.015 
Bidder CF/E 0.330 (0.338) 0.065  0.342 (0.428) 0.052 
Year  Yes    Yes   
Industry Yes    Yes   
Constant -1.226 (0.237)     -1.744 (0.171)   
N 1103       639             
Pseudo R2 0.316       0.350             
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Table 4.15: Robustness test: The effect of the RRP on the probability of using stocks: Between payment 
methods 
This table reports multinomial logistic regression results for Stock versus Cash and Stock versus Mixed on the 
RRP by different RRP groups. Specifically, RRP>0 represents bidders that are relatively more overvalued than 
their targets, and RRP<0 represents bidders that are relatively more undervalued than their targets. “Stock” refers 
to acquisitions that are 100% financed by stocks. “Cash” refers to acquisitions that are 100% financed with cash. 
“Mixed” refers to acquisitions that are neither 100% cash financed nor 100% stocks financed. There were 5 
missing observations that are defined as “Other” in terms of the method of payment in Thomson One. For both 
columns, we control for 15 variables as shown in the specification (4) of Table 4.3. Variable definitions are as in 
the notes to Table 4.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted ***, **, and * respectively. 
  (1)   (2) 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Stock Versus Cash  Stock Versus Mix 
  Coef.  p-value   Coef.  p-value 
RRP 0.728*** (0.000)  0.425** (0.017) 
Hostile -0.943*** (0.006)  -0.516 (0.126) 
Tender -3.045*** (0.000)  -1.831*** (0.000) 
Diversification -0.010 (0.947)  0.262* (0.096) 
RelativeSize 0.428 (0.143)  -0.852*** (0.000) 
Bidder lnMV -0.281*** (0.000)  -0.228*** (0.000) 
Bidder MTBV 0.058*** (0.001)  0.042*** (0.002) 
Bidder ROA -1.768** (0.031)  -1.294* (0.077) 
Target lnMV 0.471*** (0.000)  0.190** (0.015) 
Target MTBV 0.059*** (0.003)  0.050*** (0.007) 
Target ROA 0.053 (0.887)  0.324 (0.369) 
Target Volatility 2.528 (0.651)  4.395 (0.410) 
Bidder Volatility 48.423*** (0.000)  19.221** (0.010) 
Bidder Leverage -0.181** (0.024)  -0.215*** (0.002) 
Target Leverage -0.042 (0.451)  -0.156*** (0.001) 
Bidder CF/E -0.044 (0.885)  0.361 (0.239) 
Year  -2.097** (0.018)  0.541 (0.494) 
Industry Yes   Yes  
Constant Yes   Yes  
N           
Pseudo R2           
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Table 4.16: Robustness test: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums: By payment methods 
This table reports OLS regression results for the offer premium on the RRP. We divided our M&A sample in three 
subsamples according to payment methods. Column (1) reports the regression results for the acquisition sample 
that is 100% financed by stocks, column (2) reports the regression results for the acquisition sample that is 100% 
financed by cash, column (3) reports the regression results for the acquisition sample that is paid with a mixture 
of stocks and cash. There are 5 missing observations that are defined as “Other” in terms of the method of payment 
in Thomson One. For both columns, we control for 15 variables as shown in the specification (4) of Table 4.3. 
Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and * respectively. 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
Offer Premiums Stock  Cash  Mix 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.071** (2.239)  0.113*** (3.674)  0.089** (2.303) 
Hostile -0.011 (-0.184)  0.038 (1.107)  0.001 (0.030) 
Tender 0.073 (1.053)  0.070*** (3.549)  0.098*** (3.434) 
Diversification -0.014 (-0.508)  -0.009 (-0.467)  -0.030 (-1.243) 
RelativeSize 0.176*** (4.397)  0.133*** (5.699)  0.097*** (3.389) 
Bidder ROA -0.120 (-1.152)  0.303** (2.301)  0.004 (0.034) 
Bidder MTBV -0.000 (-0.042)  -0.003 (-1.529)  0.003 (1.414) 
Bidder lnMV 0.075*** (5.786)  0.038*** (5.027)  0.064*** (4.762) 
Bidder Volatility 0.170 (0.138)  -0.673 (-0.505)  1.864 (1.392) 
Target ROA 0.223*** (3.516)  0.064 (0.940)  0.073 (0.800) 
Target MTBV 0.000 (0.145)  -0.004 (-1.142)  -0.004 (-1.490) 
Target lnMV -0.091*** (-6.627)  -0.073*** (-7.326)  -0.087*** (-6.206) 
Target Volatility 0.541 (0.551)  0.026 (0.034)  -2.314* (-1.761) 
Constant -0.537*** (-3.799)  0.155 (1.322)  0.020 (0.138) 
Year  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes   Yes    Yes  
N 608     726     539           
adj. R2 0.146     0.223     0.218           
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Table 4.18: Robustness test: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums: By deal types 
This table reports OLS regression results for the offer premium on the RRP. We divided our M&A sample in two 
subsamples according to industry relatedness of the two firms involved. Where we define the “Diversification” to 
which the primary two Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes are different between bidders and targets. 
Column (1) reports the regression results for the diversified acquisition sample, column (2) reports the regression 
results for the undiversified acquisition sample. For both columns, we control for 15 variables as shown in the 
specification (4) of Table 4.3. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
  (1)   (2) 
Offer Premiums Diversified deals  Undiversified deals 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.127*** (4.066)   0.067** (2.566) 
Hostile 0.023 (0.657)  0.034 (1.254) 
Tender 0.062** (2.471)  0.090*** (4.555) 
Stock -0.016 (-0.500)  -0.002 (-0.081) 
Cash -0.035 (-1.259)  -0.039* (-1.917) 
RelativeSize 0.136*** (4.795)  0.115*** (5.611) 
Bidder ROA -0.050 (-0.316)  0.019 (0.236) 
Bidder MTBV 0.003 (1.277)  -0.001 (-0.620) 
Bidder lnMV 0.047*** (5.384)  0.066*** (7.924) 
Bidder Volatility -0.658 (-0.479)  1.414 (1.561) 
Target ROA 0.136** (2.016)  0.138** (2.472) 
Target MTBV -0.002 (-0.657)  -0.001 (-0.774) 
Target lnMV -0.082*** (-7.785)  -0.080*** (-8.938) 
Target Volatility -0.063 (-0.067)  -0.679 (-0.872) 
Constant 0.046 (0.386)  0.034 (0.327) 
Year  Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes     Yes   
N 702     1176           
adj. R2 0.159     0.173           
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Table 4.18: Robustness test: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums: By deal choice 
This table reports OLS regression results for the offer premium on the RRP. We divided our M&A sample in two 
subsamples according to deal choice or whether the deal is defined as tender offer according to Thomson One. 
Column (1) reports the regression results for the tender offers, column (2) reports the regression results for mergers. 
For both columns, we control for 15 variables as shown in the Specification (4) of Table 4.3. Variable definitions 
are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and * respectively. 
 (1)  (2) 
Offer Premiums Tender   Merger 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.148*** (4.107)   0.078*** (3.464) 
Hostile 0.007 (0.190)  0.041 (1.505) 
Diversification -0.052** (-2.044)  -0.007 (-0.478) 
Stock -0.011 (-0.190)  0.005 (0.282) 
Cash -0.076** (-2.578)  -0.020 (-1.020) 
RelativeSize 0.150*** (4.668)  0.108*** (5.862) 
Bidder ROA 0.056 (0.489)  -0.007 (-0.091) 
Bidder MTBV -0.005 (-1.172)  0.001 (0.440) 
Bidder lnMV 0.070*** (5.518)  0.052*** (7.675) 
Bidder Volatility 4.638*** (3.126)  0.028 (0.033) 
Target ROA 0.066 (0.757)  0.167*** (3.512) 
Target MTBV -0.002 (-0.800)  -0.001 (-0.543) 
Target lnMV -0.081*** (-5.372)  -0.077*** (-10.246) 
Target Volatility -0.350 (-0.349)  -0.232 (-0.344) 
Constant 0.325*** (2.764)  0.155 (1.430) 
Year  Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes     Yes   
N 380     1498   
adj. R2 0.224     0.144   
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Table 4.19: Robustness test: The effect of the RRP on offer premiums: By deal completion 
This table reports OLS regression results for the offer premium on the RRP. The M&A sample was divided in two 
subsamples according to whether the deal is completed during the sample time period studied. Column (1) reports 
the regression results for the completed deals or successful deals, column (2) reports the regression results for 
deals that are failed to complete or unsuccessful deals. For both columns, we control for 15 variables as shown in 
the specification (4) of Table 4.3. Variable definitions are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **, and * 
respectively. 
  (1)   (2) 
Offer Premiums Successful deals  Unsuccessful deals 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
RRP 0.081*** (3.921)   0.119** (2.347) 
Hostile 0.021 (0.517)  0.092*** (2.693) 
Tender 0.066*** (4.013)  0.100** (2.560) 
Diversification -0.015 (-1.007)  0.022 (0.609) 
Stock 0.010 (0.515)  -0.017 (-0.375) 
Cash -0.033* (-1.842)  0.014 (0.311) 
RelativeSize 0.130*** (7.074)  0.134*** (3.422) 
Bidder ROA 0.024 (0.320)  -0.295 (-1.512) 
Bidder MTBV -0.001 (-0.441)  0.005 (1.482) 
Bidder lnMV 0.052*** (8.597)  0.102*** (4.315) 
Bidder Volatility 0.391 (0.462)  1.543 (1.091) 
Target ROA 0.125*** (2.658)  0.291*** (2.830) 
Target MTBV -0.001 (-0.534)  -0.004 (-0.842) 
Target lnMV -0.076*** (-10.891)  -0.118*** (-4.747) 
Target Volatility -0.263 (-0.402)  -0.685 (-0.515) 
Constant 0.022 (0.240)  -0.158 (-1.015) 
Year  Yes   Yes  
Industry Yes    Yes  
N 1597    277   
adj. R2 0.164     0.238   
 
  
Chapter 4. Tables 
 
235 
 
Table 4.20: Robustness test: market-adjusted model 
This table reports the OLS regression and 2SLS regression results for both bidder and target 3-day CARs on offer 
premiums. The dependent variable for specifications (1) and (2) is the bidder CAR3 and for specifications (3) and 
(4) is the target CAR3, where CAR3 is calculated with the market-adjusted model. Specifications (2) and (4) 
reports the results of 2SLS regression using RRP as an instrument variable of offer premiums. Variable definitions 
are as in the notes to Table 4.2. Robustness t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted ***, **and * respectively. We report the results of the Hausman test and F-test 
at the lower part of the table. 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)    
 Bidder CAR3   Target CAR3 
  OLS IV   OLS IV 
Offer Premiums -0.014** -0.070**  0.469*** 0.688*** 
 (-2.167) (-2.078)  (20.616) (6.173)    
Hostile -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.004    
 (-0.385) (-0.366)  (-0.127) (-0.218)    
Tender 0.008** 0.014**  0.040*** 0.017    
 (2.102) (2.471)  (3.022) (0.970)    
Diversification 0.003 0.003  0.003 0.003    
 (0.764) (0.817)  (0.305) (0.312)    
Stock -0.010** -0.009**  -0.046*** -0.046*** 
 (-2.139) (-2.047)  (-4.023) (-3.727)    
Cash 0.020*** 0.020***  0.030*** 0.035*** 
 (5.066) (4.504)  (2.581) (2.793)    
RelativeSize -0.005 -0.005  -0.051*** -0.053*** 
 (-1.207) (-1.485)  (-6.259) (-5.780)    
Bidder lnMV -0.003*** -0.003***                   
 (-3.693) (-3.074)                   
Bidder MTBV -0.000 -0.000                   
 (-0.345) (-0.186)                   
Bidder ROA 0.034* 0.033**                   
 (1.877) (2.550)                   
Target lnMV    -0.002 0.004    
    (-0.827) (1.001)    
Target MTBV    -0.002* -0.002    
    (-1.757) (-1.372)    
Target ROA    -0.008 -0.011    
    (-0.298) (-0.557)    
Constant 0.013* 0.027**  0.107*** 0.008    
 (1.666) (2.297)  (5.604) (0.153)    
N 1878 1878  1878 1878    
adj. R2 0.050 .   0.374 . 
Hausman test X2=2.9735 (p=0.0848)   X2=4.3522 (p=0.0371) 
F-test X2=60.2985 (p=0.0000)   X2=42.9958 (p=0.0000) 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the market anticipation effect on M&A decisions and outcomes. Prospect 
theory predicts sequential risk-taking actions by decision-makers when facing losses. This 
implication was applied in the M&A context, which is a firm’s major corporate investment decision. 
The market anticipates managers making investment decisions according to its risk tolerance, hence 
maintaining confidence in the firm (i.e. market anticipation effect). Managers follow this anticipation 
to rationalise the M&A motive. The magnitude of losses was measured with the bidder reference 
price, which is the distance between the firm’s 52-week high and its current stock price, illustrating 
the market perception of a firm’s performance. Investors holding bidders’ stocks whose value is in 
significant decline relative to the reference price tend to believe risky projects should be available to 
the firm and if managers fail to engage in them, this will destroy the market confidence. Market 
anticipation increases managerial incentive to perform well in the face of performance decline and 
triggers a risk-taking appetiser. The level of riskiness of investment decisions was measured with the 
target firm-specific risk. The principal findings in this chapter are presented as follows: it was found 
that the riskiness of managerial decisions is anticipated by the market and this explains the choice of 
takeover targets. Managers who make decisions based upon market anticipation will receive positive 
market reactions. Market-anticipated risks may expose managers to great shareholder monitoring, 
pushing them to work hard to justify the M&A motive. Specifically, managers tend to exhibit great 
efforts in deal negotiation, reflected in the lower offer premiums they pay for the target, indicating 
that managers are cautious in the face of losses. The quality of their decisions according to the 
reference point proves to be value creation, reflected in positive long-term performance. Findings of 
this chapter suggest that the reference point effect has predictability for target selection.  
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5.1. Introduction 
 
“Pain, I have already had occasion to observe, is, in almost all cases, a more pungent sensation than 
the opposite and correspondent pleasure. The one, almost always, depresses us much more below the 
ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of our happiness, than the other ever raises us 
above it.” 
 
Adam Smith (1759: 176-177) 
 
One of the most well-documented phenomena of investors’ behaviour is that people tend to take risks 
subsequent to follow losses relative to a reference point, predicted in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory (1979). According to this, the market should be reluctant to realise losses relative to 
a reference point, with the anticipation that future gains can be realised through subsequent firms’ 
risk-taking decisions. In this chapter, this implication is examined in the context of M&As, which is 
a firm’s major investment decisions. Market anticipation was measured with the bidder reference 
point, the extent to which a bidder’s current price deviates from its 52-week high price. Evidence that 
the market tends to gauge gains and losses relative to a salient piece of price information is also 
documented in many studies relating to behavioural finance and M&A literature (Odean, 1998; 
Kumer et al., 2015; Schneider and Spalt, 2015)75. Risk magnitude of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
decisions was measured with target firm-specific risk similar to that employed by Kumar (2009).76 
                                                          
75 Using the firm’s 52-week high as the reference price is not new. Huddart et al. (2009) identified abnormal trading 
volumes around the 52-week high. Burghof and Prothmann (2011) and Li and Yu (2012) found that abnormal trading 
volumes around the 52-week high reflects investor attitude towards market news and uncertainty information. Baker et 
al. (2012) suggest that bidders assess the target with the target 52-week high. Consistently, the reference price was applied 
to the bidder. It reflects the extent to which the loss relative to an aspiration level that the market is unwilling to realise, 
which triggers expectations of the firm’s risk-taking decision.  
76 The construction of target firm-specific risk is presented in the methodology section of this chapter.  
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Whether market anticipation has predictability for corporate investment decisions was investigated, 
and the effect of market-anticipated risks on M&A outcomes was examined. The expectation was to 
be able to assess whether managers minimise a firm’s value by taking market-anticipated risks. 
 
Explanations regarding why losses trigger managerial willingness of risk-taking are put forward from 
the psychological view and provided with empirical evidence relating to the stock market and M&As. 
France (1902) explains that people take risks when they encounter losses. He documented a wide 
range of historical facts as well as the psychological origin of humans, revealing that the incentive to 
take risks is people’s deepest instincts of tasting the joy of life. Further to this, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) developed a model portraying the relationship between risk and choice, suggesting that people 
are loss-aversion and tend to engage in risky decisions in an attempt to compensate losses. Odean 
(1998) documents direct evidence in the stock market that investors are reluctant to realise paper 
losses, holding the belief that future gains should be generated.      
 
Kumar (2009) suggests investors’ preference for stocks with a lottery feature, which is more 
pronounced for those in a lottery-favourable environment and with low incomes. The author noted 
that investors are likely to exaggerate a small chance of a large gain. As a result, they choose stocks 
with high idiosyncratic volatility, high idiosyncratic skewness and lower stock price (i.e. lottery-like 
stocks). Studies suggest that investors who play games of chance are in the hope that their current 
wealth will be improved, indicating that investment decisions are motivated by current losses. Barber 
and Odean (2008) noted that investors’ trading decisions are based on the focus of their attention. 
Both individual and institutional investors will choose eye-grabbing stocks. In this connection, Yu 
and Li (2011) and Bhootra and Hur (2013) attribute investors’ attention to the reference point effect 
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that trading strategy is driven by a firm’s peak prices. Similarly, Gamble and Johnson (2014) claimed 
that investors gauge their losses and gains relative to prior stock returns and increase their portfolio 
risks following losses. Kumar et al. (2015) use prior stock market reactions as reference points and 
find that losses reflected in prior stock market reactions drive the firm to take on risky targets.    
   
Many additional studies have also documented salient evidence that losses drive a firm’s risk-taking 
decisions. Edmans et al. (2012) suggest current underperformance relative to an aspiration level 
increases managerial pressure relative to their peers which pushes the manager to take on risky 
projects. In a similar vein, Morrow et al. (2007) reported that managers feel great pressure when their 
firm’s current performance is far below the market expectations, leading their attempts at value 
creation through M&A activities. Kim et al. (2011) documented evidence of desperate managers 
whose aim is to grow their firm through M&As when the firm’s performance falls greatly below the 
market expectations. Gorton et al. (2009) proposed a theory of mergers relating to firm size, arguing 
that firms whose current performance is poor are associated with great pressures, which motivates 
managers to start a race for firm size through M&A activities to eliminate threats of being taken 
over.77  
 
The magnitude of loss of the firm was measured with the bidder reference price, i.e. a price deviation 
of a firm’s current price from its highest stock price occuring in a one-year window preceding the 
takeover announcement date. This gives the market insight into how the firm is currently performing 
relative to the 52-week high, which is a salient reference price that shapes investors’ minds regarding 
                                                          
77 In support of this, Dickerson et al. (2003) noted that attack, through acquisitions, is the best way to eliminate takeover 
threats.     
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change in a firm’s profitability. Thus, this measure reflects the magnitude of loss of a firm. Investors 
may lose confidence in the firm when this loss is large, inducing their managers to take on risky 
projects that could fundamentally change their current wealth status, or blame them for not working 
hard. Following Kumar (2009) and Schneider and Splat (2015), the riskiness of the M&A decisions 
was measured with target firm-specific risks, which are more easily to be assessed by the market. 
Large firm-level risks also expose managers to great shareholder monitoring, motivating the firm to 
work hard.  
 
Prior studies have provided supportive evidence as to why a firm tends to make decisions based on a 
single piece of information though in truth that they have a full access to the information about their 
own firms. Brandenburger and Polak (1996) suggest that the manager is concerned about the market 
and tend to make decisions that the market wants to see. Thus, it should be suggested that managers 
should make M&A decision according to the market anticipation. Sacheti et al. (2016) argued that 
the manager whose decisions follow market anticipation is attempting to avoid the market’s short-
term criticisms. Similarly, Kau et al. (2008) found that firms listen to the market, in that they cancel 
investment decisions if there are negative market reactions.78  
 
Using M&As as a platform to explore the reference point effect on major corporate investment 
decisions has three main reasons. First, M&A outcomes will alter a firm’s status and change the 
wealth of shareholders. Brenner (1983) indicates that a primary motive of risk-taking is to 
fundamentally change the relative position in the distribution of wealth. A firm will be blamed for 
                                                          
78 Luo (2005) and Chikh and Filbien (2011), applying this in different markets, found a consistent view with that of Kau 
et al. (2008). 
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not making sufficient effort for their shareholders when it fails to undertake the investments the 
market expects. Secondly, the fact that the shareholder motivates the firm to increase risks is common 
in the CEOs’ M&A compensation literature. For instance, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find risk-
taking managers are compensated with lucrative compensation packages. Graham et al. (2013) 
suggest that shareholders are likely to hire managers with risk-taking incentives to avoid costly 
incentive pay. M&As allow investigation of whether firms’ major investment decisions made upon 
market anticipation receive market recognition. Third, the researcher further explored whether 
managers can control risks through skills and efforts, which allows observers to distinguish risk-
taking from stock market gambling, which purely depends on probability (Kumar, 2009).  
 
This chapter has two main motivations. First, it provides novel insights into the debate on managerial 
risk-taking incentives. Previous studies have found that risk-taking incentives are driven by 
managerial overconfidence or agency problems and yield contradictory results with respect to bidder 
performance. Whilst Malmendiar and Tate (2008) claimed that overconfident managers who tolerate 
large risks tend to destroy the wealth of shareholders, Croci and Petmezas (2015) indicated that 
managerial risk-taking incentive creates value for the firm. Another line of literature links managerial 
risk-taking attitudes with CEOs’ M&A compensation. Datta et al. (2001) indicate that high pay-
performance creates managerial value-maximising incentives. However, this view is challenged by 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) who suggest that an increase in risk-taking does not necessarily 
enhance firm value. This research investigates the risk-taking motive with reference point theory, 
which explains M&A decisions from human nature response (France, 1902). It was expected that a 
firm will follow the market anticipation following losses, and managers should rationalise their risk-
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taking incentive to avoid the market criticism. Thus, market perception has a substantial impact on 
M&A decisions.   
 
Secondly, only a few papers link the reference point to target risks. For example, Kumar et al. (2015) 
use stock market reaction to a prior acquisition as the reference point. The authors find that prior 
market reaction loss induces a firm to acquire risky targets. However, how the decision of prior 
acquisition influences the current M&A decision remains largely controversial (Billett and Qian, 2008; 
Aktas et al., 2009)79. Moreover, Kumar et al. employed target stock volatility as a proxy for M&A 
riskiness. However, it measures the total risk of the market and the firm, making it hard to distinguish 
the effect of firm-specific risk from the effect of the market-wide risk.80 To combat these issues, in 
this chapter, the bidder 52-week high is used as the reference point, which is a more direct measure 
for current market reaction. Schneider and Spalt (2015), who applied Kumar’s idea (2009) of 
employing the measure for stock riskiness to the target firm, found a negative relationship between 
target risks and bidder performance. They ascribe this to a managerial gambling preference. However, 
Schneider and Spalt fail to answer whether such risk-taking has a rational motive. If the market 
believes that there are risky projects available to a firm while managers do not take any actions, this 
will lead to the investors’ belief that managers have a quiet life by entrenching themselves and 
destroying the firm’s value (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). On the other hand, when M&A 
decisions are made in relative to market anticipation, the market tends to create an image that the firm 
                                                          
79 Aktas et al. (2009) found the learning hypothesis that managers tend to adjust their behaviour according to the previous 
acquisition while Billett and Qian (2008) suggest the self-attribution hypothesis that initial success generates 
overconfident managers who tend to engage in more acquisitions, which generates lower shareholder wealth.  
80 Often the market tends to react more significantly to the firm-level news than the market news. Firm-specific risks can 
be driven by any news relating to the firm level. For example, CEO turnovers, or earnings announcement, which are more 
sensitive to outside investors.    
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is strong, or the firm strives hard to protect shareholders’ wealth, thus enhancing its confidence in the 
firm’s prospects. Croci and Petmezas (2015) suggest that managers with risk-taking incentives tend 
to select better quality acquisitions. In addition, March and Shapira (1987) indicate that risk-taking is 
an essential part of the managerial role. Based on these arguments, bidder performance is expected to 
improve when risk-taking is undertaken with market consent.    
 
Using a sample of 2,018 U.S. public acquisitions announced between 1985 and 2014, a positive 
relationship between riskiness of M&A decision and the bidder reference point was established, 
suggesting an important role of played by market anticipation in corporate investment decisions. The 
results of this chapter continue to hold after a series of tests. Further, it was found that bidders’ 
announcement returns increase with market-anticipated risks, implying that the market will push the 
manager to work hard. Further investigation shows that managers who are exposed to observable 
risks tend to exhibit greater efforts on deal negotiation and attempting to signal to the market that 
they are good managers, which is consistent with Harford et al. (2012) and Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2003).81      
 
Several contributions have been made to previous literature. This is the first paper, to our knowledge, 
investigates the reference point effect on managerial risk-taking incentives in the context of M&As. 
It is shown that humans’ psychological bias has a direct impact on corporate investment decisions. 
This study focuses on the M&A motives of firms who have announced an M&A deal, which allows 
making the distinction between the performance of bidders who undertake M&As with market 
                                                          
81 Their studies find that entrenched managers tend to have safe lives and attempt to avoid being monitored, which leads 
to overpayment. It is expected that managers making risky decisions will signal to the market that the interests of the 
manager and the shareholder are closely linked.   
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anticipation and those without, eliminating any concerns that excessive risks are due to managerial 
overconfidence and agency problems. It is expected that those M&A motives are followed by 
negative market reactions because the market does not anticipate the firm to do so. This chapter 
contributes to behavioural finance literature by directly documenting that not only individual 
investors but also institutional investors are influenced by the reference point effect while making 
decisions in uncertainty. Further, it offers new insights to the existing literature regarding managerial 
risk-taking incentives. It was found that market-anticipated risks have a significant impact on M&A 
decisions, attributable to one of the important sources of bidder performance improvement.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 summaries relevant literature. Section 
3 designs hypotheses. Section 4 summarises the data and presents methodologies. Section 5 examines 
the reference point effect on M&A decisions, and the relationship between market-anticipated risks 
and bidder performance. Section 6 conducts a series of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the 
chapter.  
 
5.2. Literature review 
5.2.1. Reference point theory and gambling  
France (1902) documents a wide range of interesting facts relating to the history of gambling across 
the world and provides experimental evidence explaining the motivation of people engaging in 
gambling activities. He concludes that it is human nature to get involved in games of chance and 
gambling. People have a gambling spirit and believe in luck. With regard to the human gambling 
spirit, France affirms that people tend not to leave the table while a big risky game is in progress. The 
human gambling spirit implies that humans naturally explore uncertain events and their attention 
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tends to be intense when information is highly uncertain. He explained luck with the fact that 
gamblers believe that if they lose in the first half of the game, they will eventually win back in the 
second half. This implies that people tend to align games of chance with an exaggerated feeling for 
their skills. Such a stimulated mental intention drives people not to think wisely but to rely on the 
gambling impulse.       
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory with an S-shape model portraying the 
relationship between risk and choice. It suggests that people seek risk when the current status is below 
their aspiration level. They are more sensitive to feelings about loss than gains given that the slope in 
the loss domain is much steeper than that in the gain. Due to the fact that people are loss-averse, they 
have a great incentive to compensate their losses through risk-taking decisions. The model ascribes 
the reason for gambling to people’s strong tendency to loss-aversion.    
 
Kumar (2009), following this line of literature, investigates the stock market and finds evidence that 
stock-purchasing decisions of individual investors are loss driven. According to the author, individual 
investors have a tendency to buy lottery-type stocks. The lottery-type stocks are those with a 
combination of high idiosyncratic volatility and skewness, and a low price. When idiosyncratic 
volatility is high, investors may overestimate the chance of extreme events occurred in the past would 
appear in the future. When idiosyncratic skewness is high, investors may overestimate the probability 
of making huge gains by investing less. The lower price reduces the costs of participation, giving 
investors an illusion of control. When a panel data set, collected from a large U.S. brokerage house, 
was analysed containing trading positions of individual investors between 1991 and 1996, the author 
revealed that investors’ preference for lottery-type stocks increased when economic conditions 
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became worse or their income was low. Their data also show that low-income investors underperform 
the market, indicating that gambling preference is associated with worse performance. Their study 
reflects investors’ gambling spirit in investors’ trading strategy in the stock market.   
 
However, it may be argued that the reason for underperformance is not simply the investors’ risk- 
taking behaviour since the investors with a lower income could also be less experienced individuals 
who are not able to manage the risk of their portfolios in the stock market. In this case, they might 
take too many unexpected risks. Borna and Lowery (1987) define this as ‘pure gambling’ in which 
people have no control over the outcome of the events but rely heavily on the probability of the 
outcome. These authors noted another form of gambling where people’s skills have an impact on the 
outcome of gambling,82 implying that acquisitions belong to this form of gambling since managers 
with superior skills can better manage the risks.                 
 
Rather than Kumar (2009), who investigated the gambling spirit of less experienced investors in the 
stock market, Schneider and Spalt (2015) focused on the motivation of gambling for institutional 
investors undertaking M&A activities. Following Kumar’s work (2009), Schneider and Spalt 
measured target riskiness with its idiosyncratic volatility, which captures the overall risk of the M&A 
decisions. Using a sample of public U.S. M&As between 1987 and 2008, the authors found that risky 
firms are likely to be acquired, showing the strong gambling preference of bidder managers. Further, 
they suggest that bidders who acquire risky targets destroy the wealth of shareholders and the value 
of firm reflected in both short and long runs, concluding that the propensity for managerial gambling 
                                                          
82 For example, Borna and Lowery (1987) further illustrate that one’s good knowledge of horse may result in successful 
horse-race betting, while rolling a dice is pure gambling in which depends on probability.  
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leads to value-destroying deals. However, their results can be interpreted that managers who gamble 
by means of M&As do not offer the market a rational motive given the lack of the current status of 
the bidder. Based on this argument, it cannot be determined whether a firm listens to the market and 
acquire targets accordingly. Investors might falsely believe that the M&A motive is simply because 
their managers ‘go with their guts’ and do not coincide with the market reaction, thus bidders receive 
negative market reactions.     
 
5.2.2. Reference point theory and risk-taking 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that people are aggressive when facing losses, as they believe 
there is a chance to break even, whilst people are risk-averse when the possible outcome of the 
decision is positive. March and Shapira (1987) provided supportive evidence that managers tend to 
avoid losses when their performance meets or exceeds market expectations. Their survey summarises 
many studies that link managerial risk perspectives and market expectations. It reveals that some 
managers interviewed believe that risk-taking is in an essential role of managers and the satisfaction 
of success is obtained from the degree of risks taken. While experiencing a decline in performance, 
managerial risk-taking incentive tends to be greater. A majority of managers, according to their 
surveyed study, believe that their skills can reduce risks. 
 
Studies also provide empirical evidence supporting the view that managers take risks when facing 
performance decline. Morrow et al. (2007) investigated firms’ strategies in the situation where a firm 
is unable to meet market expectations. Their study suggests that managers whose firms currently 
underperform the market are associated with mounting pressures from their investors whose aim is 
to achieve the aspired performance levels. This motivates managers to take actions in an attempt to 
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turn around the table. Morrow et al.’s data show that acquisitions can create value for the firm, 
reasoning that the market expects that the firms to manage risks with better management skills in 
integrating existing resources with new resources. They also noted that firms facing a decline in 
performance may decline further when taking actions that have no effect on performance, implying 
that the firm may perform even worse in the face of a decline in performance when it fails to persuade 
the market.   
 
Likewise, Kim et al. (2011) found managers are subject to the pressure of firm’s growth when facing 
a decline in stock market performance. The decline in performance indicates a lack of growth for the 
firm, which motivates the firm to gain organisational recovery via M&As. By doing so, managers 
tend to pay high offer premiums to achieve the deal. Their study interprets their results with reference 
point theory of M&A. Kim et al. indicate the driving force of overpayment is because of firms’ 
tendency to evaluate their current performance relative to their historical performance and their peers’ 
performance. When they currently perform below these performance levels, they become risk-takers, 
paying high offer premiums. However, firms that currently perform well will be aligned with market 
expectation that the firm will hit a similar level of growth in the future, and thus managers are not 
willing to engage in acquisitions that often destroy the wealth of shareholders.  
 
Edmans et al. (2012) also assert that firms that engage in M&As is because they are under great 
pressure from their industry peers. Gorton et al. (2009) proposed a theory of mergers that links the 
M&A motive with takeover threat, suggesting a firm that makes a takeover decisions does so to 
eliminate takeover threats. This finding is appealing for medium-size firms of the industry in their 
sample. The primary reason for firms engaging in unprofitable acquisitions is to eliminate takeover 
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threats and thus maintain control of the firm. If a firm’s primary motive is to complete takeovers to 
eliminate any pressure or takeover threats from the same industry, they are likely to choose takeovers 
that are easier to complete and firms that potentially bring forth higher returns. Following this 
argument, Ferreira and Laux (2007) found firms with larger idiosyncratic risk have fewer anti-
takeover defences, thus, implying that firms that lack of takeover resistance are suitable takeover 
targets. In addition, those firms have higher levels of private information flow and information about 
future earnings in stock prices, which increase attractiveness for those under great pressures.   
 
Earlier studies indicate that firms’ salient historical prices are often reference point prices that the 
market uses to assess the firms’ performances. Baker et al. (2012) proposed the target 52-week high 
as a reference point price in M&A pricing decisions. Target shareholders are less likely to forsake 
control of the firm when an offer price received is significantly lower than the reference point price. 
They judge their managerial performance during M&As according to their expectations, implying 
that those failing to meet their performance expectations will incur criticism and even face the risk of 
shareholder litigation.  
 
Li and Yu (2013) attributed their findings that investors make decisions based on the salient news of 
the market to investors’ attention hypothesis, proposing two proxies for investors’ attentions: the 
market 52-week high and the historical high. Specifically, the current market price relative to the 
market 52-week high is used as a proxy for investors’ under-reaction on the assumption that sporadic 
news leads conservative investors to under-react either to good or bad news as they are not fully 
incorporated in the market. Whilst the current market price relative to the historical high is used as a 
proxy for investors’ over-reaction, reasoning that a series of good or bad news accumulate great deal 
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of market attention, investors who make decisions according to the market historical high are over-
react. Li and Yu’s data cover the average index of the Dow Jones between 1928 and 2009 and define 
the market 52-week high as a ratio of the current Dow index and its 52-week high, and the historical 
high as a ratio of the current Dow index and its historical high. Their findings show that investors 
whose attention is based on the historical high are associated with negative market returns in the 
future, whilst those whose attention is based on the 52-week high are associated with positive market 
returns, in that both over and under-reactions are eventually corrected by the market. Their study 
suggests that investors are attention-driven, making stock market predictable.  
 
Bhootra and Hur (2013) suggest the recent effect, indicating that investors tend to have much more 
attention on the events occurred in the recent past than in the distant past. They proposed a proxy for 
investors’ recent effect based on the timing of the 52-week high, i.e. the number of days since the 
date of the 52-week high arrived. Bhootra and Hur’ s study documents the evidence of investors’ 
attention-driven performance, indicating that firms whose 52-week high occurred in the recent past 
outperform those whose 52-week high occurred in the distant past. In particular, Bhootra and Hur’ s 
findings show that the top 10% of the stocks whose 52-week high occurred in the recent past 
outperform the bottom 10% of the stocks whose 52-week high arrived in the further distance in 
monthly average returns by 0.7%. Investors create a strong momentum of profitability for the stocks 
that have achieved their best performance recently. On average, profits created by investors’ attention 
are twice as large for stocks that attain peaks recently than a long time previously. On the whole, their 
study indicates that recent events are likely to associate much more of investors’ emphasis, implying 
that a firm whose performance has recently reached its peak might less likely to initiate a takeover 
for the reason that takeovers destroy the wealth of the bidder shareholders.  
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Many additional studies also suggest the important role of the reference point effect on risk-taking 
actions and employ various reference point candidates. Kumar et al. (2015) used the stock market 
reactions to a previous acquisition as a reference point for the decision of the current acquisition. The 
authors proposed two competing hypotheses relating to the relationship between risk-taking and 
choices to examine the decision-making process: reference point effect and the house money effect. 
The former indicates that people take risks when facing losses, while the latter suggests that people 
take risks when facing gains. Analysing a sample of 823 acquisitions between 1990 and 2006, Kumar 
et al. found that firms increase M&A riskiness with both the abnormal dollar gains from the takeover 
announcement of a prior acquisition and the abnormal dollar losses, suggesting both theories play a 
role in risk-taking. Their data show that loss-aversion driven risk-taking is associated with weak 
negative market reactions to the current acquisition, while risk-taking followed by gains has an 
insignificant impact on M&A performance. Their study documents evidence that managers take on 
risky projects according to market reactions. However, their study measures target riskiness with 
target stock return volatility, which includes both the market overall risk and firm-specific risk. This 
proxy is problematic, as it cannot be distinguished whether risk-taking is driven by firm-specific or 
market overall risks. If the market overall risk is large, investors may believe that risk-taking is 
necessary and engaging any projects may as well associate with large risks, making investors feel no 
difference to M&As.    
 
Meanwhile, Gamble and Johnson (2014) found evidence suggesting that investors increase their risk 
tolerance following losses. Their study focused on individual investors’ trading strategy in the stock 
market. Their sample consists of 78,000 households between 1991 and 1996, which were collected 
from a large discount brokerage firm in the United States. Investors tend to exit the market when they 
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experience large gains or losses in the first six months of the year, whilst those remaining in the 
market tend to lower (increase) their risks subsequently follow gains (losses), which is explained by 
the disposition effect.  
 
5.2.3. Risk-taking and M&A outcomes  
The relationship between managerial risk-taking attitude and value creation is far less clear according 
to March and Shapira (1987) who affirm that risk attitudes vary significantly among different 
individual managers. Earlier M&A studies provide rather unambiguous results regarding the 
relationship between the firm’s risk-taking attitudes and M&A performance. A thread of literature 
suggests that a firm’s risk-taking incentive and M&A outcomes are negatively related, stating the 
reason for this is agency conflicts between the managers and the shareholders (Grinstein and Hribar, 
2004; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Graham et al., 2012) or managerial overconfidence (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005; 2008).  
 
Graham et al. (2012) focused on the relationship between managerial risk-taking attitudes and 
corporate investment actions and measured a CEO’s risk profile with a series of survey questions. 
The authors established that approximately 10% of the top managers interviewed are risk-averse, 
whilst a majority of managers display considerable risk-taking attitude and are likely to engage in 
value-destroying deals. Moreover, due to the high level of risk tolerance, managers are optimistic, 
leading to a great use of short-term debt to finance M&As. Their study also suggests that the firm is 
more willing to recruit risk-taking managers on behalf for their decision-making, as recruiting risk-
averse managers make compensations that motivates costly managerial risk-taking incentive. These 
findings imply that it is that shareholders expect their managers to be risk-taking but not too optimistic. 
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Likewise, Grinstein and Hribar (2004), who investigated the compensation effect on managerial risk-
taking incentive in a sample of 327 M&A deals between 1993 and 1999, noted that 39% of companies 
reward their managers who complete the deal. This leads the researcher to believe that the managerial 
incentive of value-maximising tends to reduce if the structure of compensation83  motivates the 
managers to take reductant risks. It is also noted that managers in pursuit of high compensations 
overpay for the targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988).   
  
Malmendier and Tate (2008) found overconfident managers are more likely to engage in risky 
acquisitions than their non-overconfident counterparts. Their M&A sample consists of 477 large 
publicly traded U.S. firms of Forbes 500 from 1980 to 1994. The study measured CEO 
overconfidence with option-based measures, showing that overconfident bidders lower the wealth of 
shareholders for 75 basis points as opposed to rational bidders. The authors indicate that compared 
with non-overconfident CEOs, overconfident CEOs are less likely to create value via M&As. 
Specifically, they are more likely to conduct diversifying acquisitions associated with negative 
abnormal returns, as overconfident managers overestimate their skills in an unfamiliar area of 
industry. In addition, overconfident managers tend to engage in more acquisitions, indicating that 
they underestimate the risks of acquisitions.       
 
Other literature finds contrasting evidence that a managerial risk-taking attitude leads to positive 
M&A outcomes. Croci and Petmezas (2015) studied the relationship between CEO risk perspectives 
and M&A decisions in a sample of 2,056 bidders engaged in 9,789 acquisitions over the period 1997 
                                                          
83 In this regard, Datta et al. (2001) found that managers of high equity-based compensation firms tend to take value-
enhancing M&A projects. Their study shows compensation motivates risk-taking managers to create value for the firm.       
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to 2011 and measured managerial risk perspectives with vega and delta. In their study, vega refers to 
CEO wealth to stock return volatility while delta refers to CEO wealth to stock price following the 
studies of Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002). Their findings also show that bidder 
announcement returns increase with vega at the 5% significance level, which suggests little evidence 
that risks driven by overconfidence destroy the wealth of shareholders. Rather, managers with great 
risk-taking incentive enhance the wealth of shareholders. The authors conclude that managers with a 
high level of risk-taking tend to select quality deals. Likewise, Gervais et al. (2011) found that 
overconfident managers have a high-risk profile, making shareholders’ convexity of the pay-
performance incentive redundant. Their study suggests that overconfidence serves as a solution that 
reduces managerial risk aversion, thus saving the firm’s investment costs. According to their study, 
shareholders expect their managers to be risk-taking, while the firm performs significantly lower than 
their level of expectation and it will reward managerial risk-taking behaviour with compensation. As 
such, shareholders might believe that their interests are aligned with the managers if they take on 
risky projects on their behalf.  
 
Moeller (2015), who investigated approximately 25,000 companies over a 20-year period that 
involved in over 265,000 M&A transactions, also found a positive relationship between risky 
strategies and a firm’s performance. He noted that ‘M&A is now a well-exploited strategy. The 
opportunities have therefore shrunk and risk-free deals are unlikely to yield the desired results. In 
the current environment, portfolio managers therefore have to take risks.’ This indicates that, in 
current investment environment, managers can hardly perform well without engaging in risky M&As.  
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Harford et al. (2012) found that risk-averse managers generate negative market reactions. Studying a 
sample of 1,905 M&As made by U.S. public bidders between 1990 and 2005, the authors find that 
entrenched managers who avoid being monitored by block holders tend to use cash instead of stocks 
to finance M&As, and moreover they select public targets and overpay for the takeover targets. Their 
study compares risk-averse managers to those who make value-destroying deals for fear of losing 
their jobs. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) proposed the quiet life hypothesis, whereby entrenched 
managers are risk-averse.  
 
Many additional studies have attributed the reason for risk-taking actions driving a firm’s positive 
performance to the fact that managers are able to take risks that the market anticipates, as the market 
tends also to be risk-taking when facing losses. Managers do what the market anticipates can achieve 
a better performance, since it creates an insight in the market that the firm is confident in turning 
around its performance, and it is more importantly, the interests of the managers and the shareholders 
are closely aligned. Certain literature suggests the listening propensity of managers who make 
decisions according to market reactions. Brandenburger and Polak (1996) asserted that managers tend 
to make decisions that the market thinks it is right rather than their belief that it is for the interests of 
the firm, reasoning that ‘the stock market has opinions as to what choices firms should make’. In this 
case, managers make decisions according to the market reactions rather than private information they 
have. Sacheti et al. (2016) illustrated this with a cricket game by investigating how cricket players 
make decisions when facing social pressure. The cricket captains do not make optimal decisions that 
can maximise the probability of winning when they are subject to external pressure. Similarly, Sacheti 
et al. suggest that managers who make decisions based on the market anticipation are attempting to 
avoid criticisms by the market.  
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Following this trains of ideas in relevant literature, studies document evidence that managers make 
decisions in favour of the market anticipation (Luo, 2005; Kau et al., 2008; Chikh and Filbien, 2011), 
as managers only complete the deal associated with positive market reactions. It is generally believed 
that a firm is a financing contract between the managers and shareholders, in that the managers are 
hired by shareholders, and should make major investment decisions that are highly committed to 
completing the transactions. Managers who serve the best interests of their shareholders should award 
by the market. On the other hand, managers should exhibit sufficient effort to prove they are good 
managers, thus secure their jobs (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). When a firm experiences losses in 
performance, it should become more aggressively to persuade the market that they can reverse the 
situation. Risky deals attract great deal of market attention, pushing the firm to work diligently. 
Therefore, it is expected that one of the positive sources of abnormal returns generated from M&As, 
based on the rationale that the manager and the market have a common belief to the firm’s prospects.  
 
This chapter uses the bidder reference point as a proxy for the market anticipation, which is a 
deivation of the bidder’s current price from its 52-week high, reflecting the change in market reaction 
relative to the bidder’s best performance achieved over the past year prior to the takeover 
annoucement. If bidder’s current price is significantly discounted from the reference point price, 
shareholders suffer mental losses, which motivate the managers to take more risks. On the other hand, 
the role of the reference point effect rationalises managerial risk-taking behaviour. Managers who 
conduct M&As according to the level of risks that the market anticipates leads the market to believe 
that their interests are closely aligned with those of the managers, as managers are also exposed to 
the strict shareholders’ monitoring by taking on risky projects. While the market reacts negatively to 
those taking unexpected risks, such as managerial overconfidence or agency problems. It is also 
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suggested that the market shows negative reactions to those remaining salient (i.e. entrenched 
managers) when they are expected to take an action. This researcher measures riskiness of M&As 
with target firm-specific risks in line with the Schneider and Spalt (2015). This research also focuses 
on the performance of the firm whose actions are in favour of its shareholders. Not only is the short-
term performance investigated but also the long-term, since it should be possible to observe the 
quality of decisions over a longer period of time.  
 
5.3. Hypotheses development 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) indicate a silent piece of information shapes people’s minds and is 
used as a reference point for decision-making. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) applied their idea to 
the loss-averse tendency, suggesting that mental losses are gauged by the reference point. People 
become aggressive when their expectation deviates greatly from the reference point. Odean (1998) 
put forward prospect theory in the stock market , documenting evidence that investors are reluctant 
to realise loss, thus they retain losers too long in the belief that future gains can be realised through 
risky projects. Based on this argument, shareholders holding the firm’s stocks expect the current 
losses to be turned round by managers. This author predicts that market reactions to a firm’s current 
status relative to the time when the 52-week high arrives are perceived as a loss, which requires the 
firm to respond to the market that the firm is striving to achieve profitability. It is generally believed 
that M&As are the easiest solution to boost a firm’s performance when it faces a decline in 
performance as noted in the work of Morrow et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2011), however, M&As, 
on average, do not benefit bidder shareholders, based on the assumptions that managers take too many 
unexpected risks that destroy the wealth of their shareholders (Malmentier and Tate, 2008), or 
manager avoid taking expected risks for job security (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Harford et 
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al., 2012). By contrast, when managers are cautious about the M&A motive and the take risks as the 
market anticipates, they reveal to the market that there is no misalignment of interests between the 
shareholders and the managers. The reference point price reflects the market’s risk-taking profile, 
giving managers an insight into how many risks the firm should take to rationalise its M&A motive. 
This author measures the loss magnitude of M&A decisions with target firm-specific risks and expect 
that they are increased with perceived loss measured by the bidder reference point. Based on the 
reference point effect, this research suggests that there exists a level of risks the market is willing for 
the firm to take. When the market feels loss, the firm is anticipated to gain by taking on risky projects. 
This leads the first testable hypothesis of this chapter,   
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the bidder reference point and target risks.      
 
The firm under pressures is prone to listen to the market (Luo, 2005; Kau et al., 2008). When engaging 
in risky projects, managers show that they are working hard for the shareholders instead of enjoying 
safe lives when the firm’s performance is declining (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Their risky 
actions also attract greater market attention, leading to great managerial incentive to making profits 
for the shareholders. Barber and Odean (2008) suggest the attention-grabbing hypothesis that 
investors tend to buy eye-catching stocks. France (1902) explains this phenomenon as the human 
nature to resolve uncertainty. For instance, people may find it difficult to leave the table when risky 
bets are placed unless the outcome appears. Therefore, it should be expected that managers so as to 
prove themselves as “good managers” will take levels of risks that the market can tolerate and manage 
the deal afterwards to gain market recognition.   
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H2: Market-anticipated risks are positively associated with bidder announcement returns. 
 
According to Morrow et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2011), M&A deals are an important way of value 
enhancing for managers when the firm experiences a decline to performance. The pressure triggers 
managerial risk-taking incentive. In the meanwhile, managers work hard in an attempt to calm down 
the market’s panic. They should judge how many risks should be taken based on the market 
anticipation measured with the bidder reference point. Unlike overconfident managers who overpay 
for the takeover targets, those taking anticipated risks creates the market an image of smart and 
diligent managers. By substantiating this market belief, managers reduce offer premiums and 
integrate the firm’s resources following a merger. Therefore, this leads the last testable hypothesis of 
this chapter that, 
 
H3: Managers making decisions according to market-anticipated risks work hard. 
 
5.4. Data and methodology 
5.4.1. Data 
A sample of 36,506 U.S. public acquisitions announced between Jan 1, 1985 and December 31, 2014 
was collected from Thomson One. This database contains all deal information used in this chapter. 
Deals defined as repurchases according to Thomson One were excluded, which was left with a sample 
of 13,482 acquisitions. Acquisitions are material decisions to bidders only if their outcomes can 
change shareholders’ fundamental wealth. Based on this criteria, bidders were required to acquire at 
least 50% of the target shares during the transactions, which yields 11,043 acquisitions. The deal 
sample was matched with COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The former database contains the firm’s 
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accounting information and the latter one includes all stock price information. Both bidder and target 
stock price studied were not a missing value in CRSP, as they are used to calculate target idiosyncratic 
volatility, and bidder announcement returns, which yields 5,640 acquisitions. The method of payment 
information is not missing, resulting in 5,297 acquisitions. All accounting variables used in the 
regressions were required to be available at the fiscal year end prior to the announcement date in 
COMPUSTAT. Both bidder and target market value (MV), return-on-asset (ROA), market-to-book 
value (M/B), leverage measured with debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) and relative size measured with deal 
value divided by the bidder MV, were not with a missing value. It was left with 2,278 acquisitions 
after excluding all bidder variables with a missing value, and result in a final sample of 2,018 
acquisitions after excluding all target variables with a missing value.   
 
The reference point effect on M&A decisions was studied by controlling a number of deal and bidder 
characteristics. Bidder size is expected to be positively related to target risks, as larger bidders tend 
to have greater ability to absorb risks. Firm’s growth opportunities were measured with M/B. It is 
generally believed that greater opportunities are associated with higher risks. Firm’s profitability was 
measured with ROA. It should be expected that the lower ROA bidders tend to be more aggressive 
and take more risks than their higher counterparts. Leverage was measured with D/E, reflecting risks 
in capital structure. Lower D/E firms are capable in taking more risks than their higher counterparts 
(Uysal, 2011). Small targets with lower profitability and growth opportunities tend to be risky, since 
they may need more of bidders’ efforts in integration process. At the deal level, the methods of 
payment, deal types and deal attitude that have a significant impact on M&A decisions addressed in 
the M&A literature were taken into consideration (Croci and Petmezas, 2015; Schneider and Spalt, 
2015).  
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A summary statistics for the M&A deal sample was presented in Table 5.1. Of 2,018 acquisitions, 
773 were all-cash financed acquisitions, 632 were all-stock financed acquisitions, and 581 were 
mixed acquisitions (financed with a mixture of cash and stocks).84 There was a relative smaller 
proportion of tender offers as opposed to mergers: 530 and 1,488, hostile acquisitions (129) and 
diversified acquisitions (661), and there is a larger proportion of successful acquisitions as compared 
with unsuccessful acquisitions: 1593 and 398.   
 
A summary statistics for variables used in regressions was presented in Table 5.2, with variable 
definitions are as in the note of this table. As seen, bidders are generally larger, with higher 
profitability and greater growth opportunities than targets. In public acquisitions, bidders are those 
with larger size and greater power than targets, so that they are capable of managing the deals 
following a merger. These findings are consistent with previous M&A studies (Moeller et al., 2004; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998).  
  
In Table 5.3, the whole sample was divided into risky and less risky acquisition subsamples according 
to the riskiness level of the target firm, the definition of which is by Kumar (2009). The mean, median 
and statistical differences between the two subsamples was presented in this table. Kumar (2009) 
suggests that firms with a lower price and higher firm-specific risks display higher levels of risks, 
increasing the riskiness of M&A decisions (Schneider and Spalt, 2015). Similarly, risky acquisitions 
refer to those with a target whose idiosyncratic volatility is above the median value of the sample, 
and whose price is below the median value of the sample (i.e. target price), while less risky 
                                                          
84 The method of payment for 32 acquisitions is defined as “other” according to Thomson One.   
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acquisitions refer to the opposite. As seen, bidders engaging in risky acquisitions have a larger 
deviation of the current price from the 52-week high price than those engaging in less risky 
acquisitions: 0.423 to 0.172, implying that firms perceived as losses are likely to increase risks in the 
major investments. Risky acquisitions involve a smaller bidder with lower ROA, growth 
opportunities, and leverage. One possible explanation for this is that small bidders are more 
vulnerable, which push managers to eliminate threats through risk-taking activity (Gorton et al., 
2009). The statistics also reveal that bidders in the risky acquisition subsample are likely to control 
risks by choosing a smaller target than those in the less risky acquisition subsample, based on the 
rationale that those smaller targets are less overvalued.     
 
5.4.2. Methodology 
5.4.2.1. Target risks and the bidder 52-week high 
Target idiosyncratic volatility was measured with standard deviation of residuals computed from a 
Fama and French 5-factor model using daily returns from the period of 6 months to 1 month prior to 
the announcement date. Fama-French 5-factor returns were collected from the French’s website. 
Compared with a 3-factor model, the 5-factor model controls for additional profitability and 
investment factors that have an substantial impact on major investment decisions (Fama and French, 
2015),85 which is presented as follows: 
 
1 2 3 4 5( )i f m f iR R R R SMB HML RMW CMA                                                            (5.1)                             
 
                                                          
85 Schneider and Spalt (2015) used a Fama-French 3-factor model, whereas Kumer (2009) used the 4-factor model to 
obtain idiosyncratic volatility. The results obtained in this chapter are similar when calculating target idiosyncratic 
volatility with these two models.  
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where 
iR  relates to the individual firm returns, fR  relates to risk-free returns, relates to returns on 
value-weighted (VW) market portfolio, SMB  HML  RMW  CMA  relate to returns on diversified 
portfolios of small stocks minus big stocks, high B/M stocks minus low B/M stocks, strong 
profitability stocks minus weak profitability stocks, and stocks of low investment firms minus stocks 
of high investment firms, respectively. i  relates to the residuals of the model.  
  
Target idiosyncratic volatility was then calculated with the standard deviation of 
i , denotes iiv  in 
equation (2). 
 
2
1
n
i
i
iiv
N



                                                                                                                                        (5.2)    
                                                                                 
Finally, target risks are a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the target is above the median value of 
its idiosyncratic volatility and below the median value of its price ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date, whereas the price was expressed in a logarithmic term. Kumar (2009) indicates 
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility indicate that extreme returns occurred in the past are highly 
likely occur again, and “cheap bets” are more attractive to investors with the risk-taking incentives. 
Therefore, M&A decisions are risky if the target displays a higher level of idiosyncratic volatility and 
a lower level of price.    
 
The main variable of interest to be assessed is the bidder reference point (BRP), which is constructed 
as follows: 
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, , 30ln 52 lni i t i tBRP weekhighprice Stockprice                                                                                    (5.3)                                   
 
where the 
iBRP  is defined as logarithmic term differences between the bidder highest stock price over 
335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the price ending 30 days prior 
to the announcement date. Scaling the bidder price on 30 days prior to takeover announcement 
eliminates any concerns regarding price information leakage around the announcement date biases 
the actual stock price.  
 
5.4.2.2. Short-term method 
Bidder announcement returns were calculated with the market model, with parameters were estimated 
over a period 261 up to 28 trading days prior to the takeover announcement date and a 3-day event 
window is used.  
 
1it mt itR R                                                                                                                              (5.4)                                                                                    
 
where 
itR  denotes holding period returns (CRSP: RET) for firm i in the period t, mtR  denotes value-
weighted market returns including dividends (CRSP: VWRETD), 
it  denotes the error term. 
 
5.4.2.3. Long-term method 
Following Loughran and Vijh (1997) , the firm’s long-term performance was calculated with the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). It should be expected that the outcome of 
decisions to be only assessed in the long term. A firm’s 36-month BHARs were calculated with the 
following equation: 
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where itR  denotes arithmetic returns for firm i on day t. ,index tR  denotes the arithmetic return for the 
market index on day t. Bootstrapping test was employed to deal with skewness, and the details of this 
test was presented in the methodology section of the Chapter 4.  
 
5.4.2.4. Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis was used to examine the relevant factors that have impacts on bidder 
announcement returns (Draper and Paudyal, 2008), which is presented as follows:  
 
( 1, 1) 1
1
N
i i i i
i
CAR BRP X    

                                                                                                 (5.6)  
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BHAR BRP X    

                                                                                             (5.7)       
                                                             
where ( 1, 1)CAR    relate to bidder cumulative returns of a day prior to and a day after the announcement 
date, ( 1, 36)BHAR    refer to market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to 36 months following 
acquisitions. The main variable to be assessed is the BRP. iX  relate to a series of control variables 
that have a significant impact on bidder announcement returns in M&A literature (Moeller et al., 
2004; Alexandridis et al., 2013).  
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5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1. Does market anticipation affect M&A decisions? 
Table 5.4 presents the logistic regression model of the market anticipation on managerial investment 
decisions. The results this researcher obtained show a positive relationship between the BRP and 
target risks. Specifically, specification (5) shows that the BRP coefficient is positive and significant 
at 1% level (coefficient 1.259, p = 0.000). This coefficient was translated into marginal effect, and 
presented alongside Specification (5), yielding similar interpretation of OLS regression. It is therefore 
interpreted as that for every 10% increase in the BRP increases a 2.2% likelihood of the firm choosing 
a risky target rather than a less risky target. The signs of control variables are generally consistent 
with the earlier predictions of this chapter. The goodness-of-fit tests show that logistic regression 
model has no specification errors (p = 0.890). 86  The principal results continue to hold when 
accounting for different sets of control variables, including deal, bidder and target characteristics, as 
reported from specifications (1) to (4) respectively, and all regressions control for year and industry 
effects.87  
 
The results for specification (5) indicate that the firm makes major corporate investment decisions 
according to market-anticipated risks, which is interpreted with the reference point theory of M&As. 
Specifically, the market tends to treat the firm 52-week high price as bidder’s potential profitability 
and feel mental losses when its current price is significantly deviated from this aspiration level. This 
increases their risk tolerance and pushes the firm to take risks. According to what the prospect theory 
predicts (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998), investors holding losers would presumably 
                                                          
86 The null hypothesis posits that the model has no specification error. The test results lead us not to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
87 Our results are also consistent when controlling for firm-fixed effect.  
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believe that the firm can generate future profitability via embarking on risky projects. If the firm 
responds to the market correctly, the market confirms the belief that the firm works in favour of 
shareholders’ interests. On the other hand, managers are also subject to take more risks especially the 
firm’s performance is temporarily depressed (Kim et al., 2013). The reference point enables the firm 
to justify their risk-taking behaviour without bearing market’s blame (Sacheti et al., 2016). The firm 
will also take risks to maintain the confidence of shareholders. The firm persuades shareholders that 
current losses will be realised through decisions the market anticipates. Findings can be also 
interpreted as the disciplinary effect of takeover: acquiring risky targets will also expose managers to 
shareholder monitoring, which threatens managers’ job security when they perform below the 
market’s anticipation (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). By following the market’s anticipation, managers can 
release pressure from making major investment decisions.  
 
5.5.2. Do market-anticipated risks create value?  
Thus far, the author has examined that M&A decisions are influenced by what the market has 
anticipated. In this section, there follows an investigation of the bidder performance whether the firm 
takes risks that the market anticipates. There are a variety of sources driving the manager to take 
unanticipated risks, such as managerial overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) or agency 
problems (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), which may mask the true effect of risks on bidders’ M&A 
performance. It is expected that if the firm that takes risks with a rational motive will be rewarded by 
the market. So as to disentangle the effect of expected risks from the unexpected risks, an interaction 
variable using target risks and the bidder reference point was contructed, with the expectation that 
targets risks positively related to bidders’ announcement returns on the condition that the firm takes 
risks according to what the market anticipates.  
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Table 5.5 presents OLS regressions of bidder announcement returns. Specifications (1) and (2) show 
the effects of target risks and the bidder reference point on bidder announcement returns, respectively. 
It emerged that either target risks or the BRP alone does not have an impact on bidder announcement 
returns. While specification (3) shows a significantly positive relationship between the joint effect of 
target risks and the bidder reference point on bidder announcement returns, suggesting that target 
risks can predict bidder’s performance when a bidder’s decision is made according to the market 
anticipation. In addition, the results indicate that either target risks or the bidder reference point tend 
to decrease bidder announcement returns. On the whole, the findings are consistent with the 
prediction that firms taking risks observed by the market will receive positive market reactions.  
 
5.5.3. What is the source of bidder performance improvement? 
Since the manager is also exposed to the strict shareholders’ monitoring when taking risks that the 
market can observe. Managers will attempt to prove themselves as “good managers” in order to avoid 
market disappointment (Luo, 2005). According to this, it is believed that managers wish their efforts 
to be easily seen by the market. In this case, there is an expectation that managers will exhibit great 
efforts on deal negotiation, reflected in offer premiums they pay for the target, in that the offer 
premium determines the wealth distribution of the shareholders.    
 
Table 5.6 presents results of OLS regressions of offer premiums. As seen, specification (3) of this 
table shows that both target risks and the bidder reference point will increase offer premiums. Bidders 
may find targets with greater uncertainty are hard to value or currently underperformed bidders have 
less bargaining power and pay hefty offer premiums to target shareholders accordingly. However, the 
joint effect of target risks and the bidder reference point decreases offer premiums significantly 
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(coefficient -0.0856, p = 0.000). These findings are consistent with our hypothesis suggesting that 
managers will have a direct incentive to decrease offer premiums to show negotiation skills or efforts 
to the market. The findings of this table suggest that the primary M&A motive of managers to deal 
with pressures of a decline in performance is to content their shareholders. 
 
5.5.4. Do market-anticipated risks push the firm to work hard? 
It cannot be expected that the market can fully understand the firm’s decisions in the short run, as 
uncertainty prevents the market from assessing the quality of decisions until they are gradually 
resolved in the long term. This leads the research to investigate the market-anticipated risks effect on 
the firm’s long-term performance.  
 
Results of Table 5.7 report that either target risks or the bidder reference point is positively associated 
with the long-term performance, presented in specifications (1) and (2). It should be expected that 
target risks are influenced by the bidder reference point as the firm makes decisions based on the 
market. As such, an interactive term between target risks and the bidder reference point was 
constructed, and presented in specification (3). Results show that effects of these two independent 
variables on bidder’s long-term performance diminish when including an interaction variable 
between target risks and the bidder reference point. The joint effect of target risks and the bidder 
reference point increases with bidder’s long-term performance. These findings suggest that each 
individual factor partially explains bidder’s long-term performance and has a substantial impact on 
each other. The firm gains positive market reactions in the long term when the firm enhances the 
confidence of shareholders. Furthermore, it is suggested that managers will be rewarded when their 
efforts are recognised.  
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5.6. Robustness checks 
5.6.1. Various reference point candidates based on firm level. 
The robustness checks in this chapter analysed the reference point effect on target risks using a series 
of other reference points addressed in previous literature, as presented in Panel A of Table 5.8. First, 
the firm’s historical high was used as a reference point, with the expectation that bidder historical 
high plays a role in firm’s corporate investment decision-making. A firm’s historical high reflects 
investors’ attentions over a longer period of time relative to the 52-week high, and is regarded as a 
reference point candidate for conservative investors (Li and Yu, 2012). Results in specification (1) 
show a positive relationship between bidder historical high and target risks, suggesting that 
conservatism investors also expect the firm to take risks when it faces a decline in performance. 
Secondly, a recent ratio was employed as a proxy for investors’ attention, which measures risk-taking 
timing for the market and the measure is similar to Bhootra and Hur (2013). The measure is 
constructed as 1 minus the number of days since the firm’s 52-week highest stock price arrives 
divided by 365 days. Larger of the ratio indicates that the 52-week high arrives more recently. It 
should be expected that events occurred in the recent past are more attractive to the market than 
occurred in the far distant. If this is the case, the firm should be reluctant to embark on risky 
acquisitions when the firm’s best performance recently arrives than in the far distant, since the best 
performance arrives more recently will likely to compensate market’s feelings about loss and increase 
the attitude of risk aversion. Our results are consistent with the prediction and presented in 
specification (2). Thirdly, the prior market reaction was used as a reference point, taking value of 1 
if prior market reaction is negative, and 0 if it is positive. If managerial risk-taking is driven by the 
market, current market reaction to losses will induce the firm to take on risky projects. Results in 
specification (3) show that prior market losses trigger risk-taking behaviour. Finally, it is expected 
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that managers are more risk averse than their shareholders as Kumar (2009) suggested. Using prior 
ROA relative to current ROA of a firm as a reference point, taking value of 1 if current ROA is lower 
than that of the last year, 0 otherwise. It became apparent that ROA has no predictability for risk-
taking, as presented in specification (4). It can be interpreted as follows: managers are insensitive to 
current fundamental loss; instead, they make decisions heavily upon market reactions. Overall, it was 
found that the bidder 52-week high has the greatest predictability for risk-taking after controlling for 
all relevant reference point candidates, as presented in specification (5).  
 
Results of Table 5.9 show other reference points that influence managerial risk-taking incentives. 
First, the market 52-week high was used as a reference point candidate. Baker et al. (2012) suggest 
that the market returns are an important influential factor for the firm 52-week high. The firm’s overall 
risk-profile changes according to the market condition. If the market risk is high, both the market and 
the firm may believe that risk-taking is granted. Results of specification (1) show that the market 52-
week high is positively related to target risks, at 10% significance level. Secondly, peer pressure was 
used as a proxy, which reflects the firms’ pressure from their industry peers. An increase in peers’ 
pressure increases a firm’s risk-taking incentive. According to Edmans et al. (2012), managers whose 
firms currently underperform, compared with their peers in the same industry, tend to have 
considerable pressures that trigger them to take more risks. Following this, a measurement of peer 
pressure was constructed using the logarithmic term differences between the bidder 52-week high 
and the 52-week high of the industry medians, depicting the extent to which a firm’s performance 
below that of the industry’s median, taking value of 1 if the firm performs below the industry 52-
week high median, 0 otherwise. It is expected that managers feel pressures from their industry peers 
when their firms perform significantly lower than the industry median. As seen, specification (2) 
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shows a positive relationship between peer pressure and target risks. Once again, the significance and 
sign of the bidder 52-week high does not change when including both the market 52-week high and 
peer pressure in specification (3), suggesting that the bidder 52-week high is a competent reference 
point candidate being used to anticipate the firm’s following investment decisions.  
 
5.6.2. Subsample tests 
The results are robust in different subsamples by the methods of payment, deal types, whether the 
deal is diversified and whether the deal is successful, as presented in Table 5.10. However, it was 
noted that the reference point effect is not pronounced among all-stock financed acquisition and 
diversified acquisition subsamples. One possible explanation for this is that all-stock financed 
acquisitions have those financially constrained bidders whose investment opportunities are limited 
(Eckbo et al., 2016), while acquiring diversified targets may create obstacles for shareholders, as it is 
hard for the market to judge whether the firm is able to manage in an unfamiliar area of industry.  
 
5.6.3. Alternative proxies for target risks 
Following Schneider and Spalt (2015), M&A riskiness was also measured with the target 
idiosyncratic risk and conducted with an OLS regression of target idiosyncratic risk on the bidder 
reference point. Results of specification (1) of Table 5.11 measures target risks with total volatility, 
which is employed by Kumar et al. (2015). Specification (2) measures target risks whose residuals 
were obtained from the market model. Specification (3) measures target risks whose residuals were 
obtained from Fama-French 4-factor model, which is consistent with the measure of Kumar (2009). 
It was evident that there is a positive relationship between the bidder reference point and target risks. 
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In addition, the residuals obtained from the market model and the 4-factor model do not vary 
significantly when used for target risks.      
  
5.6.4. Risk-taking and M&A performance 
Results that the market-anticipated risks taken by the firm increase bidders’ short- and long-term 
abnormal returns continue to hold by different estimation models or window periods selected. Table 
5.12 reports the relationship between bidder announcement returns and the market-anticipated risks. 
The first three specifications measure bidder announcement returns with the market model and uses 
a 5-day window while the last three specifications measure bidder announcement returns with the 
market-adjusted model with a 3-day window. A positive relationship was found between bidder 
announcement returns and the market-anticipated risks, as reflected in specifications (3) and (6) 
respectively. Once again, the results show that the firm takes risks according to the market’s 
anticipation gain rewards. Table 5.13 shows the relationship between the long-term performance and 
the market-anticipated risks. 12- and 24-month windows were used as robustness checks for the 36-
month window of BHARs. The results obtained in this table show that the market-anticipated risks 
are positively related with bidders’ long-term performance, which are consistent with the results 
reported in Table 5.7.       
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, this researcher investigates how market anticipation influences firms’ M&A decisions, 
and the effect of market-anticipated risks on M&A outcomes. It became evident that perceived loss 
measured by the extent to which the deviation of the current price to the firm 52-week high price 
triggers managerial risk-taking incentives. Market-anticipated risks lead to positive bidder 
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announcement returns, which can be interpreted as managerial great efforts on deal negotiation. 
Managers who take risks according to the market risk perspective will increase the managerial 
incentive of proving themselves good decision-makers. By doing so, managers work smart and 
diligent, reflected in lower offer premiums they pay for the targets and positive market reactions in 
the long term.   
 
This chapter contributes to managerial risk-taking incentives and behavioural finance literature. It 
was found that the risk-taking preference of individual investors can be transferred to that of 
institutional investors through M&As. The market anticipates firm’s next move, and the firm’s market 
decision should be rationalised by shareholders. It became apparent that the market anticipation is a 
practice for the firm to follow in order to gain positive market reactions. In addition, though it is hard 
to explain whether risk-taking incentive gains market recognition, managers taking risks according 
to the market anticipation serves one of the important sources for positive market reactions. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics for M&A sample  
This table reports summary statistics for 2018 U.S. domestic public acquisitions announced between 1985 and 2014. The 
number N denotes the number of deals per year. The third and fourth columns present mean and median of deal value. 
The fifth to the seventh columns present the method of payment. Here “Stock” refers to all-stock acquisitions. “Cash” 
refers to all-cash acquisitions. “Mix” refers to acquisitions that neither all-stocks nor all-cash acquisitions. “Tender” refers 
to tender offers. “Diversified” refers to diversified deals in which the primary two Standard Industry Classification codes 
are different between bidders and targets. “Hostile” refers to hostile deals. “Successful” refers to whether deals are 
completed during the sample period, there are 1991 deals with information about deal status.  
Year N Deal Value ($ mil) Payment Methods Tender  Diversified Hostile Successful 
    Mean Median Cash Stock Mix Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1985 15 325.85  30.80  6 3 2 9 6 2 13 1 14 6 3 
1986 21 225.92  61.20  14 2 3 12 9 9 12 1 20 15 3 
1987 33 690.41  66.00  15 7 10 12 21 14 19 5 28 27 4 
1988 40 986.62  116.10  18 11 10 20 20 12 28 6 34 23 15 
1989 38 209.58  86.95  21 11 6 11 27 14 24 1 37 26 8 
1990 29 481.63  21.60  15 8 5 11 18 9 20 3 26 20 8 
1991 37 102.29  26.82  9 18 4 13 24 15 22 - 37 26 8 
1992 21 136.98  40.26  6 12 2 5 16 8 13 2 19 14 6 
1993 45 515.02  93.60  14 16 14 10 35 18 27 5 40 30 14 
1994 52 260.96  86.95  13 30 8 10 42 14 38 7 45 37 14 
1995 92 572.47  88.67  17 54 19 15 77 36 56 6 86 73 16 
1996 89 726.33  157.54  19 44 26 20 69 30 59 6 83 74 15 
1997 133 633.15  217.88  23 60 50 24 109 46 87 3 130 111 22 
1998 141 1186.73  140.99  35 56 49 31 110 44 97 3 138 126 15 
1999 163 1505.82  304.21  58 58 46 45 118 67 96 14 149 131 32 
2000 137 2388.55  352.84  30 69 37 31 106 49 88 6 131 113 24 
2001 115 1052.84  111.58  35 42 38 26 89 39 76 5 110 96 19 
2002 52 1665.40  222.40  22 13 17 14 38 17 35 4 48 47 5 
2003 77 755.08  126.23  32 17 28 23 54 19 58 5 72 67 10 
2004 72 2678.95  438.18  29 17 26 9 63 22 50 3 69 64 8 
2005 75 2535.13  327.64  36 13 26 16 59 26 49 5 70 61 14 
2006 88 2444.81  509.29  49 14 25 16 72 31 57 4 84 72 16 
2007 67 1319.47  686.22  44 6 17 21 46 17 50 2 65 51 16 
2008 63 1990.04  230.27  39 7 16 24 39 13 50 10 53 39 24 
2009 53 2912.25  268.89  18 13 20 19 34 17 36 - 53 47 6 
2010 61 1719.53  440.71  35 9 14 18 43 14 47 5 56 47 14 
2011 48 2334.53  546.40  21 8 18 13 35 12 36 9 39 28 20 
2012 43 1258.88  606.27  29 3 11 12 31 19 24 - 43 40 3 
2013 54 1703.16  781.04  38 3 11 20 34 13 41 3 51 38 16 
2014 64 5140.02  1224.41  33 8 23 20 44 15 49 5 59 44 20 
Total 2018 1488.04  210.11  773 632 581 530 1488 661 1357 129 1889 1593 398 
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for variables 
This table presents the numbers, means, medians, and standard deviations of variables. Target idiosyncratic volatility is 
defined as the standard deviation of the residuals computed from a Fama-French 5 factor model using daily returns from 
the period of 6 months to 1 month prior to the announcement date. Target price is target stock price ending 30 days prior 
to the announcement date, expressed in logarithmic term. Bidder 52-week high is defined as logarithmic term difference 
between the bidder highest stock price over 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date and the 
price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. Bidder 3-day CARs are bidder cumulative abnormal returns 3 days 
around the announcement date calculated with market model, whose parameters are estimated using the period of 261 
days to 28 days prior to the announcement date. BHAR36ma refers to 36-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns. Deal characteristics include stock, cash, diversification, hostile, and tender offer which are dummy variables, 
taking value of 1 if acquisitions are 100% financed with stocks, 100% financed with cash, diversified merger, hostile 
merger, and tender offer, and 0 otherwise. Deal value is raw value taken from Thomson One. “Relative Size” is defined 
as deal value divided by bidder MV. Firm characteristics include both bidder and target firm characteristics. MV is defined 
as the product of market price and outstanding shares (CRSP: SHROUT*PRC), expressed in logarithmic form. MTBV is 
market-to-book value, defined as market equity to book equity, where book equity is total shareholders’ equity (Compustat: 
SEQ) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat: TXDITC) minus the preferred stock redemption value 
(Compustat: PSTKRV). ROA is return-on-asset ratio, defined as net income (Compustat: NI) divided by total asset 
(Compustat: AT). Leverage is measured by debt-to-equity ratio, defined as total long-term debt (Compustat: DITT) 
divided by book equity. Other variables are those mainly used in robustness checks. Offer premiums are defined as 
logarithmic term difference between offer price and target price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. Bidder 
historical high is defined as logarithmic term difference between bidder highest stock price ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date and the price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. Recency ratio is defined as 1 minus the 
number of days divided by 365 days. Market 52-week high is defined as the logarithmic term difference between the 
highest total market value (CRSP: TOTVAL) over the 335 calendar days ending 30 days prior to the announcement date 
and the total market value 30 days prior to the announcement date. Peer pressure is defined as the difference between the 
bidder 52-week high and the bidder 52-week high of the industry median. Prior market loss is a dummy variable, taking 
value of 1 if the firm’s market returns calculated from 365 calendar days before announcement date to 28 calendar days 
before takeover announcement date is positive, 0 otherwise. Prior ROA loss is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the 
firm’s current year’s ROA is less than the past year, 0 otherwise. All accounting variables were at the fiscal year prior to 
the announcement date, and continuous variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 5.2. (continued) 
Variable Mean Median N 
Main variables    
Target idiosyncratic volatility 0.040  0.033  2018 
Target stock price 2.253  2.409  2018 
Bidder 52-week high 0.308  0.165  2018 
Bidder CAR3 -0.005  -0.005  2018 
Bidder BHAR36m -0.075  -0.159  1867 
Offer premiums 0.304  0.286  1869 
Deal characteristics    
Deal value 1488.040  210.113 2018 
Cash 0.383  - 2018 
Stock 0.313  - 2018 
Hostile 0.064  - 2018 
Tender 0.263  - 2018 
Diversification 0.328  - 2018 
Relative size 0.429  0.214  2018 
Bidder characteristics    
Bidder MV 7.227  7.200  2018 
Bidder M/B 3.989  2.536  2018 
Bidder ROA 0.018  0.046  2018 
Bidder leverage 0.638  0.314  2018 
Target characteristics    
Target MV 5.173  5.080  2018 
Target M/B 2.649  1.767  2018 
Target ROA -0.053  0.024  2018 
Target leverage 0.622  0.151  2018 
Other variables    
Bidder historical high 0.919  0.711  2018 
Bidder recency ratio 0.564  0.613  2018 
Market 52-week high 0.062  0.025  2018 
Peer pressure 0.114  -0.022  2018 
Prior market loss 0.379  - 2018 
Prior ROA loss 0.457  - 2018 
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Table 5.3: Risky and less risky acquisition sample 
This table presents summary statistics for two subsamples by the median value of target idiosyncratic volatility and target 
price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date, expressed in logarithmic term. “Risky acquisitions” refer to targets 
that are above the median value of their idiosyncratic volatility and below the median value of their stock price, whereas 
“Less risky acquisitions” indicate the opposite. Means and medians of the two subsamples are reported, the number of 
observations are reported at the lower part of the table. Median values of dummy variables are omitted as they do not 
have any statistical meaning. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. Statistical tests for differences in means, 
and medians between the two samples are presented. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% 
level, 5% level, 10% level, denoted ***, **, and * respectively.  
Variables 
 
(1) 
Risky acquisitions  
 
  
(2) 
Less risky acquisitions  
  
 
Difference (1)-(2) 
  Mean Median N   Mean Median N   Mean p-value Median  p-value 
Bidder 52-week high 0.465  0.308  746  0.216  0.120  1272  0.000 0.000 
Bidder CAR3 -0.004  -0.007  746  -0.006  -0.004  1272   0.553 0.765 
Bidder BHAR36ma -0.069  -0.280  699  -0.079  -0.114  1168  0.813 0.001 
Offer premiums 0.383  0.400  661  0.262  0.258  1208  0.000  0.000 
Bidder size 6.132  5.896  746  7.870  7.824  1272  0.000 0.000 
Bidder M/B 3.581  2.450  746  4.228  2.607  1272  0.027 0.001 
Bidder ROA -0.025  0.039  746  0.043  0.049  1272  0.000 0.000 
Bidder leverage 0.506  0.173  746  0.714  0.398  1272  0.001 0.000 
Target size 3.609  3.580  746  6.090  5.986  1272  0.000 0.000 
Target M/B 1.912  1.229  746  3.082  2.076  1272  0.000 0.000 
Target ROA -0.168  -0.045  746  0.015  0.040  1272  0.000 0.000 
Target leverage 0.523  0.043  746  0.679  0.241  1272   0.039 0.000 
Hostile 0.047  - 746  0.074  - 1272  0.017 - 
Tender 0.252  - 746  0.269  - 1272  0.406 - 
Diversification 0.362  - 746  0.307  - 1272   0.012 - 
Stock 0.389  - 746  0.269  - 1272  0.000 - 
Cash 0.355  - 746  0.399  - 1272  0.049 - 
Relative size 0.372  0.182  746   0.462  0.234  1272    0.001 0.000 
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Table 5.4: Reference point effect on M&A decisions 
This table presents results of logistic regressions of target risk on bidder 52-week high. Dependent variable is a 
dummy variable, taking value of 1 if targets that are above the median value of their idiosyncratic volatility and 
below the median value of their stock price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date. Specifications (1) to 
(4) present results with different sets of variables, including deal, bidder and target characteristics respectively, 
and specification (5) controls for all of these variables. All regressions include year and industry effect whose 
coefficients are omitted. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses, 
marginal effect for specification (5) is reported alongside coefficients. Goodness-of-fit test is reported at the lower 
part of the table. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, 10% level, denoted ***, **, and * respectively.  
Dep. var. Target risks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
Bidder 52-week high 1.602*** 1.673*** 1.273*** 1.237*** 1.259*** 0.223  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Hostile  -0.350 -0.221 0.171 0.183    0.032  
  (0.122) (0.372) (0.567) (0.540)     
Tender  -0.149 -0.428*** -0.031 0.021    0.004  
  (0.273) (0.007) (0.865) (0.907)     
Diversification  0.225** 0.584*** 0.251 0.175    0.031  
  (0.045) (0.000) (0.116) (0.292)     
Stock  0.066 -0.248 -0.020 0.030    0.005  
  (0.643) (0.116) (0.920) (0.885)     
Cash  0.115 0.009 -0.525*** -0.553*** -0.098  
  (0.430) (0.958) (0.008) (0.006)     
Relative size  -0.313*** -1.365*** -0.053 0.150    0.027  
  (0.004) (0.000) (0.748) (0.461)     
Bidder MV   -0.559***  0.107*   0.019  
   (0.000)  (0.062)     
Bidder M/B   -0.011  -0.007    -0.001  
   (0.253)  (0.528)     
Bidder ROA   -0.768*  -0.034    -0.006  
   (0.093)  (0.954)     
Bidder leverage   0.027  -0.006    -0.001  
   (0.617)  (0.937)     
Target MV    -1.406*** -1.501*** -0.266  
    (0.000) (0.000)     
Target M/B    -0.045** -0.043**  -0.008  
    (0.023) (0.031)     
Target ROA    -2.376*** -2.290*** -0.406  
    (0.000) (0.000)     
Target leverage    0.046 0.046    0.008  
    (0.356) (0.352)     
Year & Industry Y Y Y Y Y  
Constant -2.496*** -2.441*** 2.550*** 5.997*** 5.698***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
N 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018     
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.171 0.301 0.517 0.518     
Pearson chi (2) X2=1885.56 (p = 0.890)         
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Table 5.5: OLS regressions of bidder CARs on market-anticipated risks 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of bidder announcement returns on target risk. We include an 
interaction variable between target risk and bidder 52-week high in specification (3). Variable definitions are as 
in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 
10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
Bidder CAR3 (1) (2) (3)    
Target risks -0.0024  -0.0148*** 
 (0.553)  (0.003)    
Bidder 52-week high  0.0044 -0.0180**  
  (0.485) (0.042)    
Target risks*Bidder 52-week high   0.0373*** 
   (0.002)    
Hostile -0.0104* -0.0103* -0.0106*   
 (0.086) (0.088) (0.078)    
Tender 0.0153*** 0.0151*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Diversification 0.0010 0.0007 0.0012    
 (0.778) (0.855) (0.742)    
Stock -0.0082* -0.0085* -0.0077    
 (0.095) (0.081) (0.114)    
Cash 0.0298*** 0.0298*** 0.0296*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Relative size -0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0033    
 (0.599) (0.652) (0.492)    
Bidder MV -0.0055*** -0.0051*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder M/B -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003    
 (0.319) (0.299) (0.371)    
Bidder ROA 0.0435** 0.0464*** 0.0506*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.003)    
Bidder leverage 0.0011 0.0012 0.0010    
 (0.448) (0.407) (0.502)    
Constant 0.0238*** 0.0191** 0.0273*** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.003)    
N 2018 2018 2018    
R2 0.092 0.092 0.098 
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Table 5.6: Whether market-anticipated risks increase offer premiums? 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of offer premiums on market anticipation driven risks. Offer 
premiums are defined as the logarithmic difference between the offer price and the target price 30 days prior to 
the takeover announcement date, which is the same as Baker et al. (2012). Bidder 52-week high is the bidder 
reference point (BRP), target risks is the dummy variable, taking value of 1 if targets are above the median value 
of their idiosyncratic volatility and below the median value of their stock price, 0 otherwise. The first regression 
presents results of offer premiums on target risk, the second regression presents results of offer premiums on 
bidder 52-week high, and the third regression presents results of offer premiums on market anticipation driven 
risks, which is an interaction variable between target risk and bidder 52-week high. Control variables in this panel 
are as the same as those in specification (5) of Table 5.4. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-
value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** 
and * respectively. 
Offer premiums (1) (2) (3)    
Target risks 0.0615***  0.0803*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)    
Bidder 52-week high  0.0544** 0.0958*** 
  (0.016) (0.000)    
Target risks*Bidder 52-week high  -0.0856**  
   (0.041)    
Hostile 0.0379* 0.0398* 0.0383*   
 (0.076) (0.064) (0.072)    
Tender 0.0747*** 0.0727*** 0.0711*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Diversification -0.0227* -0.0227* -0.0228*   
 (0.094) (0.096) (0.092)    
Stock 0.0138 0.0110 0.0087    
 (0.435) (0.534) (0.622)    
Cash -0.0265 -0.0296* -0.0259    
 (0.104) (0.069) (0.111)    
Relative size 0.1499*** 0.1491*** 0.1477*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder MV 0.0736*** 0.0752*** 0.0736*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder M/B 0.0013 0.0012 0.0011    
 (0.346) (0.398) (0.415)    
Bidder ROA -0.1001 -0.0892 -0.0951    
 (0.124) (0.170) (0.149)    
Bidder leverage -0.0061 -0.0056 -0.0051    
 (0.268) (0.318) (0.354)    
Target MV -0.0883*** -0.0967*** -0.0874*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Target M/B -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0003    
 (0.986) (0.871) (0.862)    
Target ROA 0.1388*** 0.1277*** 0.1397*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)    
Target leverage -0.0072* -0.0077* -0.0071    
 (0.098) (0.080) (0.103)    
Constant 0.1425*** 0.1834*** 0.1206*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)    
N 1869 1869 1869    
R2 0.163 0.162 0.169    
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Table 5.7: Do market-anticipated risks push the firm to work hard? 
This table presents results of OLS regression of bidder BHARs on target risk. BHARs are calculated with the 
market-adjusted model. We include an interaction variable between target risk and bidder 52-week high in 
specification (3). Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
BHAR36m (1) (2) (3)    
Target risks 0.1078**  -0.0310    
 (0.025)  (0.621)    
Bidder 52-week high  0.1900*** -0.0513    
  (0.006) (0.491)    
Target risks*Bidder 52-week high  0.3571*** 
   (0.004)    
Hostile 0.1262 0.1230 0.1200    
 (0.172) (0.180) (0.188)    
Tender 0.0405 0.0229 0.0308    
 (0.387) (0.622) (0.507)    
Diversification -0.0789* -0.0716* -0.0788**  
 (0.050) (0.070) (0.050)    
Stock -0.1631*** -0.1730*** -0.1655*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    
Cash -0.0016 0.0001 -0.0014    
 (0.973) (0.998) (0.977)    
Relative size 0.0684 0.0446 0.0557    
 (0.162) (0.351) (0.262)    
Bidder MV 0.0220** 0.0164* 0.0232**  
 (0.034) (0.093) (0.023)    
Bidder M/B -0.0118*** -0.0120*** -0.0117*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder ROA 0.5056*** 0.5511*** 0.6084*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder leverage 0.0139 0.0160 0.0160    
 (0.394) (0.331) (0.332)    
Constant -0.2137** -0.1769* -0.2090**  
 (0.030) (0.053) (0.034)    
N 1867 1867 1867    
R2 0.038 0.042 0.048    
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Table 5.8: Robustness tests: Various reference candidates in relation to the firm level 
This table presents results of logistic regressions of target risk on selected reference point candidates. Dependent 
variable is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if targets are above the median values of their idiosyncratic 
volatility and below the median value of their stock price ending 30 days prior to the announcement date, 0 
otherwise. Control variables are the same as those in specification (5) of Table 5.3. Bidder historical high refers 
to the extent to which the current stock price deviated from the firm’s highest stock price, measured with 
logarithmic term difference between the firm’s historical high and its current price. We collected all U.S. listed 
firms whose stock price between 1958 and 2014 based on data availability. Bidder recency ratio is defined as the 
days since the firm’s 52-week high arrives, measured with 1 minus the number of days since the firm’s 52-week 
highest stock price arrives divided by 365 days. Prior market loss and prior ROA loss is dummy variables, taking 
value of 1 if the firm’s market reaction (ROA) is lower than that of the past year, 0 otherwise. Specification (1) 
presents results of target risks on bidder historical high. Specification (2) presents results of target risks on bidder 
recency ratio. Specification (3) presents results of target risks on bidder prior market loss. Specification (4) 
presents results of target risks on bidder ROA loss. Specification (5) presents results of target risks on bidder 52-
week high (BRP), controlling for those reference point candidates as well as those standard variables highlighted 
in the M&A literature. Control variables in each regression are the same as those in specification (5) of Table 5.4. 
Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively.  
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Table 5.8. (continued) 
 Logit model. Target risks (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bidder historical high 0.434***    0.197 
 (0.000)    (0.115) 
Bidder recency ratio  -0.694***   -0.011 
  (0.002)   (0.969) 
Prior market loss   0.464***  0.154 
   (0.003)  (0.411) 
Prior ROA loss    0.104 0.075 
    (0.468) (0.608) 
Bidder 52-week high     0.997*** 
     (0.000) 
Hostile 0.263 0.225 0.194 0.169 0.218 
 (0.400) (0.464) (0.525) (0.591) (0.468) 
Tender 0.015 0.081 0.092 0.103 0.002 
 (0.933) (0.655) (0.612) (0.572) (0.992) 
Diversification 0.127 0.176 0.167 0.179 0.150 
 (0.439) (0.282) (0.309) (0.277) (0.364) 
Stock 0.088 0.041 0.104 0.078 0.054 
 (0.669) (0.844) (0.614) (0.703) (0.795) 
Cash -0.557*** -0.611*** -0.581*** -0.555*** -0.570*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
RelativeSize 0.163 0.183 0.195 0.189 0.155 
 (0.418) (0.349) (0.324) (0.336) (0.448) 
Bidder MV 0.105* 0.111* 0.110** 0.092 0.115** 
 (0.063) (0.050) (0.049) (0.100) (0.047) 
Bidder M/B -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.824) (0.710) (0.864) (0.466) (0.781) 
Bidder ROA 0.255 -0.228 -0.194 -0.079 0.154 
 (0.646) (0.679) (0.725) (0.888) (0.794) 
Bidder Leverage -0.014 -0.020 -0.031 -0.024 -0.010 
 (0.851) (0.794) (0.676) (0.746) (0.898) 
Target MV -1.495*** -1.506*** -1.507*** -1.490*** -1.509*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target M/B -0.040** -0.042** -0.045** -0.046** -0.039** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.027) (0.020) (0.044) 
Target ROA -2.267*** -2.400*** -2.408*** -2.486*** -2.210*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Leverage 0.048 0.048 0.055 0.056 0.044 
 (0.334) (0.347) (0.291) (0.275) (0.378) 
Year Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry  Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 5.697*** 6.431*** 5.842*** 6.086*** 5.467*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 
pseudo R2 0.512 0.510 0.509 0.506 0.520 
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Table 5.9: Robustness test: Do the market returns or peer pressures play a role in the firm’s risk-taking? 
This table presents results of logistic regressions of target risk on other variables that have influence on risk 
preferences. Dependent variable is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if targets are above the median values of 
their idiosyncratic volatility and below the median value of their stock price ending 30 days prior to the 
announcement date, 0 otherwise. Market 52-week high is defined as logarithmic term difference between the 
market index 52-week high and the market index 30 days prior to the takeover announcement date. Peer pressure 
reflects the extent to which the individual firm’s 52-week high deviated from the industry 52-week high median. 
It is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if the firm’s 52-week high lower than the industry’s 52-week high median, 
0 otherwise. Specification (1) report results of target risks on the market 52-week high. Specification (2) reports 
results of target risks on the firm’s peer pressure. Specification (3) report target risks on the bidder reference point 
which is the bidder 52-week high, controlling for both the market 52-week high and the industry’s pressure. All 
specifications control for a series of standard variables highlighted in the prior M&A literature, which are the same 
as those presented in specification (5) of Table 5.4. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is 
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * 
respectively.  
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Table 5.9. (Continued) 
Logit model. Target risks (1) (2) (3) 
Market 52-week high 2.060*  0.329 
 (0.086)  (0.786) 
Peer pressure  0.622*** 0.079 
  (0.000) (0.700) 
Bidder 52-week high   1.167*** 
   (0.000) 
Hostile 0.201 0.188 0.188 
 (0.522) (0.534) (0.529) 
Tender 0.107 0.085 0.026 
 (0.553) (0.638) (0.886) 
Diversification 0.191 0.185 0.178 
 (0.244) (0.264) (0.283) 
Stock 0.077 0.022 0.026 
 (0.706) (0.914) (0.901) 
Cash -0.566*** -0.581*** -0.559*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
RelativeSize 0.181 0.199 0.153 
 (0.352) (0.314) (0.452) 
Bidder MV 0.088 0.118** 0.108* 
 (0.113) (0.040) (0.062) 
Bidder M/B -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.520) (0.519) (0.535) 
Bidder ROA -0.154 -0.201 -0.051 
 (0.781) (0.721) (0.931) 
Bidder Leverage -0.026 -0.009 -0.006 
 (0.724) (0.901) (0.935) 
Target MV -1.490*** -1.496*** -1.501*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target M/B -0.045** -0.045** -0.043** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.032) 
Target ROA -2.478*** -2.320*** -2.283*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Target Leverage 0.052 0.047 0.045 
 (0.310) (0.342) (0.364) 
Year Y Y Y 
Industry  Y Y Y 
Constant 6.136*** 5.651*** 5.669*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2018 2018 2018 
pseudo R2 0.507 0.512 0.518 
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Table 5.10: Robustness test: Subsample tests 
This table presents results of logistic regression of target riskiness on bidder 52-week high by different deal 
samples. We partition the whole sample by the method of payment, whether the deal is a tender offer, whether the 
deal is diversified, and whether the deal is successful. Control variables are as the same as those in specification 
(5) of Table 5.4, and suppressed for the sake of brevity. Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-
value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** 
and * respectively. 
Logit model. Target risks Payment methods Tender offer 
  Cash Stock Mix Yes No 
Bidder 52-week high 2.012*** 0.467 2.118*** 2.470*** 0.909*** 
 (0.000) (0.279) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.003)    
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 5.981*** 8.711*** 3.877    7.185*** 5.985*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.162)    (0.000) (0.000)    
N 718 629 556    509 1482    
Pseudo R2 0.540 0.544 0.585    0.561 0.534    
 Diversification Successful   
  Yes No Yes No  
Bidder 52-week high 0.620 1.641*** 1.129*** 2.312***  
 (0.247) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.002)     
Controls Y Y Y Y  
Constant 5.474*** 6.285*** 6.063*** 7.688***  
 (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)     
N 659 1357    1587 395     
Pseudo R2 0.520 0.545    0.524 0.606      
  
Chapter 5. Tables 
289 
 
Table 5.11: Robustness test: OLS regressions of target idiosyncratic risk on the bidder reference point 
This table presents results of OLS regression of target idiosyncratic risks (TIR) on the bidder 52-week high (BRP), 
where target idiosyncratic risks are obtained from different estimation model used in the literature. The dependent 
variable of the first specification is total volatility of the target, which is the standard deviation of the target’s 
stock returns in the period of 1 month and 6 months prior to the takeover announcement date. Target idiosyncratic 
risks of specification (2) are calculated with the residuals obtained by the market model (MM_TIR). Target 
idiosyncratic risks of specification (3) are calculated with the residuals from Fama-French 4 factor model 
(FF4factor_TIR). Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. All regressions include the year and industry 
dummies. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, 
denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
OLS regressions (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Total Volatility  MM_TIR  FF4factor_TIR 
BRP 0.009***  0.010***  0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Hostile -0.002*  -0.003**  -0.003** 
 (0.086)  (0.017)  (0.020) 
Tender -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.150)  (0.121)  (0.126) 
Diversification 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.667)  (0.674)  (0.657) 
Stock 0.003***  0.002**  0.002** 
 (0.003)  (0.050)  (0.049) 
Cash -0.002*  -0.002**  -0.003*** 
 (0.059)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
RelativeSize 0.001  0.000  0.001 
 (0.557)  (0.578)  (0.564) 
Bidder MV 0.001***  0.001**  0.001** 
 (0.007)  (0.026)  (0.026) 
Bidder M/B 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Bidder ROA -0.013***  -0.010***  -0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Bidder Leverage 0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.988)  (0.474)  (0.463) 
Target MV -0.005***  -0.006***  -0.006*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Target M/B 0.000***  0.000*  0.000* 
 (0.009)  (0.079)  (0.087) 
Target ROA -0.022***  -0.024***  -0.024*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Target Leverage -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.980)  (0.789)  (0.812) 
Year Y  Y  Y 
Industry Y  Y  Y 
Constant 0.041***  0.046***  0.046*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
N 2018  2018  2018 
R2 0.610  0.599  0.599 
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Table 5.12: Robustness test: OLS regressions of bidder CARs on market-anticipated risks 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of bidder announcement returns on the market’s anticipated risks. 
We measure the market’s anticipated risks with an interactive term between target risks and the bidder reference 
point (BRP). The first three specifications measure the relation between bidder cumulative abnormal returns on 5 
days around the announcement date and calculated with the market model (CAR5mm) while the last three 
specifications reflect the relation between bidder cumulative abnormal returns on 3 days around the announcement 
date and calculated with the market-adjusted model (CAR3ma). Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 
5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted 
***, ** and * respectively.   
OLS regressions (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  Bidder CAR5mm   Bidder CAR3ma 
Target risks 0.0015  -0.0134**  -0.0028  -0.0111**  
 (0.740)  (0.017)  (0.485)  (0.026)    
BRP  0.0106 -0.0155   -0.0013 -0.0177**  
  (0.150) (0.115)   (0.837) (0.041)    
Target risks*BRP   0.0418***    0.0275**  
   (0.003)    (0.021)    
Hostile -0.0120* -0.0120* -0.0123*  -0.0109* -0.0109* -0.0111*   
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.076)  (0.070) (0.071) (0.065)    
Tender 0.0190*** 0.0184*** 0.0186***  0.0140*** 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Diversification -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0007 0.0004 0.0008    
 (0.934) (0.915) (0.968)  (0.854) (0.912) (0.824)    
Stock -0.0103* -0.0110** -0.0100*  -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0071    
 (0.062) (0.045) (0.065)  (0.108) (0.108) (0.138)    
Cash 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0256***  0.0290*** 0.0291*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
RelativeSize -0.0069 -0.0073 -0.0079  -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0035    
 (0.187) (0.153) (0.127)  (0.513) (0.581) (0.468)    
Bidder MV -0.0062*** -0.0060*** -0.0061***  -0.0054*** -0.0052*** -0.0054*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder M/B -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0008*  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000    
 (0.074) (0.066) (0.088)  (0.828) (0.823) (0.901)    
Bidder ROA 0.0623*** 0.0668*** 0.0721***  0.0375** 0.0378** 0.0409**  
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.026) (0.024) (0.015)    
Bidder Leverage 0.0023 0.0024 0.0022  0.0007 0.0007 0.0005    
 (0.179) (0.154) (0.193)  (0.655) (0.642) (0.728)    
Constant 0.0305*** 0.0272*** 0.0332***  0.0257*** 0.0232*** 0.0294*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.006) (0.001)    
N 2017 2017 2017  2018 2018 2018    
R2 0.091 0.092 0.098   0.083 0.083 0.086    
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Table 5.13: Robustness test: OLS regressions of BHARs on market-anticipated risks 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of bidder buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) on the 
market’s anticipated risks. BHARs are calculated with the market-adjusted model. Dependent variable of the first 
three specifications is BHARs over 12 months after the completion of a merger (BHAR12ma), while dependent 
variable of the last three specifications is BHARs over 24 months after the completion of a merger (BHAR24ma). 
Variable definitions are as in the notes of Table 5.2. P-value is reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, denoted ***, ** and * respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (6)    
  BHAR12ma   BHAR24ma 
Target risks 0.0387   -0.0113      0.0489   -0.0143    
 (0.149)  (0.742)     (0.196)  (0.767)    
BRP  0.0244 -0.0820*     0.0522 -0.0729    
  (0.525) (0.071)      (0.273) (0.224)    
Target risks*BRP   0.1565**     0.1843**  
   (0.032)       (0.045)    
Hostile -0.0301 -0.0309 -0.0322     0.0571 0.0560 0.0544    
 (0.497) (0.486) (0.469)     (0.348) (0.359) (0.372)    
Tender 0.0137 0.0102 0.0138     0.0241 0.0183 0.0225    
 (0.597) (0.692) (0.592)     (0.515) (0.620) (0.543)    
Diversification -0.0420* -0.0383* -0.0417*    -0.0466 -0.0425 -0.0464    
 (0.064) (0.088) (0.066)     (0.143) (0.177) (0.145)    
Stock -0.0404 -0.0411 -0.0378     -0.0931** -0.0954** -0.0915**  
 (0.188) (0.183) (0.220)     (0.024) (0.021) (0.028)    
Cash 0.0085 0.0087 0.0080     0.0077 0.0081 0.0073    
 (0.744) (0.739) (0.758)     (0.835) (0.826) (0.842)    
RelativeSize 0.0181 0.0099 0.0152     0.0393 0.0287 0.0348    
 (0.531) (0.724) (0.602)     (0.309) (0.441) (0.372)    
Bidder MV 0.0091 0.0060 0.0092     0.0195** 0.0161** 0.0198**  
 (0.114) (0.278) (0.111)     (0.015) (0.037) (0.014)    
Bidder M/B -0.0039* -0.0039* -0.0037*    -0.0122*** -0.0122*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.065)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder ROA 0.2911*** 0.2888*** 0.3145***  0.4589*** 0.4651*** 0.4951*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bidder Leverage -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0023     0.0122 0.0125 0.0125    
 (0.830) (0.821) (0.821)     (0.326) (0.321) (0.320)    
Constant -0.0886 -0.0561 -0.0724     -0.1835** -0.1517** -0.1700**  
 (0.126) (0.305) (0.220)     (0.021) (0.042) (0.035)    
N 1867 1867 1867     1867 1867 1867    
R2 0.018 0.018 0.022      0.040 0.040 0.043    
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6.1. Main findings 
This thesis has investigated the reference point effect on M&As. The thesis allows the 
researcher to assess investors’ major investment decision-making processes in condition of 
risks. The thesis uses the firms’ 52-week highs as reference points since they are frequently 
reported by the media that shape investors’ minds, used by M&A participants to assess the 
M&A motive and performance. This thesis has contributed to M&A literature by enhancing 
this new strand of behavioural finance theory of M&As. It has become evident that firms’ 52-
week highs are as important indications for the firm’s bargaining power, managerial market-
timing, and risk-taking.  
 
The reference point theory has been investigated into many key aspects of M&As in this thesis. 
First, the target 52-week high effect was first applied in the U.K. setting, it was found that the 
reference point effect reinforces the target firm’s bargaining power in the scenarios where the 
takeover market is more competitive and bidders endure extensive information barriers. 
Secondly, both the bidder and the target reference prices were revealed to give important 
indications of the firm’s valuation to the market and the manager alike. The reference point 
theory accommodates implications of Shleifer and Vishny’s misvaluation hypothesis (2003), 
suggesting that bidder managers can time the market with the reference points. Thirdly, direct 
evidence was produced that the bidder reference price reflects the market risk appetiser, which 
is transferrable when bidder managers make M&A decisions according to market-anticipated 
risks. Besides, it was established that the reference point theory has strong explanatory value 
on many key aspects of M&As.  
 
Chapter 3 has investigated a sample of 451 domestic and 155 cross-border public M&As in the 
United Kingdom, affirming that the target reference point plays an essential role in bargaining 
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power. The results obtained in this chapter are consistent with Baker et al.’s U.S. findings 
(2012). It is suggested that the U.K. target is much easier to reinforce the bargaining power 
with its reference price, based on the rationale that the market is competitive compared with 
the United States. Unlike U.S. firms, whose corporate governance system is manager-oriented, 
U.K. firms have a shareholders-oriented corporate governance system where the reference 
point effect is stronger since managerial decisions are likely to rely on the reference point to 
convince their shareholders that interests of the two sides are closely aligned.   
 
According to these predictions, Chapter 3 has found a positive relationship between the target 
reference price and offer premiums, suggesting that the reference point effect is translated into 
a strong bargaining power of the target for high M&A offer premiums. Further analyses of the 
market reactions to bidders whose payment according to the target reference point show 
evidence of overpayment among domestic bidders, whereas there is little evidence of 
overpayment among cross-border bidders, suggesting that the market takes foreign bidders’ 
M&A offer premiums according to the target reference point for granted, unlike those paid by 
domestic bidders. Two possible explanations were advisable for this finding. First, domestic 
bidders are believed to have a more sophisticated networking than foreign bidders, meaning 
that they should have more private information to assess the value of the target firm to reduce 
M&A offer premiums, but paying according to the target reference price gives the market an 
indication that domestic bidders maybe overconfident. Secondly, it is believed that cross-
border bidders in order to enter a more competitive market to protect their shareholders’ rights 
tend to have a relatively weak bargaining position, thus offering a price in favour of the target.  
 
Chapter 3 has made two distinct contributions to the reference point theory of M&As. First, 
scenarios where the reference point effect was enhanced were found. The reference point effect 
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is strong in a more competitive market, as compared the findings of this chapter with those of 
the United States. The reference point is pronounced in the case of bidders lacking private 
information about the target. Secondly, the reference point theory is used to distinguish the 
M&A motives between cross-border and domestic bidders. The market regards domestic 
bidders’ offer premiums according to the target reference point as an overpayment, whilst 
supporting that of cross-border bidders whose offer premiums rely on the target reference point.  
 
Chapter 4 has thoroughly explored the reference point theory in M&A misvaluation. The 
reference point prices of the two firms involved were taken into considerations. A proxy of the 
relative reference point (RRP) was constructed to explain how bidders time the market. The 
results indicate that stocks are 1.04% more likely to be used for every 10% increase in the RRP, 
suggesting that bidders use stocks to dilute overvaluation when there is a sign of it according 
to the RRP. The findings also show that for a 10% increase in the RRP lead to an increase of 
M&A offer premiums by approximately 0.9%, suggesting that the sign of relative valuation 
make takeovers costly. Despite paying according to the RRP incurring negative announcement 
returns, offer premiums are positively related to the long-run performance of the stock bidders, 
indicating the RRP facilities market-timing.  
 
Chapter 4 has made three contributions to M&A literature. First, it reconciles the misvaluation 
hypothesis with the reference point theory of M&As. A new proxy was proposed, based on the 
market perception of a firm’s valuation, to explain M&A misvaluation. The idea of using the 
RRP for misvaluation eliminates any concerns arising from the biases caused by a firm’s 
fundamentals. Secondly, direct evidence is offered showing that not only the market but also 
the managers are subject to reference-dependence bias. But they were found to treat the 
reference point differently, as the market reacts negatively to bid announcements holding that 
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bidders who pay according to the RRP are paying too much, whilst managers are concerned 
themselves with the interests of the shareholders in the long run. By looking at the RRP, bidders 
recognise the relatively more overvalued stocks and in exchange for less negative long-run 
performance. Thirdly, the RRP justifies the rationale of payment method choices. Lower M&A 
offer premiums are associated with cases where bidders pay with stocks instead of cash for 
larger RRP acquisitions, and conversely bidders paying with cash for a lower RRP acquisition 
than for a higher RRP acquisition.        
 
Chapter 5 has examined the role of the bidder reference point in the managerial risk-taking 
behaviour. One of the most important implications of the reference point is that people have a 
strong tendency to avoid loss. This implication was tested in the M&A context and the bidder 
reference point was proposed, which represents the extent to which a bidder’s current price 
deviates from the bidder 52-week high, capturing the market anticipation for a firm’s 
investment decisions. A significantly decline in performance relative to the bidder 52-week 
high motivates a great risk appetizer for the market, which also motivates the firm to take on 
risky projects so as to recover the loss. The measurement of target risks follows the proxy of 
Kumar (2009). It became clear that bidder managers select targets according to the market- 
anticipated risks and are rewarded by the market.  
 
Specifically, Chapter 5 has found a positive relationship between the riskiness of an M&A 
decision and the bidder reference point, suggesting that the market anticipates the M&A 
decision. A positive relationship between bidder announcement returns and the market-
anticipated risks was emerged, showing that bidders listening to the market would justify their 
M&A motives. It is also believed that bidders taking anticipated risks expose themselves to 
shareholders’ monitoring, pushing them to exhibit sufficient effort observed by the market. The 
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finding was verified by studying the bidder reference point effect on M&A offer premiums and 
the bidder long-term performance. Offer premiums were found to be significantly lower when 
M&A decisions are based on the market-anticipated risks, suggesting that managers who link 
their interests with those of their shareholders exhibit great efforts in negotiation. Further, the 
market-anticipated risks are positively related with long-term performance, suggesting that 
managers in the face of loss have a strong incentive to prove themselves good managers to 
avoid the risk of being replaced and so they work harder to integrate the firm’s resources.   
 
Chapter 5 has made two distinct contributions to previous literature. First, it uses the reference 
point theory to address managerial risk-taking behaviour in the M&A context. Managers take 
risks according to the bidder reference point, suggesting that the stock market serves as a risk 
transfer mechanism. Secondly, the market-anticipated risks were distinguished from 
unanticipated risks (i.e. risks driven by managerial overconfidence and agency problems), 
resulting in negative market reactions. Managers undertaking M&As are able to justify their 
motives by following the market-anticipated risks, and receive positive market reactions 
accordingly. It is clear that decisions made upon the market-anticipated risks improve a firm’s 
M&A performance.  
 
On the whole, this thesis has enhanced Baker et al.’s findings (2012) and explored reference 
point theory of M&A in a number of ways. The principal findings of this thesis suggest that 
the target 52-week high represents a role of the target’s bargaining power. When applying the 
reference point theory to the misvaluation hypothesis of M&As, the joint effects of the target 
and bidder reference point allow an assessment of the way of managers timing the market. 
Despite taking too many unanticipated risks in M&As end up value-destroying to the firm 
according to eariler M&A literature, Chapter 5 indicates that managers can rationalise their 
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risk-taking incentive by focusing on the bidder reference point, and performing this practise 
with caution and efforts can improve the firm’s M&A performance.    
 
The main findings of this thesis show that both institutional and individual investors are subject 
to reference-dependence bias, suggesting that it is a natural human nature response to make 
risky decisions in accordance with the reference point. However, managers and the market may 
value a firm differently even with the same information, as one of the main findings suggested 
in Chapter 4. Findings in Chapter 3 suggest that M&As are not only a bargaining game between 
the management teams of the two firms, but also a trade-off game between the managers and 
the shareholders in a firm. It is proposed that managers should always give a thought for the 
market when making major investment decisions. As Chapter 5 suggested, M&A decisions 
made based on the market’s anticipation convince shareholders that the firm works hard to 
protect the value of the firm, suggesting that managers would do whatever the market thinks 
right in the face of loss in firm’s performance.    
 
6.2. Implications, limitations and recommendations for future research  
Although the research was fruitful in finding results regarding the reference point effect on 
M&As, it is subject to a number of limitations, implying some proposals for future research. 
First, due to data availability, Chapter 3 has a small fraction of cross-border acquisitions in the 
U.K. market. Therefore, the reference point effect should be explored further by extending the 
sample into a worldwide cross-border acquisition sample. Further research should take into 
account some macro-economic factors, such as total trading volumes, and stock markets of the 
two countries whose firms are involved in the cross-border acquisition. Firms in a country with 
relatively strong in trading and high in stock market quality are more easily to reinforce the 
bargaining power, which is in line with Erel et al. (2012). It remains unexplored whether such 
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macro-economic factors make bidders to be less likely to focus on the target 52-week high, 
given the possibility that target shareholders are also willing to sell the firm to a relatively 
strong market regardless of the reference point effect. Meanwhile, the fact that the reference 
point effect is enhanced in a setting where the corporate governance system is strong is taken 
for granted in this thesis. However, it should be noted that firms’ corporate governance quality 
varies significantly, which requires inclusion of some corporate governance related proxies in 
the firm level.  
 
Secondly, Chapter 5 has employed a number of reference point candidates highlighted in 
previous literature as robustness tests for the bidder 52-week high. The regressions gave a 
simple indication that the firm 52-week high is the most suitable reference point effect. It 
should be expected that managers consider various reference point candidates, which requires 
the researcher to construct a composite index of reference points, including the firm-, the 
market-, and the sector-levels. By doing so, one should assign a weight for relevant reference 
point candidate, similar to an approach used by Hayward and Hambrick (1997), who 
constructed a composite index for the hubris management. In addition, this thesis only looks at 
public acquisitions since only publicly-listed firms have available 52-week high. However, it 
is worth noting that private acquisitions in which bidders encounter higher levels of information 
asymmetry should be a more suitable testing ground for the reference point effect. Although it 
is hard to find the reference point in private targets, it is proposed that efforts should be made 
to explore the reference point price of the bidder, for example, the unique characteristics of the 
bidders have undertaken many private acquisitions in the past.   
 
Finally, Chapter 5 has focused on the risk-taking incentive from the perspective of the market. 
The risk tolerance of the manager should also be taken into consideration. The consequence is 
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the question whether the firm that made a failed deal in the past is likely to take on a risky deal, 
as opposed to one that have made a successful deal. In other words, the completion status of 
the prior deal may be employed as a reference point for a current M&A decision. Though 
Chapter 5 suggests that market-anticipated risks improve a firm’s M&A performance, it 
remains unexplored that the market-unanticipated risks effect on the firm’s M&A performance 
by including managerial overconfidence and corporate governance related proxies. This 
Chapter also draws several implications for practitioners. Managers should be concerned about 
stock market signals while making major investment decisions, since the market will inform 
the firm how many risks it is willing the firm to take. Managers who do not listen to the market 
will be judged as overconfidence or irresponsibility. The researcher shows that taking risks 
does not necessarily lead to bad outcomes if that they are justifiable. Though quantifying risk 
magnitude is not an easy task according to March and Shapira’s view (1987), this researcher 
indicates a possible timing for managerial investment decisions, which is largely explained in 
the framework of the reference point theory of M&As. 
 
Overall, the idea of using a firm’s reference points should also be applied in certain areas where 
managers have an opportunity to time the market, such as SEOs, equity issuance, and in the 
settings where the levels of information asymmetry are high. 
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